- From: <sird@rckc.at>
- Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2010 10:04:10 +0800
- To: Ian Hickson <ian@hixie.ch>
- Cc: Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>, public-web-security@w3.org
- Message-ID: <8ba534861001191804k5b8ae1c1if828baee13aafbc0@mail.gmail.com>
Hmm, I agree with Adam Barth, bad developers <exist> in the world, and stupid filters that are surviving exist as well.. anyway I think that data: URIs should be on several blacklists already.. since they are vulnerable already on FF. And on another subject, data:text/sandboxed-html,<USER DATA> would be an awesome way to sandbox content inline, almost without the need of the sandbox="" element, but I would like to ask to reconsider to add a new argument for sandboxed content, to avoid old browsers from popping a download dialog: <iframe sandbox-src=""> Wouldn't that solve that specific issue? I can think that some people will just click download/open and on all browsers except IE8 it will run with localfilesystem access.. This way you also give a failsafe in case the UA doesn't support it <iframe sandbox-src="usercontent.php?id=1331" src="error-nosandbox.html"/> Anyway, regarding: On Sun, 6 Dec 2009, sird@rckc.at wrote: > > > > Starting from abarth message: > > http://sla.ckers.org/forum/read.php?13,31377#msg-31430 > > > > Anyway, maybe I misunderstood what he said, I thought he meant in chrome > it > > was a new and exclusive origin (different from the parent one) and my > tests > > sort of confirmed that. > > > > On firefox for example, the origin is something a little weird (that is > > probably the same maciej just explained). where you have a different > origin > > but access to parent/opener.. > > Is the current spec text satisfactory? > yes it is :) Greetings!! -- Eduardo http://www.sirdarckcat.net/ Sent from Hangzhou, 33, China On Wed, Jan 20, 2010 at 9:52 AM, Ian Hickson <ian@hixie.ch> wrote: > On Tue, 19 Jan 2010, Adam Barth wrote: > > On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 5:05 PM, Ian Hickson <ian@hixie.ch> wrote: > > > On Sun, 6 Dec 2009, Adam Barth wrote: > > >> In some sense, a site needs to vet all URLs for javascript URLs, but > > >> this behavior means that every time you see "javascript:" in an XSS > > >> filter, they're probably insecure unless you also see "data:" right > > >> next door. > > > > > > Any system relying on blacklisting URLs or schemes is just asking for > > > trouble. You simply cannot do a truly secure filtering mechanism with > > > anything but a pure whitelisting mechanism, where _everything_ is > > > whitelisted, including URL schemes. > > > > We've had this argument a couple of times. I worry that we're relying > > too much on authors using strong XSS filters. I don't have any solid > > data about how often folks use blacklist-based XSS filters. Anecdotally, > > I've certainly seen them in the wild. > > Sure, but they're (almost certainly) already vulnerable. We could argue > against almost any addition to the platform on the basis that it could > introduce a vulnerability in a blacklist-based filter. > > -- > Ian Hickson U+1047E )\._.,--....,'``. fL > http://ln.hixie.ch/ U+263A /, _.. \ _\ ;`._ ,. > Things that are impossible just take longer. `._.-(,_..'--(,_..'`-.;.' > >
Received on Wednesday, 20 January 2010 02:05:03 UTC