- From: Andrew Hughes <andrewhughes3000@gmail.com>
 - Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2025 17:35:30 +0200
 - To: Pryvit NZ <kyle@pryvit.tech>
 - Cc: Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>, "public-credentials (public-credentials@w3.org)" <public-credentials@w3.org>
 - Message-ID: <CAGJp9UYiN9zSFhhS+bOyebQSpVouSsnO_fp3_xM0Q+JbfwQ5kw@mail.gmail.com>
 
See? Kyle’s got the right idea here! These are indeed interesting problems that all the credentials projects would do well to consider. This is stuff I think we can pick up and deliberate about. Not promising that the result will satisfy anyone or everyone! Thanks Kyle Andrew. Andrew Hughes CISM m +1 250.888.9474 AndrewHughes3000@gmail.com https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrew-hughes-682058a On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 5:31 PM Pryvit NZ <kyle@pryvit.tech> wrote: > Personally, here’s a few things are on my list still: > > 1. We’re still issuing with privacy correlating cryptographic signatures > in a lot of places, which is like to see be deprecated. > > 2. Increased sharing of personal data and corresponding reduction of > privacy due to reduced friction for sharing such identity data, aka the > Jevons Paradox problem. > > 3. Reliance on 3P attested identity data centralizes trust on the Web > further > > 4. Increased restriction of the ability to publish, view, and participate > on the Web, and corresponding fragmentation of the Web as a whole as > digital credentials still broadly (of all formats) are adopted further > > 5. Reduction of user agency and perpetuation of existing societal power > imbalances > > While Brave originally raised this complaint specifically with the digital > credentials API because it’s the first protocol to use it within the > browser, the same problems stand irregardless of the format of how > credentials are used. Given the focus on mDLs within that API, I’d be > curious to know more of what technical details are being added to the ISO > spec at the protocol layer or data model layer to address these concerns. > For example, there’s been some good descriptions of how 2 can be solved by > restricting the sites which can request an mDL to only verifiers that are > authorized to with a PKI infrastructure [1]. Is there work going into this > by chance? > > - Kyle Den Hartog > > [1]: > https://github.com/w3c-fedid/digital-credentials/issues/35#issuecomment-2315300567 > > On Fri, Jun 20, 2025 at 2:55 AM, Andrew Hughes <andrewhughes3000@gmail.com > <On+Fri,+Jun+20,+2025+at+2:55+AM,+Andrew+Hughes+%3C%3Ca+href=>> wrote: > > And what if server retrieval mode is deprecated? What will you all > complain about next? > > Andrew Hughes CISM > m +1 250.888.9474 > AndrewHughes3000@gmail.com > https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrew-hughes-682058a > > > On Thu, Jun 19, 2025 at 4:44 PM Manu Sporny < msporny@digitalbazaar.com> > wrote: > >> On Sun, Jun 8, 2025 at 2:14 PM Tobias Looker <tobias.looker@mattr.global> >> wrote: >> > I too am supportive of the overarching message that I believe the no >> phone home statement is trying to make >> >> Good, I'm glad we agree on that. I hope that you, Oliver, and Andrew, >> given that each of you have played a central role in the mDL >> specification and its implementation, including the current version >> that specifies server retrieval, will remove server retrieval from ISO >> 18013-5. >> >> > There are also numerous other possible examples of possible >> "phone-home" vectors associated to W3C VC based credentials >> >> There is a significant amount of "whataboutism" in both your and >> Oliver's responses and that's distracting from one of the more >> concrete asks that led to the nophonehome.com website. >> >> I do agree that the compare/contrast is muddying the waters. If we >> need to focus on one thing here, we need to focus on the removal of at >> least verifier-based server retrieval, or any mechanism that strongly >> identifies the subject of interest to the issuer. That includes in >> both mDL and VCs and anywhere else this well-known anti-pattern pops >> up. >> >> Right now, the anti-pattern is firmly specified in ISO 18013-5. That's >> the difference here; server retrieval is NOT specified for W3C VCs (on >> purpose), and the sorts of "phone home dangers" both you and Oliver >> have outlined have well-known mitigations AND are explicitly called >> out as attacks on privacy in the W3C VC specifications. The mDL spec >> went in the opposite direction; it doesn't identify verifier-issuer >> server retrieval as an attack on privacy, AND it went further and >> specified exactly how to do it. >> >> All of this "whataboutism" is avoiding one of the core points of >> contention with the mDL specification. >> >> > It's hurtful to imply people aren't treating this seriously which is >> certainly how I interpret this statement >> >> Allow me to clarify then, because my intent isn't to hurt anyone's >> feelings. I know you, Oliver, and Andrew are thoughtful people and do >> care about security and privacy. I expect there are others in the WG >> that believe the same as well (but who knows how many since all of >> ISO's meetings on mDL are not minuted and are inaccessible to most of >> us; there's zero transparency there -- but, I admit that this is a >> separate issue worthy of its own thread). >> >> What I meant by "take it seriously" is that this criticism isn't going >> away. This is not the first time that you, Oliver, Andrew, or anyone >> else in the ISO WG have heard criticisms around server retrieval. It >> came in during multiple public review periods for mDL over the last >> several years that some nation states held on adoption of mDL. >> However, nothing happened to server retrieval as a result of that >> public commentary. >> >> That is why this is escalating now -- because the ISO 18013-5 WG >> didn't listen to the public commentary, or attempted to justify the >> privacy anti-pattern of server retrieval. Andrew's initial response >> was a repeat of how the previous responses had always gone: "Yes, the >> mDL WG thought about this long and hard and ended up where we are >> today for many good reasons." -- and then all the ensuing >> "whataboutism" in this thread that is muddying the waters on the >> initial concrete ask. >> >> The ISO 18013-5 WG should just fix the privacy harm that server >> retrieval introduces -- remove server retrieval since all of us agree >> that it's not broadly good for a free society. >> >> -- manu >> >> -- >> Manu Sporny - https://www.linkedin.com/in/manusporny/ >> Founder/CEO - Digital Bazaar, Inc. >> https://www.digitalbazaar.com/ >> >>
Received on Thursday, 19 June 2025 15:35:48 UTC