Fwd: [MINUTES] W3C CCG CCG Verifiable Credentials for Education Task Force Call - 2023-05-08

Hello all,

Minutes for this past Monday’s call are below. If you’re interested in watching the video, you can access it here: https://meet.w3c-ccg.org/archives/w3c-ccg-education-2023-05-08.mp4 <https://meet.w3c-ccg.org/archives/w3c-ccg-education-2023-05-08.mp4>

Thanks,

Kerri

> Begin forwarded message:
> 
> From: CCG Minutes Bot <minutes@w3c-ccg.org>
> Subject: [MINUTES] W3C CCG CCG Verifiable Credentials for Education Task Force Call - 2023-05-08
> Date: May 11, 2023 at 4:53:33 PM EDT
> To: public-credentials@w3.org
> Resent-From: public-credentials@w3.org
> 
> Thanks to Our Robot Overlords for scribing this week!
> 
> The transcript for the call is now available here:
> 
> https://w3c-ccg.github.io/meetings/2023-05-08-vc-education/
> 
> Full text of the discussion follows for W3C archival purposes.
> Audio of the meeting is available at the following location:
> 
> https://w3c-ccg.github.io/meetings/2023-05-08-vc-education/audio.ogg
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
> VC for Education Task Force Transcript for 2023-05-08
> 
> Agenda:
>  https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-vc-edu/2023May/0003.html
> Topics:
>  1. IP Note
>  2. Call Notes
>  3. Introductions & Reintroductions
>  4. Announcements & Reminders
>  5. The Next Step in Digital Credentials — Hash-based Elision
> Organizer:
>  Kerri Lemoie
> Scribe:
>  Our Robot Overlords
> Present:
>  Kerri Lemoie, Stuart Freeman, Wolf McNally, Eric Shepherd, Greg 
>  Bernstein, Sharon Leu, TallTed // Ted Thibodeau (he/him) 
>  (OpenLinkSw.com), Christopher Allen, Phil L (P1), James 
>  Chartrand, TimG, Marty Reed, Hiroyuki Sano, Kaliya Young, Nis 
>  Jespersen , Kimberly Linson, Jeff O - HumanOS, Mahesh Balan - 
>  pocketcred.com, Chris Webber, Colin Reynolds, Ed Design Lab, 
>  Keith Kowal, David Mason, Dmitri Zagidulin, Andrew, Chandi 
>  Cumaranatunge, Jim Kelly, Elizabeth Millet, Lucy Yang, David 
>  Ward, PL/T3-ASU, Jim Goodell, Phil Barker
> 
> Our Robot Overlords are scribing.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Great hello everybody Welcome to the Monday May 
>  8th edition of the BBC edu task force called my name is Cary 
>  Illinois and I'm one of the co-chairs of the group and hosting 
>  today's call I'm going to go through some introductory 
>  boilerplate stuff that we do at the beginning of every call and 
>  then we will get to our main topic with Christopher Alan wolf 
>  McNally from blockchain Commons we're going to talk to us about a 
>  slut.
> Kerri Lemoie:   Active disclosure.
> 
> Topic: IP Note
> 
> Kerri Lemoie:  So first anyone can participate in these calls 
>  this is an open Community call and we welcome anyone also but 
>  note that if you are planning on participating on contributing to 
>  any of the specs at w3c or the ccg you should join the group and 
>  sign the paperwork and if you're curious about that information 
>  you can follow this link right here that I'll put it in the chat.
> <kerri_lemoie> join info: 
>  https://www.w3.org/community/credentials/join
> Kerri Lemoie:  I mean info Link in the chat right here.
> 
> Topic: Call Notes
> 
> Kerri Lemoie:  These calls are recorded the minutes are taken by 
>  this robot transcriber that is pretty smart the most part and 
>  also we are doing an audio recording and there is now a video 
>  recording we send out the minutes after the call you don't 
>  typically include the video right now but if you would like a 
>  video of this please feel free to reach out to the chairs I try 
>  to remember to send it out to the mailing list when I whenever I.
> Kerri Lemoie:   An excuse me so next let's talk.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Introductions and reintroductions is there anybody 
>  that's new to the call today that would like to introduce 
>  themselves or perhaps Christopher wolf would like to introduce 
>  themselves before we get started on the main topic today.
> 
> Topic: Introductions & Reintroductions
> 
> Christopher Allen:  Sure I'm Christopher Alan I am the former 
>  co-chair of the ccg and one of the co-authors of the didd 1.0 
>  standard and I also have founded and host rebooting web of trust 
>  which I hope you all have heard of we have another event coming 
>  up in Cologne in September 18th so I hope to see some of.
> Christopher Allen:   You in person there.
> Christopher Allen:  I don't think I've ever been to a VC edu 
>  meeting so this would be my first meeting wolf.
> Wolf_McNally: Ali Ali researcher for location Commons Christopher 
>  and I have been working for several years together on a variety 
>  of Open Standards that allow of the Privacy Community I think 
>  should be very interested in and so excited to be here this is my 
>  first meeting.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Awesome thank you both for joining us I think bed 
>  and touch on the ccg Carl says great to have you at our age you 
>  call this week anybody else here want to make any introductions 
>  or reintroductions.
> Kerri Lemoie:  There is one thing I forgot to mention is that we 
>  use a cue system on these calls just like most of the ccg calls 
>  to if you would like to you know participate in in the 
>  conversation just put a plus in the chat and if you take it take 
>  yourself out of the cutest type Cube - you can also use the 
>  little hand in the bottom of my dashboard is good see.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Here next part is announcement.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Announcements and reminders of anybody have any 
>  announcements for they would like to make today.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Coming up at you like a fill us in on just put 
>  yourself in the queue right this Leah look.
> 
> Topic: Announcements & Reminders
> 
> Kaliya Young:  Hi I will share again if you are based in Europe 
>  or working in Europe and want to join us we're having the digital 
>  identity unconference Europe or dice happening June 7 2009 in 
>  Zurich the eighth and the ninth are the main unconference day and 
>  there's a pre-conference.
> Kaliya Young:   Reference had a on the 7th.
> Kaliya Young:  It's less is Central.
> Kaliya Young:  I'll put a link to the registration in chat feel 
>  free to reach out a few questions too.
