Re: Formal objection to Encrypted Media Extensions progressing to Proposed Recommendation without greater user protection

On Tue, Aug 16, 2016 at 11:41 AM, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:

>
>
> On 08/16/2016 07:51 PM, David Singer wrote:
> > I think you are confusing DRM and EME.  They are not the same.
>
> Actually, as pointed out by Ruben's email I just read, clearKey would
> count as DRM and be covered by the DMCA - and is part of the EME spec. I
> hadn't thought that through earlier but it's a very good point. The
> addition of clearKey would likely made EME itself covered by the DMCA.
>

​IANAL, but I think a case could be made that Clear Key is not an
"effective" protection measure, since the key is available, well, in the
clear. Certainly, no one would call it a "DRM".
​


>
> Regardless of the clearKey specifics,  EME exists to enable access to a
> CDM in a manner standardized across browser, and is thus part of a
> DRM-enabled system.
>
> >
> > EME can be shipped as an intrinsic part of the browser. The user will be
> asked to install XYZ DRM by any operating system I can think of. If they
> agree and consent to that, you’re asking for an extra step “do you also
> agree to enable access to this module from your browser?’, when in all
> likelihood that is the very reason they chose to install it.
>
> However, the OS is outside control of the W3C and does not have any
> standards. Thus, we cannot guarantee there will be agreement and
> consent. So I don't think you can just shove this step to the OS, but it
> should be required by the spec and done in *browser*.
> >
> > It makes no sense to me. It doesn’t deal with any risk you have so far
> enumerated.
>
> I would suggest just revisitng the Wikpedia page and following the large
> number of links. Note they go beyond security research, including
> problems with innovation. Accessibility concerns have also been raised.
> These are not new issues, but well-known. Which is why Steve Jobs took a
> stand against DRM:
>
> https://www.engadget.com/2007/02/06/a-letter-from-steve-
> jobs-on-drm-lets-get-rid-of-it/
>
> >
> > That security researchers haven’t assessed XYZ DRM is a risk to you is
> not the same as whether the EME implementation is a risk to you.
>
> As EME opens the door for using (and MSE possibly installs) XYZ DRM, yes
> it is.
>
> >
> > I’m sorry to press on this, but we need to be clear, because risk
> mitigation is based in being really clear what the risk is.  At the moment,
> I don’t see any risk in parts of the browser that are the *interface* to
> modules that the user may choose to load. They might be there, but
> conflating the risk of the module itself with the interface is not helping
> get clarity.
>
> If your argument is that DRM is not a risk to end-users, then there is
> widespread disagreement from the independent security and legal
> community on your point as evidenced by both Wikipedia and various
> papers by well-respected acaemics that focussed on users  [1] . From my
> individual perspective, it seems the only people who argue that DRM is
> not a problem for end-users is people whose job it is to implement DRM,
> groups whose income depends on revenue from DRM implementers,  and the
> various groups that stand to make profit from DRM. Thus, it is unclear
> if any of those viewpoints are sufficiently neutral to address the harm
> to users that DRM could cause.  Furthermore, EME is both a DRM system
> due to clearKey and an interface to specific CDMs, so the concerns
> around DRM naturally encompass EME.
>
>    cheers,
>          harry
>
> [1] http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=947391
>
> >
> >
> >> On Aug 16, 2016, at 10:36 , Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 08/16/2016 07:28 PM, David Singer wrote:
> >>>> On Aug 16, 2016, at 10:22 , Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On 08/16/2016 06:35 PM, David Singer wrote:
> >>>>> I think you’ll need to explain why the choice of how much, and how,
> the user is warned, needs to be made by you/us, and not by the browser
> maker.  You also haven’t given details of the ‘user harm’ you talk about
> for EME itself.
> >>>> The details of 'user harm' are adequately explained by the concerns
> over
> >>>> the DMCA and the use of DRM that have been well-documented elsewhere
> >>>> [1].
