Re: What I am missing

I don't disagree. But what is wrong with the notion of introducing an 
_additional_ layer of certification? Signed script and/or html would 
most certainly make it way harder to de-face a website or sneak 
malicious code into an environment.  I strongly believe that just for 
this reason alone, we should think about signed content - even without 
additional potentially unsafe functionality.

Michaela


On 11/19/2014 09:21 AM, Pradeep Kumar wrote:
>
> Michaela,
>
> As Josh said earlier, signing the code (somehow) will not enhance 
> security. It will open doors for more threats. It's better and more 
> open, transparent and in sync with the spirit of open web to give the 
> control to end user and not making them to relax today on behalf of 
> other signing authorities.
>
> On 19-Nov-2014 8:44 pm, "Michaela Merz" <michaela.merz@hermetos.com 
> <mailto:michaela.merz@hermetos.com>> wrote:
>
>     You are correct. But all those services are (thankfully) sand
>     boxed or read only. In order to make a browser into something even
>     more useful, you have to relax these security rules a bit. And
>     IMHO that *should* require signed code - in addition to the users
>     consent.
>
>     Michaela
>
>
>
>     On 11/19/2014 09:09 AM, Pradeep Kumar wrote:
>>
>>     Even today, browsers ask for permission for geolocation, local
>>     storage, camera etc... How it is different from current scenario?
>>
>>     On 19-Nov-2014 8:35 pm, "Michaela Merz"
>>     <michaela.merz@hermetos.com <mailto:michaela.merz@hermetos.com>>
>>     wrote:
>>
>>
>>         That is relevant and also not so. Because Java applets
>>         silently grant access to a out of sandbox functionality if
>>         signed. This is not what I am proposing. I am suggesting a
>>         model in which the sandbox model remains intact and users
>>         need to explicitly agree to access that would otherwise be
>>         prohibited.
>>
>>         Michaela
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>         On 11/19/2014 12:01 AM, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
>>
>>             On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 12:35 AM, Michaela Merz
>>             <michaela.merz@hermetos.com
>>             <mailto:michaela.merz@hermetos.com>> wrote:
>>
>>                 Well .. it would be a "all scripts signed" or "no
>>                 script signed" kind of a
>>                 deal. You can download malicious code everywhere -
>>                 not only as scripts.
>>                 Signed code doesn't protect against malicious or bad
>>                 code. It only
>>                 guarantees that the code is actually from the the
>>                 certificate owner .. and
>>                 has not been altered without the signers consent.
>>
>>             Seems relevant: "Java's Losing Security Legacy",
>>             http://threatpost.com/javas-losing-security-legacy and
>>             "Don't Sign
>>             that Applet!",
>>             https://www.cert.org/blogs/certcc/post.cfm?EntryID=158.
>>
>>             Dormann advises "don't sign" so that the code can't
>>             escape its sandbox
>>             and it stays restricted (malware regularly signs to do so).
>>
>>
>>
>

Received on Wednesday, 19 November 2014 15:27:59 UTC