> Kerri Lemoie:  That's great thank you for Leah.
> Kerri Lemoie:  And you have the floor.
> Kaliya Young: https://diceurope.org/
> <kaliya_identitywoman> kaliya@identitywoman.net
> Colin_Reynolds,_Ed_Design_Lab: Hey good morning afternoon evening 
>  of all God's wanted to throw out there one of the sort of 
>  projects or things that someone my team and in our networking but 
>  working on are related to The Last Mile challenges from the 
>  employer perspective and HR Tech Menders specifically and some of 
>  the challenges and barriers associated with the consumption of 
>  digital credentials and skills data so we are actively working on 
>  kind of a series.
> Colin_Reynolds,_Ed_Design_Lab:  he's of convenings and in-person 
>  get.
> <christopher_allen> Rebooting Web of Trust 12 (aka RWOT), on 
>  September 18th, in Cologne Germany: 
>  https://www.eventbrite.com/e/rebooting-the-web-of-trust-12-2023-cologne-tickets-597232116337
> Colin_Reynolds,_Ed_Design_Lab: Over the next five six months and 
>  so if anyone on the call has any good relationships or interest 
>  in supporting good relationships with individuals who are in kind 
>  of that perspective space and The Last Mile Challenge then what 
>  about the connect put my email address in the chat but yeah we're 
>  really I think we you know the last mile is a is a complex 
>  challenge but I think the employers and engaging them in the 
>  conversation and some of these HR Tech group.
> Colin_Reynolds,_Ed_Design_Lab:  has been something we've heard a 
>  lot about and have some.
> Colin_Reynolds,_Ed_Design_Lab: Who are engaging us to dive into 
>  this work so just wanted to throw that out there you know wants 
>  to chat about it or has any good contacts that they think might 
>  be helpful.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Thank you calling I like to talk more about it at 
>  some point when you have a chance.
> Colin_Reynolds,_Ed_Design_Lab: Awesome you're gonna be in The 
>  Trusted learner now become conference coming up yeah.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Yes actually that was going to be why I put myself 
>  in the key so yes.
> Colin_Reynolds,_Ed_Design_Lab: All right I'll get out of the way 
>  let's shut them.
> Kerri Lemoie:  And also I just want to point out they Christopher 
>  Allen put a reboot of trust in the chat too oh you bet that's 
>  what you mentioned his first sorry that's the link to reboot I 
>  did for myself only when I think in there right now and the q1 
>  for the ASU tln on conference next week which runs at on Thursday 
>  next week I'm going to be running a workshop there that I'm 
>  hoping will be helpful to folks I'm still working through it 
>  because it's kind of challenging but.
> Kerri Lemoie:   It's about the language to describe.
> Kerri Lemoie: https://github.com/digitalbazaar/vc-render-method
> Kerri Lemoie:  Both credentials and education and Workforce so 
>  verifiable lers but sort of been leaning towards calling things 
>  lately so that folks could be able to take this Tech back to 
>  their communities and describe it in ways that are comfortable 
>  and familiar to them so I'm working on that for next week and 
>  then the other announcement that I had for all of you if you 
>  haven't seen it in the ccg there's been a new work item announced 
>  that is going to be really useful to this community this.
> Kerri Lemoie:   Is that the rendering methods work item put the 
>  link to the.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Reaper there and essentially what this is is 
>  making it possible for issuers to make suggestions as to how they 
>  think a credential should display in wallet well I won't have to 
>  necessarily pay attention to this but they could and so I work 
>  for the digital credential Consortium we work with universities 
>  and one use case for us for that is diplomas that institutions 
>  may want to say hey we're going to issue a VC version of this 
>  diploma but we would really have to look at.
> Kerri Lemoie:   This way.
> Kerri Lemoie:  And we're going to provide it.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Actions for the wireless to do that so if you are 
>  interested in in that work item please go do that repo and read 
>  through what they have there and and participate.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Okay so I think that is all for Nelson's and 
>  reminders for now if you think of anything feel free to cure 
>  yourself up later I'm going to know him things over to 
>  Christopher and wolf you do their announced do their presentation 
>  I'm going to put a link to it in the chat for all of you so that 
>  you have it.
> 
> Topic: The Next Step in Digital Credentials — Hash-based Elision
> 
> Christopher Allen:  Okay thank you thank you just booting up my 
>  screen.
> <kerri_lemoie> Presentation Link: 
>  https://tinyurl.com/gordian-educational-pdf
> Christopher Allen:  Okay I hope everybody can see that so I'm 
>  Christopher Allen from blockchain Commons you know our big goal 
>  is what we create an open interoperable secure and compassionate 
>  digital infrastructure to enable people to control their Destiny 
>  and to maintain their human dignity online we are particularly 
>  focused now on working with developer communities.
> Christopher Allen:  Tools for digital identity digital assets and 
>  responsible key management but these are based on our gordian 
>  principles are Guardian principles are for Independence privacy 
>  resilience and openness and those in turn are based on the self 
>  Sovereign identity principles so that is really kind of the 
>  context where we came into this.
> <colin_reynolds,_ed_design_lab> If you'd like to connect on the 
>  employer + HR Tech side of the Last Mile challenge, please send 
>  me an email: creynolds@eddesignlab.org
> Christopher Allen:  This discussion so obviously I've been 
>  involved in D IDs and verifiable credentials for a very long time 
>  I'm a co-author of the didd 1.0 standard and then I'm also a 
>  co-author of the TLs standard from the late 90s and I really 
>  wanted to talk with you as you know we I think you guys have done 
>  a great job with schemas and VC group has done a great job.
> Christopher Allen:  Model I just really wanted us to take the 
>  next step and the next step is significantly more privacy so 
>  clearly digital credentials are a better way of sharing when we 
>  wouldn't be in this meeting today if we didn't believe that to be 
>  true I mean they simplify Administration you know you just create 
>  this thing that is a digital version of what you've done in the 
>  past you digitally sign it you put your public keys in a pki and 
>  to a certain extent that's relatively simple you know.
> Christopher Allen:   You're publishing.
