- From: Michaela Merz <michaela.merz@hermetos.com>
- Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2014 09:03:48 -0600
- To: noloader@gmail.com
- CC: public-webapps WG <public-webapps@w3.org>
That is relevant and also not so. Because Java applets silently grant access to a out of sandbox functionality if signed. This is not what I am proposing. I am suggesting a model in which the sandbox model remains intact and users need to explicitly agree to access that would otherwise be prohibited. Michaela On 11/19/2014 12:01 AM, Jeffrey Walton wrote: > On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 12:35 AM, Michaela Merz > <michaela.merz@hermetos.com> wrote: >> Well .. it would be a "all scripts signed" or "no script signed" kind of a >> deal. You can download malicious code everywhere - not only as scripts. >> Signed code doesn't protect against malicious or bad code. It only >> guarantees that the code is actually from the the certificate owner .. and >> has not been altered without the signers consent. > Seems relevant: "Java’s Losing Security Legacy", > http://threatpost.com/javas-losing-security-legacy and "Don't Sign > that Applet!", https://www.cert.org/blogs/certcc/post.cfm?EntryID=158. > > Dormann advises "don't sign" so that the code can't escape its sandbox > and it stays restricted (malware regularly signs to do so).
Received on Wednesday, 19 November 2014 15:03:55 UTC