- From: Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>
- Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2020 04:26:44 -0400
- To: daniel.hardman@evernym.com
- Cc: Dan Bolser <dan@geromics.co.uk>, "public-did-wg@w3.org" <public-did-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CANYRo8iE2SH8epQvHztffyw4dFEEiSoPROzwdr749i+uEv3QEg@mail.gmail.com>
Daniel H describes three essential aspects of DID service endpoint(s) below: A - Protocol plug-ins that support various transports are important B - VCs are optional because they add unnecessary complexity C - Three-party use cases with the DID subject as controller but not proxy are important. I would note, - these three aspects are orthogonal to each other and equally relevant to DIDs. - Secure data stores cross all three of the essential aspects but are not essential in the same way as these three - We might need a way to decide a taxonomy of service endpoints before we make progress on SDS. - Adrian On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 2:18 PM Daniel Hardman <daniel.hardman@evernym.com> wrote: > I do not necessarily disagree with any of the answers that have already > been given, but I think they ask us to generalize about data and > authorization in ways that the original question didn't require. So let me > add a simpler answer. > > If we didn't have tech and we wanted to know someone's shoe size, we'd > just ask them. If we wanted to make sure that the question and answer > happened in private, we'd whisper in their ear, and they'd whisper back. > Here's the closest that I know of to doing remotely and securely, with tech. > > 1. The controller of a DID includes a DIDComm endpoint in their DID doc. > 2. The party wanting info sends a DIDComm message to that endpoint, asking > their shoe size. This could be done with the BasicMessage protocol or the > CommittedAnswer protocol, for example. (DIDComm endpoints can run any > number of protocols at the same endpoint; they don't need a new one for > each protocol. Protocol support at an endpoint is discoverable.) > 3. The controller of the DID responds with a DIDComm message containing > the answer. > > This can be done over HTTP, over email, entirely offline over BlueTooth or > with QR codes/Sneakernet, etc. The protocol doesn't change when a new topic > arises. It doesn't require any special authorization by either party, > because you're using authenticated encryption and getting the data direct > from the source, not a third component that is brokering access to data. It > is exactly as secure as DID control (not susceptible to tampering or > eavesdropping, if key hygiene is good; both parties know the other party is > actually the controller of the DID that's used; can be non-repudiable if > desired). It can be done with public DIDs or peer DIDs. Etc. > > Note that I didn't use VCs in the 3-step sequence. VCs are about issuers > attesting to data, and being believed due to issuer reputation. If the > party wanting to know shoe size is willing to believe whatever the DID > controller says on the topic, then you *could* model this with a VC where > the issuer is the DID controller -- but you could also just get the DID > controller to answer a question, and short-circuit the whole VC mechanism, > and your level of assurance would be the same. > > Now, a bunch of smart people in this group are working on technologies > that are more elaborate than this, and may bristle at my simple steps > above. Depending on whether your real use case is more elaborate than a > one-off self-attested shoe size, they might be totally right to assert that > something fancier is needed. So let me point out various ways that the > answer above breaks down. > > A. If the party requesting data won't believe the data unless it's > attested by some third party that they deem trustworthy, then VCs > become much more compelling. > > You might embody the answer in a VC and request/reply over a credential > exchange protocol (CHAPI, streaming JWT-based VCs over OIDC the way > Microsoft is advocating, or the Present Proof protocol from Aries RFC 0037, > for example) instead. CHAPI is very webby and browser-friendly; the > OIDC+JWT approach might offer easy integration with enterprise login > workflows; the Present Proof protocol is identical in guarantees and > flexibility to the simple question/answer protocols listed above, but is a > Hyperledger thing that some in this group dislike. I'm not trying to argue > the relative virtues here -- only showing that if you start down the VC > route, a new set of considerations comes into play. There is now an > issuance process that must have produced the data in question, either long > before or just before it's presented, and there's a validation process that > includes signature verification on the receiving side. Revocation becomes a > thing. Etc. > > B. If the data you're after is something repeatable and not requiring > third party attestation, and if you want access to the data that doesn't > run through its owner directly, then data vault / identity hub / semantic > containers technology can add value. > > As Daniel B pointed out, fetching your preferred profile photo, your > twitter handle, your all time top-10 movies list, and a playlist of your > favorite songs can be helpfully modeled as a "Can I please