> <kerri_lemoie> Announcement that I forgot: ELM Webinar this Thurs 
>  May 11, 2-4pm CET 
>  https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7059946834986754048
> Christopher Allen:  The you know they allow you to simplify your 
>  usage the students can use them as they will it's not Institute 
>  necessary for you know a staffer an institution to verify because 
>  the signature does that and of course there's no phone home that 
>  that's actually one of the first useful things from a verifiable 
>  credentials model is that the holder can basically get it 
>  verified without having to call home.
> Christopher Allen:  Which could cause privacy problems but I also 
>  feel like digital credentials can be dangerous all that we've 
>  done with them is right now make them better but we haven't 
>  necessarily addressed the the problem so in particular how do you 
>  protect student privacy so you know a subclass of that is how do 
>  you protect against discrimination against students but possibly 
>  even.
> Christopher Allen:   I'm more important especially.
> <kerri_lemoie> Fixed presentation link: 
>  https://tinyurl.com/gordian-educational-pdf
> Christopher Allen:  Group which is working directly with 
>  universities and other educational institutions is how do we 
>  reduce liability especially given laws like gdpr the CCPA in 
>  California and I've been involved with even more digital privacy 
>  laws that are emerging so what are the problems of digital 
>  credentials well obviously an important one is identity theft you 
>  know you get three points of data about somebody and.
> Christopher Allen:   And you know you're on.
> Christopher Allen:  Well on the path of understanding who they 
>  are why they are what are their weaknesses what are their 
>  strengths excetera so we're always trying to minimize this and 
>  credentials even educational credentials contain a huge amount of 
>  info and a lot of stuff is you know not properly boxed so 
>  oftentimes you'll have you know personal identification issue to 
>  allow for Authentication.
> Christopher Allen:   Action which.
> Christopher Allen:  Nothing to do with the credential data so you 
>  know oftentimes in there will be things like birthdays you know 
>  real names various ID numbers and these are often used by other 
>  parties as identity questions but specific data can cause 
>  problems too so let's talk about that a little bit gender 
>  discrimination so at the last rebooting we had a young woman from 
>  Eastern Europe.
> Christopher Allen:  Who was a doctoral candidate come and her 
>  basic thing was you know a she's already dealing with gender 
>  discrimination but then she also graduated from a central 
>  European University so she's also discriminated against as 
>  central European and her name sounds ethnic and so she's also 
>  potentially discriminated on a religious.
> Christopher Allen:   All data.
> Christopher Allen:  That's going to be on her her credentials in 
>  addition to that it may have their birthplace in may have various 
>  issuer location information other things that can be used for 
>  racial or other things there's age discrimination when I last 
>  taught in an MBA program number of my students were in their 50s 
>  and you know in the years since that I've communicated with them 
>  despite.
> Christopher Allen:   Getting their MBA.
> Christopher Allen:  They felt discriminated against because of 
>  their age at least the initial interviews with people so 
>  faith-based school information whether or not it's a religious 
>  school or something that gives a clue about religious details can 
>  also be used and then you know in the basic problem is the more 
>  data the more problems so how do we solve this and one of the 
>  simplest Solutions is something that we call holder based 
>  Elysian.
> Christopher Allen:   So what is this.
> Christopher Allen:  Session is the data field credentials should 
>  be out shouldn't be out in the wild as much as possible instead 
>  let the holder redact the information as they see fit now note 
>  very carefully I'm not saying subject I'm saying the holder 
>  redact information yes the subject is the first holder but there 
>  are a variety of reasons as these go back out to HR departments 
>  out to various accrediting bodies or Loan review bodies Etc where 
>  they become.
> Christopher Allen:   Um holders and they to me.
> Christopher Allen:  To redact potentially in different ways that 
>  meet their needs so this allows all the parties to you know 
>  eliminate potential discriminatory information or partially 
>  reveal it but the holder still have the full credential when it's 
>  needed because the signatures will still verify that's the 
>  question of data retention deletion.
> Christopher Allen:  And Etc becomes more of an issue for the 
>  holder and of course the holders Wallet not the educational 
>  institution so how do we how does this work so I'm going to talk 
>  about one particular approach to it this is from blockchain 
>  Commons wolf is the implementer and it basically starts with a 
>  hash I presume that everybody here knows you know what is a hash 
>  I mean it's a data fingerprint you can see here the input is 
>  hello.
> Christopher Allen:  A 256-bit hash we also have beside it here as 
>  something called a life hash which is a visual version of that 
>  that was invented by wolf because it's really hard to read those 
>  numbers I mean on everybody I know looks at like the first three 
>  in the last three which isn't as secure but if you see both the 
>  hash and a life print you can feel much more confident that two 
>  hashes are the same.
> Christopher Allen:   We very small.
> Christopher Allen:  Changing the input from a no to a gnome Lotto 
>  makes for a drastic change both in the hash and in the Life print 
>  so that's what pastures are there fixed size no matter what the 
>  size of the input is you can kind of consider them to be the 
>  ultimate in lossy compression and hashes are one way you can pack 
>  them out and they're really a long series of numbers but again 
>  they can be made more visually visible so what does hash-based 
>  elisions so.
> Christopher Allen:   Right now when you sign a document.
> <kerri_lemoie> ASU TLN Unconference: 
>  https://tech.asu.edu/events/2023-tln-unconference
> Christopher Allen:  And then you remove the data you can no 
>  longer verify the signatures so you're kind of stuck without the 
>  data so how do we allow the holder to remove the data without 
>  invalidating the signature so instead of signing the the input 
>  we're basically signing the hash now you could say it's pretty 
>  obvious because that's actually technically underneath the scenes 
>  what actually is happening but we're making this even more 
>  explicit and designing it in the.
> Christopher Allen:  The key thing is that with the data is 
>  removed the hash remains in the document when the Hat when the 
>  data is restored you can verify that the data is Hash matches the 
>  hash in the document so let's take this up to the next level what 
>  is a tree of hashes so data can be arranged in a tree oops and 
>  for some reason I'm not seeing the tree image there it is the all 
>  similar data is kept in the same.
> Christopher Allen:   Branch for credentials.
> Christopher Allen:  All of us.
