Re: [Execution and Security Model] Proposal from Samsung Electronics

>> But I definitely think that our ultimate goal should be to move as
>> many of the APIs to as low level as possible. Or at least as much as
>> possible for the various APIs to as low level as possible. So for
>> example the SMS API might have a subset which is only exposed to
>> certified apps, whereas the ability to be notified of incoming
>> messages is exposed to privileged apps, and the ability to read the
>> database of stored messages is exposed to normal apps. (Just to pull
>> an example out of thin air).
>
> Why would the SMS API be limited to certified applications? A privileged
> application is an application that has been marked as privileged by a
> store that has been marked as privileged by the runtime. Why should we
> expect such an application to not behave correctly? If Firefox OS or
> Tizen or Webinos trusts a store and that store trusts an application
> whether because the code has been reviewed or the author is trusted.
On Android, would you trust all applications available via the Play 
Store? Or in other words - would you trust all of them the same? Or do 
you also look at user ratings, download numbers, who the author is, etc?
You gave a good example in your other email, where you wrote about SMS 
API being abused by an app that was trusted enough to use it...

> If
> we still can't give the right to such an application to send SMS', we
> are whether being too cautious or that means we do not believe the
> security model is working and in that case, we should fix it.
And I think what we're doing now is designing the security model, having 
in mind other solutions currently on the market.

/Janusz

Received on Tuesday, 26 February 2013 09:25:35 UTC