- From: Zhiheng Wang <zhihengw@google.com>
- Date: Fri, 22 Oct 2010 00:59:07 -0700
- To: Sigbjørn Vik <sigbjorn@opera.com>
- Cc: public-web-perf@w3.org
- Message-ID: <AANLkTinB3j+gxxTx8L3z1UpW3nvTQfrU8P3mfvwsNt47@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, Oct 22, 2010 at 12:29 AM, Sigbjørn Vik <sigbjorn@opera.com> wrote: > On Thu, 21 Oct 2010 19:00:56 +0200, Zhiheng Wang <zhihengw@google.com> > wrote: > > On Thu, Oct 21, 2010 at 7:46 AM, Sigbjørn Vik <sigbjorn@opera.com> wrote: >> >> I see the following note: >>> "Note: The relaxed same orgin policy doesn't provide sufficient >>> protection >>> against unauthorized visits accross documents. In shared hosting, an >>> untrusted third party is able to host an HTTP server at the same IP >>> address >>> but on a different port." >>> I must have missed this discussion, this is similar to the mail just sent >>> about cookie domains (here called relaxed same origin). I am not quite >>> sure >>> I understand what "unauthorized visits accross documents" means? >>> >>> >> ah, right, I missed this in the discussion yesterday. cookie domain >> doesn't work in cases like shared hosting, e.g., I have my web site on >> my.hosting.com and >> yours on yours.hotsting.com. We probably don't want to share information >> between them. >> > > Right, this is a potential problem. However, these domains already share > cookies, and such domains are rarely used for sensitive data[1]. Timing > information is not direct information either, only indirect, which at most > indicates if a user is logged in or not. > > My thought is that using a cookie domain will be of great benefit to > developers, and that it has little real-life negative impact on websites. Do > you foresee any practical problems doing this? > > [1] Maybe with the exception of people putting their personal documents > online to be available for themselves, but such use cases are unlikely to be > tricked by spoofing. > > Different sub-domain is only part of the story. Origin<http://www.w3.org/TR/html5/origin-0.html> refers to (schem, host, port), so different ports and schemes could be potential risk as well. It's a good point that they are sharing the same cookie already, so the additional negative impact by relaxing the SOP is at most incremental. I actually have a bit more thought after the previous email... The SOP doesn't seem to guarantee absolute safety either, e.g., some web services are already hosting UGC on the same domain but a user-specific path like some.domain.com/mystuff. Arguably though, some.domain.com *should* cover any potential security issues. Don't make me wrong. Cookie domain is also my favorite and I tend to agree that its benefit is greater than other concerns. :-) I just feel like bringing up the point for discussion. And if we all agree on using the cookie domain, we will go with it. thanks, Zhiheng > > -- > Sigbjørn Vik > Quality Assurance > Opera Software > >
Received on Friday, 22 October 2010 07:59:46 UTC