> Christopher Allen:  Students personally identifiable information 
>  might be in one branch all of their qualifications might be 
>  another this organization continues down from there now this 
>  allows us to Allied specific types of envelope so how does this 
>  work you know every bit has its own hash and you know it you know 
>  is reflected all the way up to the root hash this is a really old 
>  and you know consider to be mature technology the Merkle tree.
> Christopher Allen:   Was invented in.
> Christopher Allen:  It was one of the first cryptography things 
>  so we know how to do this well so what is hash-based Elysian well 
>  if a document is a tree of hashes than any change anywhere will 
>  invalidate the signatures so you know we see here we sign this 
>  route document and it's basically you know anything changes and 
>  Below boom it propagates other upward and now the signature no 
>  longer verifies because the hashes different right.
> Christopher Allen:   Pretty Basics but with hash.
> Christopher Allen:  The document is a tree of hashes not a tree 
>  of the actual data than any branch can be removed while leaving 
>  the hash behind so that all the higher-level signatures can be 
>  evaluated so in this case the root is also signed but we can 
>  choose to Allied this particular document let's say that this is 
>  my age and I don't want to send that to somebody it removes 
>  certain information about me I can send this.
> Christopher Allen:   Along to someone else and.
> Christopher Allen:  Given that a lighted information the 
>  signature still verifies and maybe they don't care or not are not 
>  supposed to care about my age they don't need that extra alighted 
>  information so this really allows for data minimization which is 
>  the Cornerstone of privacy the basic reveal reveal no more than 
>  what is needed you know that's the bottom line any kind of data 
>  minimization and my opinion requires some.
> Christopher Allen:   Um system of selecting.
> Christopher Allen:  Are there and there are a number of other 
>  approaches I think this is one of the better ones because holder 
>  based hash based religion makes students allows student holders 
>  to make all of the initial decisions about how things are going 
>  to be shared so you know as people creating these credentials why 
>  do we care so we want meaningful credentials but we also want to 
>  protect students and their Futures we want to protect vulnerable 
>  populations that are.
> Christopher Allen:   Coming to our schools.
> Christopher Allen:  Students are particularly vulnerable they're 
>  young they're away from home they're away from their support 
>  systems their way often times from their own cultures we have to 
>  protect them and then of course we value diversity and we want to 
>  protect the diversity in our institutions and but we also want 
>  people to be able to leave our institutions and get great jobs 
>  and careers and support our institutions in the future.
> Christopher Allen:   Some other ways that it helps Institution.
> Christopher Allen:  As you don't have the admin of a light and 
>  credentials the institution does not have to understand what the 
>  risk requirements of a you know a somebody who is the third party 
>  and a verifiable credential you know the person that is hiring 
>  the student now has some information about the students 
>  credentials and they have very different needs they may need to 
>  prove hey I've got 10 people in my organization who have these 
>  qualifications.
> Christopher Allen:   Ins to some other body but they don't want 
>  to give the people.
> Christopher Allen:  Names or anything.
> Christopher Allen:  Allows other parties to to poach those 
>  students those employees so they have a different holding and 
>  Elysian requirement than what is needed the institution doesn't 
>  need to have to understand this and how this works or enable it 
>  it's just automatic with Gordy and envelope thus they also don't 
>  have the liability of overfull credentials you know having too 
>  much data in there because it is all a Lie To Believe.
> Christopher Allen:   By the by.
> Christopher Allen:  This lowers your responsibility I probably 
>  should have put a legal caveat here you still have 
>  responsibilities in GDP are but it lowers your responsibility for 
>  gdpr because some of it is and you know specific to the holder 
>  institutional compliance Elysian can also protect institutions 
>  from violating laws so for instance often time institutions need 
>  to be able to say this number of students graduated to somebody.
> Christopher Allen:   That is loaning money to students and wanted 
>  to make sure that the.
> Christopher Allen:  Doing that how do you exchange all of this 
>  thing to know what is the status of you know these students 
>  without violating their privacy well with Elysian you can prove 
>  yes we have these number of students and this number of students 
>  is employed and you know the the hash tree works and the and 
>  compliance rules work for this and but I'm not giving you the 
>  names of the students and names of the instead of the.
> Christopher Allen:   The their employees.
> Christopher Allen:  This is particularly important in the United 
>  States because of FERPA and the ppra which has very very strong 
>  requirements as far as how information about students is passed 
>  forward and I think a lot of Institutions are in violation in the 
>  sense that you know they're doing stuff that allows others to 
>  violate the Privacy so.
> Christopher Allen:   I don't think there's any case.
> Christopher Allen:  It pulls it back to him but institutions can 
>  clearly do better in your there isn't a specific law around 
>  student information but gdpr is pretty Broad and of course CCPA 
>  and California is you know kind of a variant cjd PR ish some pros 
>  and cons but there's a whole bunch more coming data supporting 
>  data minimization can really help you provide compliance for a 
>  lot of these different kinds of rules and regulations.
> Christopher Allen:  So that is in general what is elision and why 
>  it's important specific to gordian envelope are some additional 
>  features so there's this concept of something called a proof of 
>  inclusion so instead of having an individual certificate you can 
>  basically sign the root hash and publish it with no other 
>  information then when someone reveals.
> Christopher Allen:   Their document to say oh.
> Christopher Allen:  You know I'm a student only the necessary 
>  hashes are revealed between the students credential and this root 
>  hash and that allows for a lot of interesting use cases so that's 
>  one that's one thing we really wanted to support natively one of 
>  the particular ones that I really like with this is something 
>  called heard privacy the institution can give every student or 
>  credential like they do now but with some additional information.
> Christopher Allen:  You know where are they in the cohort and 
>  then it all the institution has to do is publish the public root 
>  for the entire cohort so instead of giving out you know a 
>  thousand graduation credentials certificate credential great 
>  credentials and all this type of stuff for a cohort of students 
>  you can just publish a public you know a public route and the 
>  students can choose to to prove that they were.
> Christopher Allen:   Part of that particular court.
> Christopher Allen:  Graduating class or the you know quarterly 
>  ending public root of something this allows for a lot of 
>  additional anti-correlation capabilities and such it is however 
>  different than the classic verifiable credentials model so there 
>  would have to be some adjustment to think about it because in 
>  some sense as you this is a giant verifiable credential for 
>  everybody in the class rather than a you know per individual per.
