- From: David Lin-Shung Huang <linshung.huang@sv.cmu.edu>
- Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2012 10:40:47 -0700
- To: Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>
- Cc: Eric Chen <eric.chen@sv.cmu.edu>, Odin Hørthe Omdal <odinho@opera.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAGiwpwiw4rVW27sDL42wBf0AyTCOwA9EqKeWUJ+tqsOw4OPEEA@mail.gmail.com>
Yeah, perhaps ad might use CSP to disable DNT extensions..? On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 10:37 AM, Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com> wrote: > http://www.schemehostport.com/2011/10/priority-of-constituencies.html > > On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 10:29 AM, Eric Chen <eric.chen@sv.cmu.edu> wrote: > > I'm not sure if this idea has been discussed before, but why not have a > CSP > > policy that disables extensions? Disabling extensions entirely is > probably > > better than half-breaking extensions. > > > > > > -- > > -EC > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 29, 2012 at 4:34 AM, Odin Hørthe Omdal <odinho@opera.com> > wrote: > >> > >> Hello all :-) > >> > >> I've gotten some internal web site author feedback trying to implement > CSP > >> on a web email service that I'd like to share and discuss. > >> > >> There's of course a few minor things that will get better with time. > Like > >> browsers using prefixes and different implementations of different > >> versions of the spec. As well as some potential bugs found, such as > using > >> an same-domain iframe with an email in it, and then rewriting links > >> therein to do target=_blank, and it was suddenly blocked. They had to > open > >> up frame-src: * in order for the links to open. From my cursory reading > of > >> the spec, it does seem like this is in fact intended behaviour, but I'm > >> not sure. > >> > >> The biggest problem however is the interference of pages' CSP policies > >> when an extension goes mucking around the page doing whatever it likes > to > >> do. > >> > >> This is not the same as having a CSP-profile on the extension, as Chrome > >> is doing, but the other way around: > >> > >>> Extensions can > >>> inject arbitrary javascript, css into the page and modify the DOM in > any > >>> way. Depending on the CSP policy, those will potentially be blocked. > The > >>> most annoying thing is that those might break your extension or the > page > >>> in subtle ways because some things the extension does work (DOM > >>> manipulations), but other things fail (scripts/css injection). > >>> Additionally changes that do fail will generate heaps of false positive > >>> feedback reports, making the reporting feature a pain to sift through > >>> and work out "now is this a problem with my CSP poilicy, or is it some > >>> extension the users installed that's trying to modify the page in some > >>> way". > >>> > >>> I don't see any realistic solution to this. You'd have to track a whole > >>> bunch of manipulations and changes to the DOM as either "done by the > >>> page" or "done by an extension" to work out if they should be allowed > or > >>> not. > >>> > >>> So at first I thought "what a great idea", but after two days of > messing > >>> around and actually trying to use it, I decided that it might be > >>> bordering on unuseable in the real world > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> I have not looked into it myself, but this is a very valid concern if we > >> were to implement it in Opera. What have you that have implemented this > >> already done about it? How does it work? Is really extensions crippled > in > >> such a way, do they have to think about it? > >> > >> -- > >> Odin Hørthe Omdal (Velmont/odinho) · Core, Opera Software, > >> http://opera.com > >> > > > >
Received on Wednesday, 29 August 2012 17:41:18 UTC