Re: [w3ctag/design-reviews] Private Proof API (Issue #1071)

toreini left a comment (w3ctag/design-reviews#1071)

Hi @arichiv , many thanks for this spec. Can you please have a look at these?

1) I have a question regarding the design of the protocol:
How does this spec resists against a fraudulent who want to impersonate an honest user?
Consider this scenario:
  - You are fraud or part of a fraud campaign that is small or medium sized, you use a malicious extension to record the message exchange (which is not an unreasonable assumption for fraud). 
  - As message is not bound to time or recorded nonce (to prevent tracking), you distribute it among dozen of other user agents. Each one will try to impersonate a user, relaying the same messages with the hope that one of them will pass the browser challenge (if the T* is predictable, which I think it is).
  - the above scenario may work with large scale or targeted fraud attacks too.

2) Also, The diagram in the explainer is confusing (and misleading) in many ways: for instance (but not limited too), client private key k and then, response k? are they different? Does it mean the private key is sent to the server?

Many thanks again,
Ehsan

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