- From: Mark S. Miller <erights@google.com>
- Date: Tue, 4 May 2010 14:37:03 -0700
- To: Scott Wilson <scott.bradley.wilson@gmail.com>
- Cc: public-webapps WG <public-webapps@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <AANLkTil-tqCQuCR1PAbl-SNzgnZ672bqqw9a_B3B3Ahz@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, May 4, 2010 at 10:29 AM, Scott Wilson < scott.bradley.wilson@gmail.com> wrote: > I've just been reading through the WARP spec again, and in particular this > stood out: > > In the default policy, a user agent<http://www.w3.org/TR/widgets-access/#dfn-user-agent> > *must* deny access <http://www.w3.org/TR/widgets-access/#dfn-deny-access> > to network resources<http://www.w3.org/TR/widgets-access/#dfn-network-resource> external > to the widget by default, whether this access is requested through APIs > (e.g. XMLHttpRequest) or through markup (e.g. iframe, script, img). > > I'm not sure if this statement is actually helpful here. While it makes > sense that WARP defines policies that widen access beyond whatever the UA's > default policy may be, is it strictly necessary to define the default > policy? > > For example, this implies that a UA should actively block widgets using > JSONp, CORS, Google's Ajax libraries, CDNs, or even a widget just grabbing > its company's icon off their website in an img tag. > If these were limited to Uniform Messages, how much of a need would there still be to disallow them? What would the remaining threats be? > > Now there may be UAs who have a default policy that is this strict, but > requiring this to be the default policy as a conformance requirement for any > WARP implementation seems OTT. > > S > > > -- Cheers, --MarkM
Received on Tuesday, 4 May 2010 21:37:32 UTC