> >>> No, those criticisms were almost exclusively focused on the risk to
> security researchers. Not one of the sub-headings you link to appears to
> apply to users.  Current politics notwithstanding, repeatedly stating
> something doesn’t intrinsically make it true.
> >> I don't agree.  Insofar as security researchers cannot audit the
> >> security of DRM systems, then it is *users* who will face any harm due
> >> to the lack of security audits. That is a unique feature of DRM that EME
> >> enables. EME can also, due to clearkey, be considered a DMCA-compliant
> >> system itself (i.e. clearKey's Key System is equivalent to a CDM).
> >>
> >>>> Any installation or use of software that is compliant with the DMCA
> >>>> can be considered a risk to users and security researchers as is noted
> >>>> on WIkipedia [1].
> >>> Users and security researchers are not the same people.
> >> See above.
> >>
> >>>> Although the FO is filed as an individual, one task of W3C is to
> assure
> >>>> there is representation of the interest of users and to ensure the Web
> >>>> is secure.
> >>> Sure, but you need to say what the *user* harm is.
> >> If there is a part of a browser that makes security research difficult
> >> and possibly illegal,  then that part of the browser is rather
> >> self-evidently dangerous to end-users. While I appreciate the effort,
> >> sandboxing may help but there is no such thing as a perfect sandbox.
> >>
> >>>> So, I think the decision should be made by the Working Group
> >>>> with the best interests of users in mind, not just the browser makers.
> >>>> While you can consider 'off by default' to be unreasonable, I think if
> >>>> one takes that this same approach has been adopted by similarly
> >>>> controversial APIs (Geolocation API), I think it's quite reasonable.
> >>>>
> >>>>  cheers,
> >>>>       harry
> >>>>
> >>>> [1]
> >>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Millennium_Copyright_
> Act#Criticisms
> >>>>
> >>>>>> On Aug 16, 2016, at 4:28 , Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On 08/13/2016 05:05 PM, Paul Cotton wrote:
> >>>>>>> Note that I am responding to an email and proposal from Harry from
> earlier in this thread.
> >>>>>>> https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-html-media/
> 2016Aug/0005.html
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> The text I would add to the EME spec would be similar:
> >>>>>>>> "A conforming implementation of this specification MUST ensure
> that this
> >>>>>>>> API cannot be used without the user's express permission due to
> the
> >>>>>>>> inherent risks in the activation of a CDM in a user agent. The
> API MUST
> >>>>>>>> be disabled by default, and should only be activated when the
> user gives
> >>>>>>>> express consent and is fully informed on a per-origin basis."
> >>>>>>> This request would appear to be (at least partially) covered by
> the existing text in the EME CR:
> >>>>>>> http://www.w3.org/TR/encrypted-media/#navigator-extension-
> requestmediakeysystemaccess
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> 3.1.1 Methods
> >>>>>>> requestMediaKeySystemAccess
> >>>>>>> Note
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Calling this method may have user-visible effects, including
> requests for user consent. This method should only be called when the
> author intends to create and use a MediaKeys object with the provided
> configuration.
> >>>>>>> Requests access to the specified Key System. When
> supportedConfigurations is specified, the configuration specified by at
> least one of its elements must be supported. The resulting
> MediaKeySystemAccess will correspond to the first such element.
> >>>>>>> Any permission checks or user interaction, such as a prompt, MUST
> be performed before resolving the promise.
> >>>>>>> Were you aware of this text in the EME specification?  Can you
> live with the current text since changing this text to be normative and
> changing it to a MUST (I believe) would be a “breaking change” and would
> require that we re-publish another EME CR?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> /paulc
> >>>>>>> HME WG Chair
> >>>>>> Paul,
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Thanks for noting 'use-visible effects' but it does not either
> explicitly 1) require a user-visible effect for fully informing the user"
> and "gaining their consent" as well "turning off EME by default". Simply
> put, the text you are noting says MAY have user-visible effects and as so
> is too weak to include in a test-suite or support EME being off by default.
