Re: Formal objection to Encrypted Media Extensions progressing to Proposed Recommendation without greater user protection

Ok, I stand corrected.

Paul, I think you are right that Wendy's proposal would address Harry's
concerns too.

However, the two proposals have very (very) different effects, so I think
it's best to keep them separate.

...Mark

On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 11:58 AM, Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com> wrote:

> Hi Paul,
>
> IIUC, Wendy's proposal applies to the EME specification, whereas Harry's
> concerns are about the CDM (which we constrain in some ways but do not
> specify). Harry would like to mitigate his concerns about the CDM by
> requiring user consent to use the EME API, since using the latter may cause
> use of the former.
>
> But, as I said, I may have misunderstood Wendy's proposal, so input from
> her would be very useful.
>
> ...Mark
>
> On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 11:37 AM, Paul Cotton <Paul.Cotton@microsoft.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Wendy’s issue states:
>>
>>
>>
>> > The specification should explicitly state that implementations MUST
>> not be construed as "technological measures" or interfaces to technical
>> protection measures in the meaning of DMCA Section 1201
>> <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/1201> or similar copyright
>> laws in other jurisdictions.
>>
>>
>>
>> And DMCA Section 1201 <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/1201>
>> states:
>>
>>
>>
>> > No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively
>> controls access to a work protected under this title.
>>
>>
>>
>> So if EME is NOT a “technological measure” then I believe the latter part
>> of Harry’s motivation below about the “anti-circumvention provision of the
>> DMCA” does NOT apply:
>>
>>
>>
>> > Such a content decryption module can serve as both a technical
>> security risk, as it puts a highly privileged process in the user's
>> computer outside their direct control by design, and as a legal risk
>> subjects any inspection of the DRM-enabled system on their computer due to
>> the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA or local equivalent.
>>
>>
>>
>> This is why I thought the two “issues” were related.
>>
>>
>>
>> It would be VERY useful to have input from Harry and/or Wendy on this
>> thread.
>>
>>
>>
>> /paulc
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Mark Watson [mailto:watsonm@netflix.com]
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, August 3, 2016 11:19 AM
>> *To:* Paul Cotton <Paul.Cotton@microsoft.com>
>> *Cc:* Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>; public-html-media@w3.org;
>> wseltzer@w3.org
>>
>> *Subject:* Re: Formal objection to Encrypted Media Extensions
>> progressing to Proposed Recommendation without greater user protection
>>
>>
>>
>> Paul - I think they are different issues, depending perhaps on the answer
>> to the question I just posted on #288.
>>
>>
>>
>> If Wendy's proposal applies in the narrow sense to implementation of the
>> EME APIs defined in the specification and not to the CDM, then I expect
>> Harry's concerns regarding the CDM still apply.
>>
>>
>>
>> ...Mark
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 3, 2016 at 7:52 AM, Paul Cotton <Paul.Cotton@microsoft.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> > Can you please open an EME GitHub issue for your proposed change
>> indicating exactly where in the specification you wish this text to be
>> added?
>>
>>
>>
>> We have now received a new EME issue that is proposing a very different
>> approach to the question of  whether EME offers “a legal risk subjects any
>> inspection of the DRM-enabled system on their computer due to the
>> anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA or local equivalent.”  See
>> https://github.com/w3c/encrypted-media/issues/288
>>
>>
>>
>> I would to recommend that we fold your proposed change into the ISSUE-288
>> discussion since it is unlikely that we would accept both proposed changes.
>>
>>
>>
>> Comments?
>>
>>
>>
>> /paulc
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Paul Cotton [mailto:Paul.Cotton@microsoft.com]
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, August 2, 2016 9:55 AM
>> *To:* Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>
>> *Cc:* public-html-media@w3.org
>> *Subject:* RE: Formal objection to Encrypted Media Extensions
>> progressing to Proposed Recommendation without greater user protection
>>
>>
>>
>> > The text I would add to the EME spec would be similar:
>>
>> >"A conforming implementation of this specification MUST ensure that this
>> API cannot be used without the user's express permission due to the
>> inherent risks in the activation of a CDM in a user agent. The API MUST be
