- From: <bugzilla@jessica.w3.org>
- Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2010 23:18:01 +0000
- To: public-html-bugzilla@w3.org
http://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=11402
Kornel Lesinski <kornel@geekhood.net> changed:
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--- Comment #2 from Kornel Lesinski <kornel@geekhood.net> 2010-11-24 23:18:00 UTC ---
(In reply to comment #1)
> This can potentially be mitigated by specifying particular hash algorithms that
> can be used, so the browser can verify that the script actually hashes to the
> provided value before committing it to the cache, but that still leaves us at
> the mercy of hashing algorithms being strong.
Obviously browsers would have to verify the hash and only share verified files.
> but that still leaves us at the mercy of hashing algorithms being strong.
Security of HTTPS is at mercy of hashing algorithms too.
> Had this been specified before we knew that MD5 was broken, for example, the attack described above would now be completely doable even *with* hash verification.
I disagree. Even today attack you've described is not know to be possible.
Replacing library that has already been signed by another website requires
preimage attack, and not merely a collision. It's possible to generate MD5
collisions, but there is no known preimage attack yet.
If you only have a collision, you first need to convince attacked site to use
specially crafted JavaScript file with unescaped, unmodified binary blob that
you know collision for.
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Received on Wednesday, 24 November 2010 23:18:03 UTC