Re: ISSUE-133 - TAG role / makeup

On Mar 10, 2015, at 1:19 PM, David Singer <singer@apple.com> wrote:

> 
>> On Mar 10, 2015, at 12:17 , Linss, Peter <peter.linss@hp.com> wrote:
>> 
>> There's also another potential situation, which already exists, and isn't ameliorated by your proposed changes. What happens when W3C member X has a TAG member (elected or appointed) who's term does not expire in the current election, another employee of X is nominated for the election (presumably by a different W3C member who, under your rules, doesn't have a current TAG member) and wins. Under the exiting rules, both can't serve, but there's no explicit rule stating which must step down. 
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> The only way I can see this working is to have the member state that “if X is elected, then Y (the current member) will resign”.  Otherwise, why nominate in the first place?  But has this ever happened?  Is it likely to happen? 

This hasn’t happened to my knowledge, and it’s not a case I’m particularly worried about, I was just going through the possibilities of the algorithm and making sure the corner cases are covered. Yes, I work on specs for a living. Under the current process, if this should happen it is not deterministic which TAG member would resign, it could just as easily be the member just elected, which makes no sense. There would be an empty seat after the election, then most likely resulting in yet another by-election, which we should avoid.

If it ever should, I’m presuming the situation would most likely arise when the second employee of X is nominated by an different W3C member and there is contention within the ranks of member X. It would also conceivably be a tool the AC could use to force an existing TAG member out. Though my preference is that we create a formal recall process rather than require election gaming (and the recall process should also be effective against the AB, FWIW). 

If we had a recall process, then we could relax the membership requirements and allow honest people, acting in good faith, to do the right thing. While having a tool to remove bad behavior rather than try to create a constrictive rule structure to prevent bad behavior in the first place (which will never cover all cases anyway). Those types of constrictive rules tend to limit options to solve real problems and often cause more pain than they avoid.

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>> 
>> I propose that in this particular situation, the most recently elected TAG member retains their seat and the other steps down (it should also be called out in the nomination announcement that electing that TAG member would automatically cause the other to be removed). The vacated seat could then be immediately filled by the next-most preferred candidate in the election and we avoid needing a special election.
>> 
>> Or, we simply remove the restriction about multiple TAG members from a single W3C member... which is my actual preference.
> 
> David Singer
> Manager, Software Standards, Apple Inc.
>