Re: Resolving issues around avoiding key requests

On Fri, Aug 14, 2015 at 12:08 PM, David Dorwin <ddorwin@google.com> wrote:

> For security and interoperability reasons, we have a list of data
> prohibited from Initialization Data. As there is no support in the
> algorithms for key extraction or its usage in the client, I added "key(s)"
> to this list. Preventing a key from being in the opaque blob passed to a
> server or otherwise used in the generation of a license request - and used
> for nothing else - is an unintentional consequence. (I had not thought of
> this case, which is why I thought fixing Issue 52 was dependent on
> supporting one of the other use cases.)
>
> It is unclear whether such real world use cases exist. However, in order
> to make the text more technically sound, I propose we remove "key(s)" from
> the current sentence and add:
>
>> Implementations MUST NOT use Initialization Data for anything other than
>> generating a license request. Specifically, Initialization Data or portions
>> of it MUST NOT be persisted, used to configure the CDM or session, or used
>> directly by the implementation to extract or derive key(s).
>
>
> We can append "unless explicitly stated in the algorithms" as appropriate
> when adding support for use cases (i.e. Issues 41 and 53) that need more
> flexibility.
>
> I believe this resolves Issue 52 and concerns about the technical
> correctness of the current spec text without contradicting (by omission)
> the algorithms.
>
> One comment inline.
>
> On Thu, Aug 13, 2015 at 8:08 AM, Bob Lund <B.Lund@cablelabs.com> wrote:
>
>> All,
>>
>> I agree with Mark W, Joe and Jerry on issue 52, especially the point
>> already raised about opaque InitData always assumed in the development of
>> the EME spec and that that is consistent with CENC. Absent a compelling,
>> specific scenario that breaks interoperability we should remove the
>> constraint.
>>
>
> The scenario where keys in the initData affects interoperability is when
> it affects application-visible behavior, especially when such behavior is
> not defined by the algorithms. Specifically, if keys were to be extracted
> by the CDM and used for anything other than generating a license request,
> which is currently the only defined/supported use for |initData|.
>

​I agree that if the information in the initData caused the
application-visible behavior to be outside that defined in the
specification that would be a problem.

However, provided the application-visible behavior is within spec, I don't
see any reason to constrain what is in the initData or how the CDM uses it.

In particular, we all agree that the number and timing of request /
response exchanges that have to occur before keys are usable is up to the
CDM. Applications are supposed to facilitate ​exchanges between CDM and
server on request. Here are two possible implementations which exhibit
exactly the same application-visible behavior:
(A) the initData contains a content key encrypted to the server which the
CDM passes to the server in the request. The server decrypts the content
key, re-encrypts it to the CDM and sends that in the response. The CDM
decrypts the content key and uses it for media decryption.
(B) the initData contains a content key encrypted with a key encryption key
(KEK) as well as a KEK ID which is passed to the server in the request. The
server uses the KEK ID to identify the KEK, encrypts that to the CDM and
returns that in the response. The CDM decrypts the KEK and uses it to
decrypt the encrypted content key.

I don't know why anyone would do (B) over (A), but the point is that
despite the application-visible behavior being identical, (B) is prohibited
by the proposed text and (A) is not.

Either we are following the model in which initData and the request /
response messages are opaque or we are not. If they are opaque, I'm not
sure what we can say about what they contain or how they are used. The
allowed application-visible behaviors need to be clearly defined to achieve
interoperability, but the only way to do that is to clearly define those
behaviors directly. Imposing restrictions on what is contained in opaque
data structures in the hope this will somehow constrain application-visible
behaviors does not seem very reliable.

A further objection to the proposed text is that even in the case of
initData containing only key ids (as in clearKey), that list of key ids may
be used to determine whether all the required keys have been received from
the server. That usage is prohibited by the proposed text.