> Christopher Allen:   Per subject.
> Christopher Allen:  More I'm going the wrong direction sorry.
> Christopher Allen:  So again the student can prove inclusion in a 
>  cohort also another aspect of gordian envelope is that we allow 
>  for a lot of different kinds of elisions so Gordy and envelope 
>  I'm sure all of you are comfortable and familiar with triples you 
>  know Alice knows Bob in this particular case and the gordian 
>  envelope anode is the the kind of the the leaf hash of Allah.
> Christopher Allen:   Less its assertions Who and the nose and.
> Christopher Allen:  You can see the Hat there are five hashes 
>  here we can Allied the subject we can say that somebody knows Bob 
>  and have it be signed we can say that Alice has some relationship 
>  to Bob but not what that specific relationship is we can say 
>  Alice knows somebody yeah we're has some predicate there and we 
>  can also just say Alice has a number of.
> Christopher Allen:   Oceans but we're not going to.
> Christopher Allen:  Many and of course there is just the ability 
>  to have the single hash route where everything is a lighted this 
>  gives for a lot more choices as compared to some other Elysian 
>  spec so right now these are the four major ones there's SD jaw 
>  twitch is being run through the ietf it leverages the verifiable 
>  credentials jot Echo System dif uses a lot of.
> Christopher Allen:   Of those it's.
> Christopher Allen:  Needed to the iso mdl and MDOC standards that 
>  are being used for mobile driver's license you know for a lot of 
>  people if they like it because it doesn't require schemas which 
>  you know if you're familiar with this area that's a complicated 
>  pro and con a particular con is that the hash list is not a tree 
>  they basically elide a whole claim from a list.
> Christopher Allen:   So they basically the list of claims and 
>  they say well we're going.
> Christopher Allen:  You know three five and nine so it is not 
>  quite as flexible As a treat version of it there's LD Merkel 
>  disclosure which I think is a little less mature but there is a 
>  w3c doc on it the particular advantages of it is that it 
>  leverages the json-ld echo system which I believe the vce you 
>  community is losing its particularly convenient.
> Christopher Allen:   For node graph data.
> Christopher Allen:  But again it is a you know a hash list not a 
>  tree you're just basically being able to allocate Allied an 
>  entire claim and it does require you to have a node graph 
>  structure for your data and a schema for it to properly work 
>  Gordy it envelope is ours its data structure agnostic meaning you 
>  can do graphs you can do lists you can do schemas or no schemas 
>  you can even do different.
> Christopher Allen:   Kinds of graphs you can do node graphs you 
>  can.
> Christopher Allen:  Edge graphs Etc so that gives it a lot more 
>  capability that this is why we can offer things like redaction 
>  inclusion proofs heard privacy that I discussed earlier but we 
>  can also encrypt data we can put you know is something in escrow 
>  and still be able to verify it signed if it's a large object we 
>  can press it and then we have some special capabilities as far as 
>  secret sharing the cons is it's not W3 cvcc.
> Christopher Allen:   Trick in some ways it's a little bit below 
>  the VC it's useful for many other purposes also.
> Christopher Allen:  IDs and other data but it's not on a 
>  standards track we have submitted it to the ietf and we hope at 
>  some point it will be standards track but it's not been a you 
>  know accepted by an existing working group yet finally we have 
>  BBS plus signature which is being run through the ietf but are 
>  active people in both the dif and w3c communities in regarding 
>  regarding it.
> Christopher Allen:   Its main advantage is that it allows for.
> Christopher Allen:  Signatures that's something hash Collision 
>  can't do because what happens with it as you're offering proof of 
>  knowledge of an undisclosed the signature and then correlating 
>  that it's a powerful feature it doesn't use hashes and instead 
>  uses a brand-new cryptography I would even argue two layers of it 
>  it uses pairing cryptography and then it uses new cut 
>  cryptography on top of pairing cryptography the combination of.
> Christopher Allen:   Of this makes it more complicated.
> Christopher Allen:  There are it's a little bit more complicated 
>  to do holder based elision scenarios but it's still a very 
>  powerful technology.
> Christopher Allen:  Digital credentials are powerful simple 
>  Productions credentials do not protect privacy both the holder 
>  and the issue issue or have risks they're also transient they can 
>  be lost there's too much information we need strong safe 
>  credentials with control by the holder the ability to alai 
>  maintenance of signatures through hashing and proofs for further 
>  data minimization and I really need to put this call to action 
>  here holder based.
> Christopher Allen:   Collision is crucial for privacy.
> Christopher Allen:  It can do more I mean I if you're supporting 
>  BBS plus proofs fabulous that doesn't mean that you shouldn't 
>  also be considering holder base to listen we really need to turn 
>  some of these oh well maybe we can do some privacy things maybe 
>  we should do some privacy things and start putting them in musts 
>  I'd like to see more specs more groups saying this must be done 
>  could because legally data minimization really is a requirement 
>  so.
> Christopher Allen:   Why aren't we doing that.
> Christopher Allen:  Ethically if you're part of the self 
>  Sovereign Community you've also said that user control is a 
>  requirement so we need to turn these in the musts we'd love for 
>  you to use gordian envelope because it has some of these 
>  additional features capabilities privacy Etc but if not please 
>  please use one of these other Elysian specs for your base so more 
>  on gordian Tiny you.
> Christopher Allen:   Your url.
> <kerri_lemoie> INTRO TO GORDIAN ENVELOPE: 
>  https://tinyurl.com/gordian-envelope
> <kerri_lemoie> GORDIAN ENVELOPE VIDEOS: 
>  https://tinyurl.com/gordian-videos
> <kerri_lemoie> EDUCATIONAL USE CASES: 
>  https://tinyurl.com/gordian-educational
> Christopher Allen:  Elope there's also a bunch of very useful 
>  videos and transcripts of videos Etc at this URL tinyurl tinyurl 
>  gordian hyphen videos and then specifically there is this 
>  educational use case where we've tried to describe you know the 
>  utility of gordian for for that and I'll quickly show you what 
>  that looks like so this is the educational use case.
> Christopher Allen:   You know we talked about.
