- From: Emmanuel Revah <stsil@manurevah.com>
- Date: Tue, 14 May 2013 10:09:45 +0200
- To: public-restrictedmedia@w3.org
On 2013/05/14 08:49, Henri Sivonen wrote: > In the DRM case, Alice runs a CDM in order to watch movies to which > Cecil own the copyright from a streaming service operated by Bob. The > adversary is Alice, so the CDM runs on a computer controlled by the > adversary. This is an issue with trust. Alice must trust Cecil's CDM because/and Cecil does not trust Alice. Alice is an authorised user, she is either logged in to her account or the content is publicly available, yet still, to consume the media properly Alice must put her faith in Cecil's honnest intentions to control her browser. In this evironment everyone should be wary of each other. Why should Alice trust Cecil to not have malicious intentions ? What about Cecil2 ? Are all the Cecil's well intentioned ? This has been mentionned before (I think over a year ago) but I will repeat: Why are the clients treated as adversaries ? This is a bug. > publishing the source code > for the CDM makes developing the obfuscating compiler postulated in > the previous paragraph a more difficult engineering undertaking than > developing an obfuscating compiler that may rely on the secrecy of the > CDM source code. And this is why a 100% Free Software/Open Source browser will not function with DRM'd content. The user must install a non-free CDM to render the media. The specifications may be open, but the implementation is not. -- Emmanuel Revah http://manurevah.com
Received on Tuesday, 14 May 2013 08:33:22 UTC