​...Mark​




>
>> Bob
>>
>> From: Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com>
>> Date: Wednesday, August 12, 2015 at 5:19 PM
>> To: "Jerry Smith (IEP)" <jdsmith@microsoft.com>
>> Cc: David Dorwin <ddorwin@google.com>, Joe Steele <steele@adobe.com>,
>> "<public-html-media@w3. org>" <public-html-media@w3.org>
>> Subject: Re: Resolving issues around avoiding key requests
>> Resent-From: "<public-html-media@w3. org>" <public-html-media@w3.org>
>> Resent-Date: Wednesday, August 12, 2015 at 5:20 PM
>>
>> All,
>>
>> I agree with Joe and Jerry.
>>
>> Regarding *Issue 52*: it has always been assumed that the initData is
>> opaque, that the CDM uses information in the initData to construct a key
>> request and that the server uses that information to construct a response
>> containing the content key. Any mechanism that adheres to that model should
>> be allowed. Clearly, we all expect the opaque portion of the initData to
>> contain information that identifies the content key. Whether that
>> information is in the form of a key id or the key itself seems irrelevant
>> to the specification and to interoperability. Is it allowed for the
>> initData to contain a partial key and then an id for the remainder ? If it
>> contains one bit of the key and an id for the remainder is it ok ? If it
>> contains 127 bits of the key and an identifier for the last bit of the key
>> is that ok ? In neither case does the initData contain a "key". What huge
>> problem does that one additional bit of the key cause ?
>>
>> I also agree with Joes description of the way this change was introduced
>> without discussion: I think the onus should be on David to describe a
>> problematic scenario that this prohibition on keys in initData precludes
>> before we introduce that prohibition. In the meantime the prohibition
>> should be removed.
>>
>> Regarding *Issue 41*: our model for key exchange messages is that the
>> number of exchanges needed, and their timing, is up to the CDM. CDMs may
>> need more than one request / response exchange in order to establish the
>> keys. They may initiate additional exchanges at any time (e.g. for license
>> renewal). It seems consistent and unproblematic from an interop pov if the
>> number of exchanges is zero. It has always been possible that the CDM has
>> other information (from the initData, from other message exchanges) which
>> mean there is no exchange necessary. Perhaps the beginning of the content -
>> unbeknownst to the application - is not encrypted and the CDM learns this
>> from the initData. It seems arbitrary to require the number of message
>> exchanges at session start to be non-zero.
>>
>> Regarding *Issue 53*: it's not clear to me that changes to the
>> specification are required to enable this, though I agree it warrants
>> discussion. Certainly I don't see any reason why this issue should block
>> either 52 or 41, which stand on their own. There is nothing in the
>> specification preventing key exchanges from delivering CDM-specific
>> information to the CDM that has a scope greater than the session in which
>> it is delivered. Such information would not be deleted when the session is
>> closed and could be used by other sessions. Again, the model is that the
>> CDM executes as many message exchanges as it needs (zero or more) whenever
>> it needs to and signals the status with respect to content keys to the
>> application via KeyStatus.
>>
>> ...Mark
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 10:37 AM, Jerry Smith (IEP) <
>> jdsmith@microsoft.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Keys in initData is specifically allowed by the ISO specification on
>>> Common Encryption.  I’ve included a reference on this in a comment on Issue
>>> #52 below.  I do not believe we should make the EME spec more restrictive
>>> than the controlling ISO CENC documentation.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Keys distributed in initData support license renewal use cases with
>>> seamless and efficient key distribution.  This method is commonly used by
>>> streaming media services that use CENC today.  We should align the EME spec
>>> to support it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> My recommendation is that we approve and implement issue #52 now, and
>>> review and confirm the algorithm changes in issue #41 to support them.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Jerry
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* David Dorwin [mailto:ddorwin@google.com]
>>> *Sent:* Sunday, August 2, 2015 9:09 PM
>>> *To:* Joe Steele <steele@adobe.com>
>>> *Cc:* <public-html-media@w3.org> <public-html-media@w3.org>
>>> *Subject:* Re: Resolving issues around avoiding key requests
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have provided specific comments on the three issues inline. To
>>> summarize, I believe 52 (removal of a single word) depends on 41, resolving
>>> 41 should also consider 53, and that 53 requires a significant amount of
>>> work to develop a consistent, cohesive, and interoperable solution.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No new information has been provided that demonstrates that inclusion of
>>> these features - in an interoperable and consistent manner - is certain or
>>> that such resolution of the issues is trivial. Given the finite cycles of
>>> the editors, my recommendation is to continue to focus on facilitating
>>> interoperability for the existing feature set and resolving issues that
>>> affect many/most authors and implementers and block LC/CR.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 11:07 AM, Joe Steele <steele@adobe.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> There are three open issues relating to keys being provided in a manner
>>> that may allow key requests to be avoided. I am listing them below.
>>>
>>> *Please review all three issues carefully and respond to this thread