> Christopher Allen:  Various would call this a progressive use 
>  case various official credentials she restricts them somebody 
>  wants to hire her she gives them their information later there's 
>  an open badge and then three kind of progressive heard privacy 
>  credentials we'd really like to see contributions from this 
>  community to take this educational and credential industry use 
>  case forward I think.
> Christopher Allen:   That's it.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Thank you Christopher is still a lot but also 
>  really interesting and important I have I'm free to thank you I 
>  see if we have fill in the cube I have a question for you to 
>  controlling could you explain to us how how would a wallet how 
>  would a VC wallet Implement something like ordering envelopes so 
>  that an individual would know that they have the option to you 
>  know share limited pieces of data.
> Kerri Lemoie:   And also how would a verifier.
> Kerri Lemoie:  That so how would you apply this to the software 
>  simplest kind of the suffer we have now you know.
> Christopher Allen:  Correct so I mean one of the problems with 
>  any of these types of things is it does put a greater burden not 
>  just on the the provider of the information in the form of the 
>  holder but also the verifier in the information so my kind of 
>  take on it is it needs to be incentivize hand-in-hand because to 
>  a certain extent the holders don't want the information I mean 
>  the non subject holders don't want the information either becomes 
>  toxic.
> Christopher Allen:   Asic data so we really want to you know 
>  create systems.
> Christopher Allen: 
>  https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/rwot11-the-hague/blob/master/draft-documents/selective-correlation.md
> Christopher Allen:  Are the the verifier goes this is the 
>  information I must have and so we've actually kind of written a 
>  at rebooting we have this draft paper called selective disclosure 
>  I'll send put the link in the chat the talks about a different 
>  way of thinking about things which is we really need to deeply 
>  understand you know what we.
> Christopher Allen:   Want and need to be correlated.
> Christopher Allen:  So that's part of it I think there's a lot of 
>  exploration to in ux of how to do this without overwhelming users 
>  you know my hope is that as we you know look carefully at these 
>  schemas and such that we maybe break them apart a little bit more 
>  it's one of the advantages of the tree structure that gordian has 
>  because on one hand and institution who is.
> Christopher Allen:   You know making.
> Christopher Allen:  About authentication information of a user 
>  which allows you know the you know it's kind of like the student 
>  ID type stuff for the purpose of then separately being able to 
>  validate the credential keeping those separate really helps and 
>  then within the credential itself you know having it have sub 
>  credentials and things of that nature will also help you X in 
>  this so one of the other things is I've written an article on 
>  something called Progressive.
> Christopher Allen:   Rest of trust.
> Christopher Allen: 
>  https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/musings-progressive-trust/
> Christopher Allen:  I think that anybody who's implementing this 
>  type of thing has to think in this sense there is a there's a 
>  desire among developers in this community which is O going to get 
>  this blob and I'm going to throw the blob into a box and the box 
>  is going to Glow green and say go you're done okay I just don't 
>  think that's the way the world works in the in in its patterns of 
>  trust things are much more gray than that you know you only.
> Christopher Allen:   We want the information.
> Christopher Allen:  The risks that you're having at the moment so 
>  that means the the the verifiers need to be able to throw these 
>  blobs into the box and box come back it's okay but it might just 
>  need one more thing and then go ask for the one more thing and 
>  then the user can basically say well do I really want to do this 
>  I mean why are they asking me for this one more thing and I 
>  basically can decide no I don't want to give him this one more 
>  thing you know it's.
> Christopher Allen:   I don't need this.
> Christopher Allen:  Of that bad I've got other applicants who 
>  aren't asking for that information I hope that helps.
> Wolf_McNally: Yeah I look at something too if that's okay.
> Wolf_McNally: Yeah so what we tried to do with envelope is design 
>  a substrate that is very flexible and because of the tree 
>  structure is because tremendous and you can have these triples 
>  which are assertions but you can also have assertion Zahn the 
>  assertions as many levels as you want and so there's many 
>  possible structures that could emerge to make this easier for 
>  users one would be and of course you know a nose in substrate 
>  we'd like to see people start to create tools and standards 
>  around this substrate for instance you could provide.
> Wolf_McNally:  templates that say okay for a particular purpose 
>  here's the required information.
> Wolf_McNally: This credential that we need and then you apply the 
>  template and it shows you in one step essentially what's being a 
>  lighted because and only with the required information is left 
>  another possibility is that issuers can actually put assertions 
>  on various parts of the data saying this is potentially 
>  discriminatory and so the user can just use a tool to say 
>  eliminate all potentially discriminatory information or let me 
>  review it so I can decide what to Allied so there's a lot of ways 
>  that these documents can be both constructive.
> Wolf_McNally:  and and manipulated such that the user actually 
>  has a lot of transparency into the kind of information they're 
>  providing are choosing not to provide.
> Christopher Allen:  Yeah just to be clear on that one of the 
>  differences between the sort of the node graph model of json-ld 
>  is that you know you you have this triple and then you have one 
>  more value that you can add to that triple which allows for the 
>  quad to function and do ordering and other different types of 
>  things we're not limited to that kind of structure so you know 
>  you.
> Christopher Allen:   You can basically have.
> Christopher Allen:  Certian zor multiple predicate surround the 
>  same claim so you can have all kinds of annotation sub 
>  annotations of things and in fact even the predicates can be 
>  envelopes so they can have multiple assertions about the 
>  predicate to say oh this is an owl schema this is a you know this 
>  is a you know belongs to such and such a template or whatever so 
>  again it's a lot depends on whether or not you.
> Christopher Allen:   Want to go up to the full flexibility.
> Christopher Allen:  Gordy and envelope if you're using json-ld 
>  jot or nuts ild it's anyhow you're if you're using one of the 
>  selective disclosure Alternatives in the jaw or json-ld system 
>  you won't be able to take advantage of those but it you know you 
>  can at least say you know this one claim you know I don't want to 
>  share.
> Wolf_McNally: Yeah I'd also had the the Christopher went to this 
>  5 illusion points in a document of course that applies to the you 
>  know all the way down the the tree but any of those illusion 
>  points can also be encrypted public symmetrical encrypted public 
>  key encrypted split into shares which can be distributed to a 
>  group of parties where a quorum is required to actually 
>  reconstruct the secret and compressed things like that they're 
>  all available illusion obviously is one way of protecting 
>  information such as the holder has.
