- From: Svensson, Lars <L.Svensson@dnb.de>
- Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 11:04:46 +0000
- To: Annette Greiner <amgreiner@lbl.gov>
- CC: "public-dxwg-wg@w3.org" <public-dxwg-wg@w3.org>
Hi Annette, On Tuesday, January 08, 2019 1:09 AM, Annette Greiner [mailto:amgreiner@lbl.gov] wrote: > Thanks for following up on this. Thanks for your feedback! I've updated the wiki page [1] to the best of my understanding while taking the liberty to use some of your suggestions verbatim. > I think we should address question 4.1 a bit more fully. Since the web > server receives information about all profiles prioritized, it could > obtain information about the user that identifies them by the overlap of > profiles or a profile plus their IP address. For example, if a user > requests information with a profile used in a specific area of interest > and also a company-specific profile, the identity of the person could > become knowable (e.g., a person interested in model railroads who works > for Adobe in San Francisco). Moreover, any health-specific profile > information could hint at personal health information. Also, it's worth > considering that marketers could look for specific profiles for targeted > advertising. OK. > The question about high-value data (4.2) is interesting. There's no > reason conneg could not be used for high-value data. Could the specific > profile chosen to obtain high-value data have consequences? What happens > if stock traders share a profile and that footprint were suddenly seen > more frequently at a certain company's web site? Could that information > get passed to a third party? Perhaps this specification should actually > distinguish between first-party and third-party contexts. I don't think I quite understand what you mean here, particularly your distinction between first-party and third-parte contexts... Can you suggest some text? > Question 4.5 should be a yes, I think. Profile preference information is > exposed to the origin server. OK. > Re persisting data to the user's local device, the profile settings in a > browser that supports content negotiation by profile would be persisted. That's 4.15. OK. > Re enabling persistent monitoring, a user with specific settings for > profiles could be tracked by the headers created by those settings. The > feasibility of that technique of monitoring depends on the uniqueness > and the prevalence of profile settings. That's 4.16. OK. > I think the above all depends on whether and how browser makers support > content negotiation by profile. It might be worth considering adding > some MUSTs to ensure security in future browsers. Here too: Can you suggest some text? > 4.14 has a typo, I think. It says "The only difference could be that the > use or profile URIs is prohibited in private browsing mode". That > probably should say "use of profile URIs". Fixed. > 4.15 has a typo, I think. It says "This specification defines a > request-/response-interaction and does not specify and storage of data." > That probably should say "does not specify any storage". Fixed. Thanks again! [1] https://www.w3.org/2017/dxwg/wiki/CnegPrivacyAndSecurityQuestionnaire Best, Lars > On 1/7/19 7:23 AM, Svensson, Lars wrote: > > Dear Annette, > > > > On Monday, December 17, 2018 6:59 PM, Annette Greiner > [mailto:amgreiner@lbl.gov] wrote: > > > >> oops, sorry, my comments were for the prof conneg doc, not the guidance! > > So are your comments relevant for the prof-conneg security and privacy section > [1]? To me they don't directly address anything in that section or in the answers to > the questionnaire [2]. > > > > [1] https://www.w3.org/TR/dx-prof-conneg/#security_and_privacy > > [2] https://www.w3.org/2017/dxwg/wiki/CnegPrivacyAndSecurityQuestionnaire > > > > Best, > > > > Lars > > > >> On 12/15/18 12:08 PM, Nicholas Car via GitHub wrote: > >>> Questions from https://w3ctag.github.io/security-questionnaire/ with > >>> answers: > >>> **4.1 What information might this feature expose to Web sites or other > >>> parties, and for what purposes is that exposure necessary?** Guidance > >>> document - no code/system exposing anything directly. > >>> **4.2 Is this specification exposing the minimum amount of information > >>> necessary to power the feature?** N/A > >>> **4.3 How does this specification deal with personal information or > >>> personally-identifiable information or information derived thereof?** > >>> It does not. > >>> **4.4 How does this specification deal with sensitive information?** > >>> It does not. > >>> **4.5 Does this specification introduce new state for an origin that > >>> persists across browsing sessions?** No. > >>> **4.6 What information from the underlying platform, e.g. > >>> configuration data, is exposed by this specification to an origin?** N/A > >>> **4.7 Does this specification allow an origin access to sensors on a > >>> user’s device?** No. > >>> **4.8 What data does this specification expose to an origin? Please > >>> also document what data is identical to data exposed by other > >>> features, in the same or different contexts.** N/A > >>> **4.9 Does this specification enable new script execution/loading > >>> mechanisms?** No. > >>> **4.10 Does this specification allow an origin to access other > >>> devices?** No. > >>> **4.11 Does this specification allow an origin some measure of control > >>> over a user agent’s native UI?** No. > >>> **4.12 What temporary identifiers might this this specification create > >>> or expose to the web?** No temporary identifiers. Use of it will > >>> ultimately generate persistent identifiers (URIs) for documents > >>> (profiles). > >>> **4.13 How does this specification distinguish between behavior in > >>> first-party and third-party contexts?** It does not. > >>> **4.14 How does this specification work in the context of a user > >>> agent’s Private \ Browsing or "incognito" mode?** N/A > >>> **4.15 Does this specification have a "Security Considerations" and > >>> "Privacy Considerations" section?** Yes but a trivial one for now. To > >>> be updated. > >>> **4.16 Does this specification allow downgrading default security > >>> characteristics?** No or N/A. > >>> **4.17 What should this questionaire have asked?** I can't think of > >>> what it could ask to better probe potential privacy issues for this > >>> kind of Guidance document. > >>> > >>> > >> -- > >> Annette Greiner > >> NERSC Data and Analytics Services > >> Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory > >> > > -- > Annette Greiner > NERSC Data and Analytics Services > Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Received on Wednesday, 23 January 2019 11:05:16 UTC