>>> with your opinions and questions.*
>>>
>>>
>>> Issue 52 - Remove reference to keys in Initialization Data definition
>>>
>>> https://github.com/w3c/encrypted-media/issues/52
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The addition of keys to the list of restricted data in the initData was
>>> made without any group input as far as I can tell. This restriction flies
>>> in the face of the CENC specification which members of this group agreed to
>>> support. I believe that the burden should be on the author of this list to
>>> provide justification. In the F2F meeting the justification offered for
>>> this restriction (as I recall) was that this would lead to an interop
>>> problem. I disagree with this and say that this can only lead to an interop
>>> problem if in fact those keys are used by the CDM directly, which *could*
>>> require the algorithm changes proposed in issue 41. However it does not
>>> *necessarily* lead to an interop problem. This edit is also required to
>>> allow for the DRM specific key metadata specified by CENC. I believe this
>>> issue can be resolved independent of issues 41 and 53.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Some corrections:
>>>
>>>    - As I have repeatedly explained, adding the word "key(s)" to the
>>>    definition was not a change in behavior; it made the definition consistent
>>>    with the algorithms, which provide no mechanism for extracting keys from
>>>    Initialization Data. Allowing keys (other than as a detail of the opaque
>>>    blob to be sent to the license server) would require defining the
>>>    extraction and processing of such keys (Issue 41).
>>>    - Just as MSE supports a subset of MP4 streams to ensure
>>>    compatibility with the algorithms and increase the likelihood of
>>>    interoperability, EME supports a subset of possible CENC streams with a
>>>    preference for openness and interoperability. In other words, EME is not a
>>>    superset of CENC.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Questions:
>>>
>>>    - Could you clarify why you believe that keys in initData is
>>>    currently supported by the spec? Specifically, how/where in the application
>>>    flow/spec are they used?
>>>    - Regarding "this can only lead to an interop problem if in fact
>>>    those keys are used by the CDM directly": Since “DRM specific key metadata”
>>>    is opaque - and in Adobe’s case encrypted - I believe only the CDM /
>>>    license server can access such keys. Am I missing something? How would such
>>>    keys be used indirectly by the CDM or by some other entity?
>>>
>>>
>>> Issue 41 - Update algorithms to reflect keys being provided in the
>>> Initialization Data
>>>
>>> https://github.com/w3c/encrypted-media/issues/41
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The justification for this proposal is that requesting a key from a
>>> license server is expensive. If it is unnecessary to request a key because
>>> the keys are already available to the CDM in a manner that complies with
>>> all other security/privacy restrictions in the spec, I believe the spec
>>> should support not issuing a key request. It has been argued that this will
>>> lead to interop issues. I would point out that protocol and policy
>>> differences can already cause key requests to happen on a different
>>> schedule between Key Systems. This is not fundamentally different and I do
>>> not believe that this change will cause much if any additional work for
>>> developers. *This is blocked by issue 52*.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> As you note under Issue 53 below, the spec does not currently allow use
>>> of keys not present in an active session (other than keys that are part of
>>> the DRM protocol, such as platform or individualization/provisioned keys).
>>> Thus, there is currently no mechanism for "the keys [to] already [be]
>>> available to the CDM." I don't oppose such a concept, but I think it
>>> requires careful consideration and design to maintain consistency with the
>>> rest of the spec as well as related features, such as issue 53.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This is *blocking* issue 52 for the reason explained in that section
>>> above. (In reality, they would likely be resolved together.)
>>>
>>>
>>> Issue 53 - Allow for long-lived key encryption keys (aka "master" keys)
>>> to increase performance
>>>
>>> https://github.com/w3c/encrypted-media/issues/53
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The justification for this proposal is supporting increased performance
>>> for DRMs that can avoid additional license requests. Most if not all DRMs
>>> already support some type of key chaining, where a key is either generated
>>> on the client or delivered to the client and then that client key is
>>> subsequently used for decrypting the content keys provided via key server
>>> responses (aka licenses). This chaining today is invisible to the
>>> application and is considered “out of scope” for this specification. I am
>>> proposing that we bring a variety of key chaining in scope, specifically
>>> when more than two keys are involved in the chain for performance reasons.
>>> The main problem with the current text is that it assumes that keys
>>> acquired during a session will go away once the session is closed, even
>>> when there are other active sessions on the same MediaKeys object. This
>>> would need to change to make retaining master keys across sessions
>>> compliant with the spec. *This is blocked by issue 41*, since using a
>>> master key would imply that a key request is not required in some cases.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have ideas for how this might work, but they involve significant
>>> changes/additions to the spec, including new session type(s).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Joe
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>