- From: Nathan <nathan@webr3.org>
- Date: Wed, 03 Nov 2010 21:31:50 +0000
- To: Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>
- CC: RDFa WG <public-rdfa-wg@w3.org>
Manu Sporny wrote: > Just noting this here as it popped into my head while dealing with some > SSL-related browser issues. > > When a web page and its associated resources are loaded over TLS, the > browser will provide a graphical warning (usually in the URL bar website > icon) if there are some resources that were loaded over a non-TLS > connection into the page. This is usually triggered whenever there are > images, or CSS files that were loaded over an HTTP vs. and HTTPS > connection. The browsers do this because an image or CSS file might > trick the person browsing into doing something that is unsafe. > > @profile falls into this category, if a @profile is compromised, it may > generate the wrong triples in a page. If one is operating on RDF triples > via the RDFa API on a page that was loaded via HTTPS, and the @profile > was loaded via HTTP, there is a possible security vulnerability there. > > I can't think of an attack that could do a serious amount of damage at > this point, as the RDFa API does not exist and RDF page data is probably > not used to drive logic at this point in time. > > Just throwing this out there as I do think that we would want to ensure > that the browsers that implement RDFa Core "fail to load a profile" when > a profile is loaded from an HTTPS page in non-HTTPS mode. It's really > implementation guidance, but perhaps something that should be placed > into the RDFa API spec or the RDFa Core spec? > > Thoughts? Agree that it's an issue which needs noted in some form, probably offering some guidance for both Profile authors and users; and probably within the RDFa API. Personally if I was creating an RDFa Profile then I would publish it at both http:// and https:// locations, and encourage authors to reference it by a URI-reference of the following form: profile="//example.org/my/rdfa-profile" Thus negating the issue. Best, Nathan
Received on Wednesday, 3 November 2010 21:32:52 UTC