>> disabled by default, and should only be activated when the user gives
>> express consent and is fully informed on a per-origin basis."
>>
>> Can you please open an EME GitHub issue for your proposed change
>> indicating exactly where in the specification you wish this text to be
>> added?
>>
>>
>>
>> /paulc
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Harry Halpin [mailto:hhalpin@w3.org <hhalpin@w3.org>]
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, August 2, 2016 5:00 AM
>> *To:* public-html-media@w3.org
>> *Subject:* Re: Formal objection to Encrypted Media Extensions
>> progressing to Proposed Recommendation without greater user protection
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 08/02/2016 03:00 AM, Paul Cotton wrote:
>>
>> > An individual who registers a Formal Objection *should* cite technical
>> arguments and propose changes that would remove the Formal Objection;
>>
>> http://www.w3.org/2015/Process-20150901/#WGArchiveMinorityViews
>>
>>
>>
>> Before I record your formal objection at [1] I would like to ensure that
>> your “proposed change” for your objection is understood.
>>
>> > There is prior art in HTML for similarly powerful and privacy-invasive
>> features such as the Geolocation API [4]. Thus, there should be no
>> procedural problem in requiring user consent and disabling EME by default
>> in all browsers.
>>
>>
>>
>> The reference you provide as a “prior art” precedent in [4] is in a
>> non-normative section of Geolocation API and it does NOT disable the
>> Geolocation API by default.  Can you explain why you think this reference
>> is useful here?  Are you suggesting similar text be added to EME?  If so
>> could you suggest exact text that would remove your formal objection?
>>
>>
>> The exact phrasing is " A conforming implementation of this specification
>> must provide a mechanism that protects the user's privacy and this
>> mechanism should ensure that no location information is made available
>> through this API without the user's express permission"
>>
>> To clarify, I agree that the spec should have used capitalization: " A
>> conforming implementation of this specification MUST provide a mechanism
>> that protects the user's privacy and this mechanism should ensure that no
>> location information is made available through this API without the user's
>> express permission."
>>
>> However, I do believe that all browsers *do* indeed ask for user consent
>> before using the Geolocation API and that it is disabled by default, which
>> is clear prior art for EME. This is indeed the case on the browsers I use,
>> but if others activate Geolocation API without user consent, please do
>> inform me, as I don't use Microsoft products.
>>
>> The text I would add to the EME spec would be similar:
>>
>> "A conforming implementation of this specification MUST ensure that this
>> API cannot be used without the user's express permission due to the
>> inherent risks in the activation of a CDM in a user agent. The API MUST be
>> disabled by default, and should only be activated when the user gives
>> express consent and is fully informed on a per-origin basis."
>>
>> Given there is already a place where user consent MUST be asked in the
>> EME spec (" User agents must ensure that users are fully informed and/or
>> give explicit consent before Distinctive Identifier(s) are exposed, such as
>> in messages from the Key System implementation"), there is no reason why
>> this MUST can't be broadened. I would also remove the "or." The user must
>> be fully informed AND give explicit consent.
>>
>> Furthermore, given this normative, testing for express user consent on a
>> per-origin basis should be part of the test-suite.
>>
>>        cheers,
>>                harry
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> /paulc
>>
>> HME WG Chair
>>
>>
>>
>> [1] https://dev.w3.org/html5/status/formal-objection-status.html
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Harry Halpin [mailto:hhalpin@w3.org <hhalpin@w3.org>]
>> *Sent:* Monday, August 1, 2016 6:42 PM
>> *To:* public-html-media@w3.org
>> *Subject:* Formal objection to Encrypted Media Extensions progressing to
>> Proposed Recommendation without greater user protection
>>
>>
>>
>> [Note this is a formal objection as an individual in a private capacity,
>> not on behalf of my organization]
>>
>> I'd like to fill a formal objection against Encrypted Media Extensions
>> progressing to Proposed Recommendation status without adequate protection
>> for users.
>>
>> I believe that this work is so problematic given the well-known and
>> well-documented problems with DRM,  it should not happen as a standard at
>> all at W3C. That being said, for reasons which I do not agree with and hope
>> he reconsiders, the Director has approved both the scope of the charter and