> So, it does not cover my objection, which normatively requires much
> stronger text, including "off by default". So, no I can't live with that
> text and require the change (or a semantically equivalent one) that I
> suggest in the github repo and e-mail list:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> https://github.com/w3c/encrypted-media/issues/304
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Thus, my formal objection still stands.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> cheers,
> >>>>>>     harry
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> From: Harry Halpin [mailto:hhalpin@w3.org]
> >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 2, 2016 5:00 AM
> >>>>>>> To: public-html-media@w3.org
> >>>>>>> Subject: Re: Formal objection to Encrypted Media Extensions
> progressing to Proposed Recommendation without greater user protection
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On 08/02/2016 03:00 AM, Paul Cotton wrote:
> >>>>>>>> An individual who registers a Formal Objection should cite
> technical arguments and propose changes that would remove the Formal
> Objection;
> >>>>>>> http://www.w3.org/2015/Process-20150901/#WGArchiveMinorityViews
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Before I record your formal objection at [1] I would like to
> ensure that your “proposed change” for your objection is understood.
> >>>>>>>> There is prior art in HTML for similarly powerful and
> privacy-invasive features such as the Geolocation API [4]. Thus, there
> should be no procedural problem in requiring user consent and disabling EME
> by default in all browsers.
> >>>>>>> The reference you provide as a “prior art” precedent in [4] is in
> a non-normative section of Geolocation API and it does NOT disable the
> Geolocation API by default.  Can you explain why you think this reference
> is useful here?  Are you suggesting similar text be added to EME?  If so
> could you suggest exact text that would remove your formal objection?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> The exact phrasing is " A conforming implementation of this
> specification must provide a mechanism that protects the user's privacy and
> this mechanism should ensure that no location information is made available
> through this API without the user's express permission"
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> To clarify, I agree that the spec should have used capitalization:
> " A conforming implementation of this specification MUST provide a
> mechanism that protects the user's privacy and this mechanism should ensure
> that no location information is made available through this API without the
> user's express permission."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> However, I do believe that all browsers *do* indeed ask for user
> consent before using the Geolocation API and that it is disabled by
> default, which is clear prior art for EME. This is indeed the case on the
> browsers I use, but if others activate Geolocation API without user
> consent, please do inform me, as I don't use Microsoft products.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> The text I would add to the EME spec would be similar:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> "A conforming implementation of this specification MUST ensure
> that this API cannot be used without the user's express permission due to
> the inherent risks in the activation of a CDM in a user agent. The API MUST
> be disabled by default, and should only be activated when the user gives
> express consent and is fully informed on a per-origin basis."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Given there is already a place where user consent MUST be asked in
> the EME spec (" User agents must ensure that users are fully informed
> and/or give explicit consent before Distinctive Identifier(s) are exposed,
> such as in messages from the Key System implementation"), there is no
> reason why this MUST can't be broadened. I would also remove the "or." The
> user must be fully informed AND give explicit consent.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Furthermore, given this normative, testing for express user
> consent on a per-origin basis should be part of the test-suite.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>      cheers,
> >>>>>>>              harry
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> /paulc
> >>>>>>> HME WG Chair
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> [1] https://dev.w3.org/html5/status/formal-objection-status.html
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> From: Harry Halpin [mailto:hhalpin@w3.org]
> >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, August 1, 2016 6:42 PM
> >>>>>>> To: public-html-media@w3.org
> >>>>>>> Subject: Formal objection to Encrypted Media Extensions
> progressing to Proposed Recommendation without greater user protection
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> [Note this is a formal objection as an individual in a private
> capacity, not on behalf of my organization]
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I'd like to fill a formal objection against Encrypted Media
> Extensions progressing to Proposed Recommendation status without adequate
> protection for users.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I believe that this work is so problematic given the well-known
> and well-documented problems with DRM,  it should not happen as a standard
> at all at W3C. That being said, for reasons which I do not agree with and
> hope he reconsiders, the Director has approved both the scope of the
> charter and the move of the Working Draft to Candidate Recommendation.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> If it does happen, then it seems given the well-documented
> problems, some harm mitigation should be pursued. The security research
> community has broad support for the EFF covenant being a normative
> requirement [1]. However, it appears consensus is not forthcoming on either
> EME itself or the EFF covenant, with the Technology and Policy IG also
> failing to gain any consensus for even further discussion (as it failed to
> even get chartered).
