- From: James M. Greene <james.m.greene@gmail.com>
- Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2015 15:17:02 -0500
- To: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@google.com>
- Cc: public-webapps <public-webapps@w3.org>, Olli Pettay <olli@pettay.fi>
- Message-ID: <CALrbKZg8dwc0gNq+LeQ19kYjRqvbmrFFQLbzpzDA4CjaMjdLzA@mail.gmail.com>
Why we would exclude any data formats that the browsers currently already support copying today? Definitely not a fan of that idea offhand. Is it not possible for a malicious image to be displayed (or display as broken) in Chrome and allow a user to choose "Copy Image" from that element's context menu? If not, how is that protection/prevention achieved today? Could the same process to applied to outgoing copy/cut operations and incoming paste operations? Sincerely, James M. Greene On Jun 9, 2015 2:19 PM, "Daniel Cheng" <dcheng@google.com> wrote: > I'm not against considering more formats to be dangerous. =) > > In particular: > JS: I'm not support what context we'd ever want to support this, since we > go out of our way to try prevent XSS in HTML pastes. > XML: I wouldn't mind getting rid of this. XML parsers seem to have RCE > bugs on a semi-regular basis. > > Daniel > > On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 12:01 PM Olli Pettay <olli@pettay.fi> wrote: > >> On 06/09/2015 09:39 PM, Daniel Cheng wrote: >> > Currently, the Clipboard API [1] mandates support for a number of >> formats. Unfortunately, we do not believe it is possible to safely support >> writing a >> > number of formats to the clipboard: >> > - image/png >> > - image/jpg, image/jpeg >> > - image/gif >> > >> > If these types are supported, malicious web content can trivially write >> a malformed GIF/JPG/PNG to the clipboard and trigger code execution when >> > pasting in a program with a vulnerable image decoder. This provides a >> trivial way to bypass the sandbox that web content is usually in. >> > >> > Given this, I'd like to propose that we remove the above formats from >> the list of mandatory data types, and avoid adding support for any more >> complex >> > formats. >> > >> > Daniel >> > >> > [1] http://www.w3.org/TR/clipboard-apis/#mandatory-data-types-1 >> >> >> Why would text/html, application/xhtml+xml, image/svg+xml, >> application/xml, text/xml, application/javascript >> be any safer if the program which the data is pasted to has vulnerable >> html/xml/js parsing? >> >> >> -Olli >> >>
Received on Tuesday, 9 June 2015 20:17:31 UTC