> Wolf_McNally:  tourist provide the information but it could be 
>  encrypted or other kinds of escrow so it's very flexible.
> Kerri Lemoie:  It's very interesting I'm going to I'm going to 
>  oversimplify and then really feel I'm going to hand it over to 
>  you in a second we work with the open badges spent quite a bit in 
>  the space right now because it's the one that's really like a 
>  line to BC so far pretty closely and education could it be so 
>  simple as that spec includes a property that says this is where 
>  you put this if somebody just wants to know that this person say 
>  it's a diploma they just won't know if they wanted to graduate.
> Kerri Lemoie:   And then we add a property for that.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Would that be useful.
> Christopher Allen:  There has been discussion in some other 
>  places where admits another format you know you know Jason or 
>  whatever there is a gordian spot inside it gordian is uses see 
>  bore if you're familiar with that so that's a binary expression 
>  language that is determined we use a particular variant of Sabor 
>  called.
> Christopher Allen:   DC borer which is.
> Christopher Allen:  Some deterministic variant so our data is 
>  binary but that being said it can be because of the you know how 
>  we've done the layers you can encode it any way you want you can 
>  turn it into boring hex you can have used various other 
>  compression things or whatever but it is a self describing format 
>  and there are some real advantages to using Seaboard directly and 
>  that is a you know an ietf standard and there's lots of tooling 
>  out there for it the it.
> Christopher Allen:   It but it isn't Jason.
> Christopher Allen:  I mean you obviously can you know put it into 
>  a Jason statement but it's not Jason.
> Kerri Lemoie:  It does help thank you Phil Long you have the 
>  floor now thank you for your patience.
> PL/T3-ASU: Can you hear me clearly a complex topic I just had a 
>  really simple question at the very beginning you mentioned that 
>  you were able to doing this eliminates the check the sections of 
>  the tree that you relied in and presumably that means it's 
>  actually not transmitted it's it's not hashing those things that 
>  the individual receiving it can't.
> PL/T3-ASU:  view and.
> Kerri Lemoie: CBOR: https://cbor.io/
> PL/T3-ASU: Translate or otherwise recover the information in it 
>  it's removing it from the actual credential that is true that is 
>  transmitted and received by the.
> Christopher Allen:  That is correct so I mean there are some 
>  subtleties here again we're trying to keep this simple not use a 
>  whole bunch of advanced cryptography and things and you know I 
>  can talk to you exactly when you must really do BBS plus proofs 
>  or things of that nature but most of the time 99% of the time you 
>  just basically either want to provide the data the data don't 
>  provide the data.
> Christopher Allen:   And then there's sort of an arc.
> Christopher Allen:  You going to solve the data for 
>  anti-correlation so again this requires a different sense of 
>  thinking we do have a sense sometimes in the as a trust architect 
>  it's like oh everything should be selectively disclosed you know 
>  disclosed we should you know you know nothing should be 
>  correlative all etcetera but I think you have to turn that upside 
>  down and say no you need to design very carefully there are some 
>  things that must be correlated or won't work because it's the 
>  whole point of a car.
> Christopher Allen:   Essentials your correlating that somebody 
>  graduated with a person who graduated and.
> Christopher Allen:  So there is.
> Christopher Allen:  Nation things that are important but you know 
>  what is the Persistence of that correlation you know an 
>  institution doesn't need signature privacy a user might you know 
>  so you can salt things such that you know things can't be reused 
>  or somebody can't try to play games but in some cases salting you 
>  know not salting can be advantageous so there are some design 
>  considerations will.
> Wolf_McNally: If I can give a quick really quick you know 
>  intuitive kind understanding of this if a person's name is John 
>  Smith and you hash that you get a particular you know a 
>  fingerprint back and if you know at that fingerprint is for John 
>  Smith you can search a large database fine every hash that's 
>  identical and say oh this correlates to John Smith so 
>  theoretically if you have unsalted hashes you can find every John 
>  Smith in the database without that data being actually present 
>  just by its hash so Christopher Ford assaulting salty.
> Wolf_McNally:  because it's.
> Wolf_McNally: Because you can have a certian saint anything you 
>  can have random data asserted on which is called salt asserted on 
>  a name and therefore what that does because that's part of the 
>  tree of that name when the name is lighted the hash is unique in 
>  the whole world and so you can have 15,000 John Smith's and every 
>  single one of them in this kind of document will have a different 
>  hash on their name and you won't be able to correlate them so 
>  that's the kind of thing Foresters talking about.
> PL/T3-ASU: That's a good that's a good example I think thank you.
> Christopher Allen:  So yeah and just to be also clear so the the 
>  SD jaw and LD Merkel both have salting in them but they're in 
>  order to say space in the case of the SD jot they basically have 
>  one salt and then they basically create children salts from that 
>  one salt.
> Christopher Allen:   Each has some pros and.
> Christopher Allen:  It means you're only salting the individual 
>  you know once you're only having to put you know a few bites in / 
>  the entire Prudential but it also really limits what you can do 
>  there and one of the consequences of that is they often you know 
>  they kind of have two blobs here are the things that can be 
>  alighted and then here's the things that can't be delighted in 
>  gordian there isn't really a difference everything would be a 
>  lighted so.
> PL/T3-ASU: If I can if I can ask one other quick question you 
>  mentioned that gordian aligns with both Edge graphs as well as as 
>  node graphs that would suggest then that property graphs are 
>  natively supportable within okay just wanted to clarify.
> Kerri Lemoie:  Thank you hash I see you in the queue here you 
>  have the floor.
> Mahesh_Balan_-_pocketcred.com: Thank you great presentation 
>  Christopher and work for just a quick question maybe this is very 
>  clear to everybody else but you know I just wanted to clarify so 
>  in the example you just gave about let's say that John Smith 
>  really wants to reveal his name to you know an institution so 
>  that they can know that it is John Smith so how does the verifier 
>  actually decrypt any piece of disclosed information right.
> Mahesh_Balan_-_pocketcred.com:  whatever they disclose How do 
>  they.
> Mahesh_Balan_-_pocketcred.com: 10 and know who you are right.
