Re: Hope you guys can take a look!

I’ve only been into web development for about ten months, and I came here
mostly to seek help and guidance. I understand the direction conceptually,
but I’d really appreciate advice on where to go from here, who to talk to,
which working groups or initiatives might be most relevant, and how I could
contribute in a meaningful way even as a newcomer.

I’m genuinely passionate about this idea and willing to put in the time to
learn whatever’s necessary to move it forward.

ma 6.10.2025 klo 22.14 Jori Lehtinen (lehtinenjori03@gmail.com) kirjoitti:

> Hi Manu,
>
> Awesome to hear I’ve reached the right people!
>
>    1.
>
>    Regarding your first question: how can the verifier tell if a
>    state-issued eID value was actually used, in zero knowledge?
>
> You’re absolutely right, that’s currently the missing link. Conceptually,
> AWA behaves almost exactly like the BBS credential-bound pseudonym model
> you’re working on. In AWA terms, the parameters would be:
>
> nym_domain = verifierTopDomain
> nym_secret = masterSub
>
> and the derived pseudonyms are essentially computed as SHA-256(nym_domain,
> nym_secret).
>
> What’s missing, as you pointed out, is the verifier’s ability to confirm
> that the pseudonym was actually derived from a valid, state-issued seed
> (masterSub).
>
> My current thinking is that the eID provider should issue not only the
> seed but also a separate signature or blinded proof that can be
> independently verified via the eID provider’s standard verification
> endpoint.
>
> The main issue is that such a signature proves the issuer’s participation,
> but not that the presented pseudonym is mathematically derived from the
> same seed.
> So the only realistic way forward is to introduce blinding directly at the
> eID level, meaning the eID provider would issue both a seed and a blinded
> seed.
> The blinded version could later be used by a verifier to check that a
> legitimate “proof-of-person” seed exists by performing a simple
> deterministic verification such as:
> unblindSeed(blindedSeed) →  checkSeedDb(unblindedSeed) → compute
> SHA256(unblindedSeed, allegedVerifierDomain) →
> checkMatch(allegedPairwiseSub, computedPairwiseSub) → if match, return ok.
>
> This would allow the verifier to confirm, in zero knowledge, that the
> pseudonym is derived from a real, eID-issued seed without revealing or
> linking the underlying identity.
> It’s not fully clear yet... I need to review the full BBS specification
> and CFRG pseudonym signature methods to determine the cleanest,
> standard-compliant way to express this construction.
> ------------------------------
>
>    2.
>
>    Regarding the national boundary question: the system can, in fact,
>    operate globally. Each verifier or relying party would simply rely on the
>    user’s national eID provider for personhood verification.
>
> What I meant in the README is that the personhood seed itself is never
> shared in plaintext across borders, to avoid cross-jurisdictional
> surveillance. The user’s national authority manages it securely, and if
> nationality changes, the seed can be migrated. Global interoperability is
> therefore possible, but without cross-border exposure of raw identity tied
> material.
> ------------------------------
>
> And yes, I’d really love to hear ideas from you and the group. Eventually,
> I’d like to see this evolve into a pseudonymous, pairwise, cross-device,
> cross-time consistent proof-of-personhood standard, something that can be
> tied to an database encrypted with data only this personhood proven
> authenticated pseudonym can use or an encryptedtoken wich issuance was
> authorized by the user can work as a way for other pseudoyms to read and
> write the database or shard or row or well you get it... The goal is full
> data sovereignty and a web where even zero-knowledge services that don’t
> know who their users are can still exchange data safely and privately with
> good UX.
>
> Honestly, I want this to exist before building any other software
> products, because what’s the point of creating new web services if they
> don’t respect privacy, and what’s the point of anti-abuse systems that keep
> fighting symptoms instead of fixing identity itself?
>
> Best regards,
> Jori Lehtinen
>
> ma 6.10.2025 klo 16.19 Manu Sporny (msporny@digitalbazaar.com) kirjoitti:
>
>> On Mon, Oct 6, 2025 at 2:53 AM Jori Lehtinen <lehtinenjori03@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> > AWA is an open, web-native pseudonymous authentication model
>>
>> Hi Jori, thanks for the work you're doing on AWA and wanting to move
>> the Web toward the future that you mentioned above. There are many of
>> us on this list that are attempting to do the same, so you're in good
>> company. :)
>>
>> > A full description of a possible protocol can be found in the READ ME.
>> (ITS PRETTY DARN GOOD)
>>
>> I read it quickly, so might have missed a few things. It reminds me of
>> the BBS work we're doing with pseudonyms:
>>
>> https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-di-bbs/#credential-bound-pseudonyms
>>
>> What I can't tell from your write up is how the RP (we call it a
>> Verifier) can tell if a state's eID value was used or not. How do you
>> do that in zero knowledge?
>>
>> You also say that the solution can only be used inside a national
>> boundary, which would work against sybil attacks inside the national
>> boundary, but proof of personhood often goes beyond national
>> boundaries -- how do you solve for that?
>>
>> -- manu
>>
>> --
>> Manu Sporny - https://www.linkedin.com/in/manusporny/
>> Founder/CEO - Digital Bazaar, Inc.
>> https://www.digitalbazaar.com/
>>
>