>> the move of the Working Draft to Candidate Recommendation.
>>
>> If it does happen, then it seems given the well-documented problems, some
>> harm mitigation should be pursued. The security research community has
>> broad support for the EFF covenant being a normative requirement [1].
>> However, it appears consensus is not forthcoming on either EME itself or
>> the EFF covenant, with the Technology and Policy IG also failing to gain
>> any consensus for even further discussion (as it failed to even get
>> chartered).
>>
>> To myself, the danger of EME is that over the last year suddenly over
>> millions of people had a content decryption module installed without their
>> explicit consent on their computer. For many users, such as those of
>> Firefox, the DCM was installed via a silent update they had no control
>> over. Such a content decryption module can serve as both a technical
>> security risk, as it puts a highly privileged process in the user's
>> computer outside their direct control by design, and as a legal risk
>> subjects any inspection of the DRM-enabled system on their computer due to
>> the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA or local equivalent. Thus,
>> regardless of whether or not one agrees with EME, it seems the *least* the
>> W3C should do is warn the user about the installation and activation of a
>> CDM on their machine - and that the CDM should not be installed and EME
>> should not be activated without explicit user consent. Thus, in all
>> configurations, EME should be *de-activated by default.*
>>
>> There is prior art in HTML for similarly powerful and privacy-invasive
>> features such as the Geolocation API [4]. Thus, there should be no
>> procedural problem in requiring user consent and disabling EME by default
>> in all browsers.  While it can be argued many users will want to watch
>> protected videos and will turn them on, just as many users will want to use
>> Google Maps with Geolocation APIs, there does not seem to be a reasonable
>> case for having such
>> powerful and possibly dangerous features enabled by default.
>>
>> Current language in the spec is so weak as it may not be enforced and so
>> EME does not have to be disabled by default: " User Agents have some
>> flexibility to determine whether consent is required for a specific
>> configuration and whether such consent may also apply to other
>> configurations. For example, consent to one configuration may also imply
>> consent for less powerful, more restricted configurations. Equally, a
>> denial of consent for one configuration may imply denial of consent for
>> more powerful, less restricted configurations."
>>
>> The only place where the spec [5] makes normative statements around
>> consent, but due to how DRM (i.e. Key Systems) are designed, it is unclear
>> how the user agent should interpret these statements
>>
>> "If a user agent chooses to support a Key System implementation that
>> cannot be sufficiently sandboxed or otherwise secured, the user agent should
>> ensure that users are fully informed and/or give explicit consent before
>> loading or invoking it."
>>
>> "User Agents should ensure that users are fully informed and/or give
>> explicit consent before a Key System that presents security concerns that
>> are greater than other user agent features (e.g. DOM content) may be
>> accessed by an origin..."
>>
>> " User agents must ensure that users are fully informed and/or give
>> explicit consent before Distinctive Identifier(s) are exposed, such as in
>> messages from the Key System implementation."
>>
>> Although these statements show some progress towards trying to mitigate
>> the dangers of DRM, given that DRM systems work in conjunction with
>> anti-circumvention legislation that prevents a developer from knowing
>> whether or not they can sufficiently sandboxed (or 'otherwise secured') and
>> whether a Distinctive Identifier is used by the DRM system, so the use of
>> EME will *always* present security concerns that are greater than the rest
>> of the user agent features involving the Open Web Platform.
>>
>> Is the Working Group amendable to having EME and associated DRM systems
>> (i.e. "Key Systems") *normatively* disabled by default in order to protect
>> users?
>>
>>    cheers,
>>        harry
>>
>> [1]
>> https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/security-researchers-tell-w3c-protect-researchers-who-investigate-browsers
>> [2]
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_rights_management#Opposition_to_DRM
>> [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_rights_management#Shortcomings
>> [4] https://www.w3.org/TR/geolocation-API/#implementation_considerations
>> [5] https://w3c.github.io/encrypted-media/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>