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> To myself, the danger of EME is that over the last year suddenly
> over millions of people had a content decryption module installed without
> their explicit consent on their computer. For many users, such as those of
> Firefox, the DCM was installed via a silent update they had no control
> over. Such a content decryption module can serve as both a technical
> security risk, as it puts a highly privileged process in the user's
> computer outside their direct control by design, and as a legal risk
> subjects any inspection of the DRM-enabled system on their computer due to
> the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA or local equivalent. Thus,
> regardless of whether or not one agrees with EME, it seems the *least* the
> W3C should do is warn the user about the installation and activation of a
> CDM on their machine - and that the CDM should not be installed and EME
> should not be activated without explicit user consent. Thus, in all
> configurations, EME should be *de-activated by default.*
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> There is prior art in HTML for similarly powerful and
> privacy-invasive features such as the Geolocation API [4]. Thus, there
> should be no procedural problem in requiring user consent and disabling EME
> by default in all browsers.  While it can be argued many users will want to
> watch protected videos and will turn them on, just as many users will want
> to use Google Maps with Geolocation APIs, there does not seem to be a
> reasonable case for having such
> >>>>>>> powerful and possibly dangerous features enabled by default.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Current language in the spec is so weak as it may not be enforced
> and so EME does not have to be disabled by default: " User Agents have some
> flexibility to determine whether consent is required for a specific
> configuration and whether such consent may also apply to other
> configurations. For example, consent to one configuration may also imply
> consent for less powerful, more restricted configurations. Equally, a
> denial of consent for one configuration may imply denial of consent for
> more powerful, less restricted configurations."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> The only place where the spec [5] makes normative statements
> around consent, but due to how DRM (i.e. Key Systems) are designed, it is
> unclear how the user agent should interpret these statements
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> "If a user agent chooses to support a Key System implementation
> that cannot be sufficiently sandboxed or otherwise secured, the user agent
> should ensure that users are fully informed and/or give explicit consent
> before loading or invoking it."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> "User Agents should ensure that users are fully informed and/or
> give explicit consent before a Key System that presents security concerns
> that are greater than other user agent features (e.g. DOM content) may be
> accessed by an origin..."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> " User agents must ensure that users are fully informed and/or
> give explicit consent before Distinctive Identifier(s) are exposed, such as
> in messages from the Key System implementation."
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Although these statements show some progress towards trying to
> mitigate the dangers of DRM, given that DRM systems work in conjunction
> with anti-circumvention legislation that prevents a developer from knowing
> whether or not they can sufficiently sandboxed (or 'otherwise secured') and
> whether a Distinctive Identifier is used by the DRM system, so the use of
> EME will *always* present security concerns that are greater than the rest
> of the user agent features involving the Open Web Platform.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Is the Working Group amendable to having EME and associated DRM
> systems (i.e. "Key Systems") *normatively* disabled by default in order to
> protect users?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>  cheers,
> >>>>>>>      harry
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> [1] https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/security-researchers-
> tell-w3c-protect-researchers-who-investigate-browsers
> >>>>>>> [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_rights_management#
> Opposition_to_DRM
> >>>>>>> [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_rights_management#
> Shortcomings
> >>>>>>> [4] https://www.w3.org/TR/geolocation-API/#
> implementation_considerations
> >>>>>>> [5] https://w3c.github.io/encrypted-media/
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>> David Singer
> >>>>> Manager, Software Standards, Apple Inc.
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>> David Singer
> >>> Manager, Software Standards, Apple Inc.
> >>>
> > David Singer
> > Manager, Software Standards, Apple Inc.
> >
> >
>
>
>
>