Re: Technical Review of EME (DRM in HTML5)

Manu Sporny:
> More importantly, who is going to be using Clear Key in production?

Clear Key was introduced as a red herring to "prove" that open CDMs are
possible. That is also the reason for the contradictory statements made
by proponents of EME regarding Clear Key.

> It would be even better if a goal was to provide a decent open source
> CDM so that companies like Mozilla don't get screwed over by the
> royalties from content protection companies.

This is not only about Open Source browsers. EME first of all is an
attack on Open Source operating systems (especially Linux distributions).

>> 4. Does increasing the attack surface on a browser via completely 
>> closed DRM plug-in modules pose any privacy risks? How do you know 
>> that the DRM module isn't tracking everything you're doing online if 
>> people can't verify the source.

EME is a Trojan Horse which would enable privacy violations. One of the
supporters of EME (Google) promotes or promoted such technologies.

Below I have appended a quote from March 2012 from Widevine ("a Google
Company") regarding "silent monitoring".

That is one of the reasons why it is a shame that the W3C is involved in
helping to create a Trojan Horse enabling evil things like this.

Cheers,
Andreas
---

"Here's How It Works:
Content is encrypted, stored and distributed to the user who then
watches it in a browser or video player. During playback, encrypted
content has been decrypted and the video is now vulnerable to piracy
simply by downloading a free software tools such as screen scrapers and
stream recorders which can pirate the video stream to a DRM-free file.

In the background, Widevine’s digital copy protection solution monitors
for the acceptable usage of content. If a user attempts to use a screen
scraper or other piracy method, Digital Copy Protection will detect this
and produce a number of customizable responses from silent monitoring to
revocation of viewing rights."
http://www.widevine.com/digital_copy_protection.html
(page no longer exists)

Received on Wednesday, 30 January 2013 09:39:36 UTC