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Re: Secure dynamic JS compilation under CSP

From: David Bruant <bruant.d@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 22:31:58 +0200
Message-ID: <50086EBE.9020705@gmail.com>
To: Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>
CC: John J Barton <johnjbarton@johnjbarton.com>, public-webappsec@w3.org
Le 19/07/2012 22:21, Adam Barth a écrit :
> On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 12:48 PM, John J Barton
> <johnjbarton@johnjbarton.com> wrote:
>> My point is that eval() is not intrinsically unsafe. The ultimate problem is
>> failure of network security. Removing eval() because the network is
>> insecure makes the platform weaker. We should -- as CSP does in other
>> ways -- make the network more secure.
> That's why Content-Security-Policy, as a whole, gives developers the
> option of whether to take the risk of enabling eval for their site.
I'm glad to learn eval can be re-enabled.

> We use the term 'unsafe-eval' to indiciate that enabling this feature
> does introduce some amount of risk.  In Chrome Extensions, we've
> adopted a stricter policy than is appropriate for the web at large.
Backward compat aside, I disagree. If the scripting security model could
be revised, I would make the exact same choice than the Chrome
Extensions did, specifically disabling eval&friends by default (but
enabling as opt-in) as well as disabling inline scripts which are an
awful feature from the security point of view, because it's basically
saying to any attacker "drop your script, I'll execute it anyhow".

Received on Thursday, 19 July 2012 20:33:17 UTC

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