have data item X > owned by subject Y?" operation, where the place you're fetching from is not > Y directly, but rather a service that dispenses data on subject Y's behalf. > Now the question of authorization that Adrian raised also becomes vital, as > does consent; the data dispensing service must know that Y actually agrees > to release the data, and must enforce terms of service. In exchange for the > indirection and complexity of such a mechanism, the service can add value > by being online constantly, by serving very large amounts of data in an > automated way without bothering Y, by giving back the data over and over > again to the same questioner as the data changes, etc. > > > > On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 10:19 AM Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> > wrote: > >> MyData has spent the past 7 months doing a spectacular job of driving to >> a consensus around the MyData Operators construct. Hot off the presses >> today: https://mydata.org/operators/ >> >> The Operators paper doesn't get into standards but it does reach a >> consensus among 50 or "proto-operators" over how they might be governed and >> interoperate as fiduciary or at least neutral agents for the individual >> data subject. >> >> When data changes over time, like your temperature and respiratory rate >> in a pandemic, issuing serial VCs from that wearable or its online proxy, >> becomes a problem. Even worse, as the person walks around, there might be >> constant queries for their personal data that will need to be considered. >> Who is asking (based on their VCs)? What do they want to know? Why do they >> want to know? Whether it's a VC of my temperature or a access to a stream >> from my thermometer, the response to this query will need to be automated >> by the operator. >> >> - Adrian >> >> On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 12:01 PM Daniel Buchner < >> Daniel.Buchner@microsoft.com> wrote: >> >>> I think we should consider the multitude of cases where you want to >>> grant access to a preference or some other type of data that changes over >>> time, such that the party you want to have the info is able to see its >>> latest state over time. For this, basic credential exchange won’t suffice, >>> unless we want users inundated with endless mobile notifications as >>> entities attempt to ascertain the current state of the preference you >>> wanted them to know about. An example would be sharing your shipping >>> address for UPS, Fedex, etc., because people often move, or what type of >>> music you are most into presently, because your go to playlist changes >>> composition. >>> >>> >>> >>> - Daniel >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* Brent Zundel <brent.zundel@evernym.com> >>> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 29, 2020 6:51 AM >>> *To:* Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com> >>> *Cc:* public-did-wg@w3.org; Dan Bolser <dan@geromics.co.uk> >>> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] Re: Fwd: Protocol for requesting private data? >>> >>> >>> >>> And, as Many had hinted at by referring you to the credential handler >>> API, this sort of problem is what verifiable credentials are great for, >>> rather than DIDs. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Apr 29, 2020, 07:24 Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> On 4/29/20 5:10 AM, Ivan Herman wrote: >>> > Are there specific / concrete proposals on how to negotiate this data? >>> >>> Yes, several. One is the Credential Handler API: >>> >>> >>> https://github.com/digitalbazaar/credential-handler-polyfill/blob/master/README.md >>> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fdigitalbazaar%2Fcredential-handler-polyfill%2Fblob%2Fmaster%2FREADME.md&data=02%7C01%7Cdaniel.buchner%40microsoft.com%7C8216aa689aba46ca510108d7ec4471e5%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637237651027389404&sdata=QF53MBGLuJLfjYukvxjP%2B%2FZJIgrZa8WVpMZd64Pi64w%3D&reserved=0> >>> >>> Very old but still relevant video here: >>> >>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bm3XBPB4cFY >>> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Dbm3XBPB4cFY&data=02%7C01%7Cdaniel.buchner%40microsoft.com%7C8216aa689aba46ca510108d7ec4471e5%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637237651027389404&sdata=XApQGIpLKzR2MXeF7UgqLR0FQE01%2FwqICD0dGP8%2FB70%3D&reserved=0> >>> >>> -- manu >>> >>> -- >>> Manu Sporny - https://www.linkedin.com/in/manusporny/ >>> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2Fin%2Fmanusporny%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cdaniel.buchner%40microsoft.com%7C8216aa689aba46ca510108d7ec4471e5%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637237651027399403&sdata=zBkkH8xVTZ3ZmpUnnf4bN7dc1sCd%2BG5K8XY9vPhi%2BQo%3D&reserved=0> >>> Founder/CEO - Digital Bazaar, Inc. >>> blog: Veres One Decentralized Identifier Blockchain Launches >>> https://tinyurl.com/veres-one-launches >>> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftinyurl.com%2Fveres-one-launches&data=02%7C01%7Cdaniel.buchner%40microsoft.com%7C8216aa689aba46ca510108d7ec4471e5%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637237651027399403&sdata=5PebANwgB672SgXUTJr2CARC5gPvxP9m9cou6gBhS74%3D&reserved=0> >>> >>>
Received on Thursday, 30 April 2020 08:27:10 UTC