> Christopher Allen:  So in that sense you know what if you give 
>  somebody your name you know so I'm John I'm Christopher Alan you 
>  know I graduated and here is my credential to you know hiring 
>  institution you have the the in that particular institution that 
>  hiring body has that information it's not encrypted okay and it's 
>  very easy to tell that the educational institution has.
> Christopher Allen:  It because there's a signature associated 
>  with it and you know and there's the ongoing problem okay so now 
>  how do you identify that I'm Christopher Allen and that can be 
>  done within the credential in some way or some external method of 
>  doing that authentication Etc the the heart the harder problem is 
>  that let's say I'm applying for a job okay and the job says I 
>  need to have a laser welding safety certificate for that job.
> Christopher Allen:   Okay so.
> Christopher Allen:  Up that I can basically prove that I have 
>  that and I can give them a you know idid and how to contact me 
>  with it whatever but I don't need to give them that I'm you know 
>  that I'm Mohammed Joan Muhammad something and I got my degree 
>  from an accredited institution in in Central Europe I can just 
>  basically say you know I have a degree from a European 
>  credentialed school and I.
> Christopher Allen:   Have this have.
> Christopher Allen:  Particular credential that you are asking for 
>  and now you know are you interested in interviewing me and if 
>  you're not interested in interviewing me I'm not gonna give you 
>  any more information so there this is what I mean by Progressive 
>  disclosure and again I have a whole article on you know kind of 
>  what the implications of that are so the next step is that you 
>  know the company comes back and says yeah you know we're only 
>  like you know what information you've given you we've given you 
>  we'd like an interview you may reveal some.
> Christopher Allen:   Other information which might be how a 
>  contact you and zoom links and other.
> Christopher Allen:  Different things of that.
> Christopher Allen:  Nature endorsements in the form of badges 
>  personal endorsements I've been long encouraging Kim Hamilton to 
>  put peer endorsements into the schemas that you guys are working 
>  on he'll present a few of those again being sensitive to privacy 
>  and when they actually make you an offer and you accept that 
>  offer that's when you might actually give all here is my 
>  equivalent of social security number I might prove that I have I 
>  can have a.
> Christopher Allen:   Field that's basically.
> Christopher Allen:  You know social security number is alighted 
>  and signed by another institution that basically says yes we have 
>  their social security number so we actually does have a Social 
>  Security number not to give it to you until you give me a job 
>  because you don't need it until I you give me a job so that's 
>  Progressive trust it you know that is you know I think 
>  increasingly how we have to think about our designs.
> Christopher Allen: https://lifehash.info
> Mahesh_Balan_-_pocketcred.com: Super I find might slip in another 
>  question I was really curious about the graphic display of the 
>  hash itself seems very fascinating as a human way of kind of you 
>  know interpreting what is just a jumble of numbers so is there 
>  some you can you say a few words about it as to what kind of 
>  technology that is.
> <kerri_lemoie> We'll close after this question.
> Christopher Allen:  Sure so what I'm going to do is I'm going to 
>  put in the the the link to the life hash page and if you take a 
>  look at that page wolf we'll talk about it.
> Wolf_McNally: Yeah so life hash was my conception and 
>  implementation as a kid I became familiar with an algorithm that 
>  is John Conway's Game of Life which is not really a game at the 
>  cellular Atacama automata and it produces these patterns which 
>  are very concerned with very simple to simple grid of black and 
>  white squares and it involves a long very kind of organic lines 
>  as you watch it and I was inspired to create what's called often 
>  called a a visual.
> Wolf_McNally:  hash based on the idea that because you give it 
>  unique input you get unique output.
> Wolf_McNally: Using a number of techniques to have retained the 
>  whole history of this evolving pattern called life and then using 
>  mirroring and coloring to make it even more kind of interpret 
>  what people's minds I was able to come up with a system where 
>  pretty much any two pieces of data can go in and even if they 
>  were similar they come up with very different visuals and you 
>  know and they're very difficult to it's very difficult to come up 
>  with two pieces of data that actually come up with visually 
>  indistinguishable hashes.
> Wolf_McNally:  I want impossible I think and so we published this 
>  is an open-source specification we.
> Wolf_McNally: Limitations other people have converted from 
>  patient other languages so we're very happy to see that it's 
>  being adopted in kind of inspiring people as well and that's part 
>  of our mission is to you know be compassionate about these kinds 
>  of things working with long strings of numbers especially trying 
>  to find you know where they might differ is not a very easy 
>  cognitive tasks and so you know from a ux perspective you know 
>  this isn't the only system that does these kinds of visual hashes 
>  this is the one we developed and we think it has a lot of.
> Wolf_McNally:  of kind of.
> Wolf_McNally: Approachability compared to some others and yeah so 
>  and all the information is there and I hashed out in fact you can 
>  enter strings and see the life has changed you know Generate 
>  random life hashes and kind of compare them and kind of see for 
>  yourself and then download the software and and the plate 
>  yourself so it's just open for anybody to use.
> Christopher Allen:  And of course to be clear from a 
>  cryptographers perspective there we do not have a proof that this 
>  is as strong a hash that this visual hash is as strong a hash as 
>  a sha-256 or you know even md5 the but that's not the point you 
>  know we do have strong machine-readable hashes that allow for 
>  that have the cryptographic details that we need.
> Christopher Allen:   We just need.
> Christopher Allen:  Additional hint to users and this this helps 
>  you know.
> Wolf_McNally: Yeah we often recommend this be used in conjunction 
>  with at least like eight digits of the of a hash itself of the 
>  Apple hexadecimal digits and that way users have kind of 
>  multimodal ways of quickly verifying that a hash is the same 
>  across providers.
> Mahesh_Balan_-_pocketcred.com: Excellent thank you so much.
> <pl/t3-asu> Gotta run - Thank you Christopher & Wolf
> <christopher_allen> ChristopherA@LifeWithAlacrity.com
> Kerri Lemoie:  Thank you for the question Christopher and well 
>  thank you very much for coming here today we appreciate this I'll 
>  get the minutes published soon so thanks again everybody thanks 
>  for being here good week you next week take care.
> Christopher Allen:  Thank you everybody I put my email and 
>  contact information.
> Christopher Allen:  Thank you everybody.
> Wolf_McNally: Thank you it's great.
> 
>