- From: Amir Herzberg <herzbea@macs.biu.ac.il>
- Date: Tue, 13 Jun 2006 18:57:06 +0300
- To: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
- CC: public-usable-authentication@w3.org
James A. Donald wrote: > > Amir Herzberg wrote: > > we can easily turn one password into many > > site-specific keys. Plus, we can try to force users to > > use different passwords (which, of course, is not as > > good, but easier to do - see problems below). > > > > There are `only` two problems: 1. This requires the > > password manager to set or change the user's password. > > This _can_ be done, but since no standard exists for > > this, this is problematic. A standard may help. 2. > > What happens when the user moves to a new machine, > > etc.? > > User has master password, which he gives to the program > that manages all his logins and site specific passwords sure > > Login program uses master password, plus a large random > number locally stored on the computer, to generate > account specific passwords for each account. this already requires us to change passwords (problem 1). This is tricky, I wish we could standardize this. Or, any tips on how we do this? We actually are implementing , you know this makes life harder.. > > Oops, we are on a new computer? Random number is not > there? Then do an SRP login to the server of the > company issuing the login program, and get a copy of the > large random number. This means that the company > issuing the login program can launch a dictionary attack > on your master password, as can anyone who has access to > one of your logins and access to a computer on which you > used the login program, but no one else can launch a > dictionary attack. Do you mean to authenticate to the `login helper trusted party (LHTP)` using as a shared key the hash of your master password, and they'll send the user's `random number` ? That does seem a reasonable solution. Tks, Amir Herzberg
Received on Tuesday, 13 June 2006 15:57:48 UTC