- From: Daniel Hardman <daniel.hardman@gmail.com>
- Date: Sat, 22 Feb 2025 09:09:59 -0700
- To: Christopher Allen <ChristopherA@lifewithalacrity.com>
- Cc: Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com>, Leonard Rosenthol <lrosenth@adobe.com>, "Andrea D'Intino" <andrea@dyne.org>, public-credentials@w3.org, Shannon Appelcline <shannon.appelcline@gmail.com>, Wolf McNally <wolf@wolfmcnally.com>
- Message-ID: <CACU_chkJA_hLnEvD_wGTEDWe578FCocsFLrNHimBDk8Z=obLMw@mail.gmail.com>
I will use Christopher's note about terminology to repeat a comment I've made several times, which is that we ought not to use "selective disclosure" for anything we do. Before the identity and credentials community started using "selective disclosure" as a term for a technique of sharing only part of a credential's attributes, this term already had a long, well-defined, and ugly history in financial services. It refers to the nefarious practice, by business executives, of sharing only part of the relevant details about company finances with an auditor, a regulator, or a potential acquirer, in order to distort perceptions and manipulate stock prices. (A simple web searching on this term, without using "credentials" or "identity" as a qualifier, will confirm the gravitas and age of that meaning relative to our own...) In other words, in the minds of many smart people, "selective disclosure" is a fraud technique. Applying such a term to an advocated feature in verifiable credentials doesn't seem like savvy politicking to me, especially if we want VCs in finance. --Daniel On Fri, Feb 21, 2025 at 9:47 PM Christopher Allen < ChristopherA@lifewithalacrity.com> wrote: > On Fri, Feb 21, 2025 at 7:23 AM Andrea D'Intino <andrea@dyne.org> wrote: > >> writing live from CCG data-integrity meeting: does anyone has some and >> examples about "selective redaction" (maybe Calvin Cheng?) >> > The term **"selective redaction"** lacks a well-defined formal meaning, > though it has gained traction—particularly within the Singapore DID/VC > community—to describe specific hash-based redaction techniques in > credential verification. However, at Blockchain Commons, we have generally > preferred the term **"elision"**, as the underlying technique is useful for > more than just redaction. > > The earliest reference to this topic within the W3C community that I’m > aware of is from 2016: > > Redaction Signature Suite 2016: > https://w3c-ccg.github.io/lds-redaction2016/ > > This JSON-LD Signature Suite used a hash list approach, but I don't know > if it was ever formally implemented. I believe the Singapore DID/VC > community uses something similar to it. ISO mID/mDOC also uses a hash list > approach, but they don't call it selective redaction. > > Elision, as we define it at Blockchain Commons, enables **structured > omission** of data while preserving cryptographic integrity. This allows > verifiable claims to be **selectively revealed or concealed** without > invalidating proofs. Unlike redaction, which focuses on removing data, > **elision can support progressive disclosure, controlled compression, and > layered encryption**, making it applicable to a wider range of use cases. > > We avoided the term **"selective redaction"** due to potential confusion > with **"selective disclosure."** Historically, selective disclosure > referred to **minimal disclosure**—revealing only the necessary subset of > data. However, more recently, it has also come to describe cryptographic > techniques like **BBS proofs**, which focus on unlinkability and > anti-correlation of signatures. Given these evolving meanings, precision in > terminology is crucial. > > For those interested, I’ve written extensively on **selective disclosure > and data minimization** in the context of verifiable data exchange: > > Musings of a Trust Architect -- Data Minimization & Selective > Disclosure: > https://www.blockchaincommons.com/musings/musings-data-minimization/) > > We have useful section of a our video on Gordian Envelope specifically > about "Elision and Redaction" starting at the 6m25s mark: > > Understanding Gordian Envelope (#Elision and Redaction 6m25s): > https://youtu.be/-vcLCFKQvik?feature=shared&t=385 > > On Fri, Feb 21, 2025 at 3:39 PM Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> The “selective redaction” that is needed for supply chain use cases has a >> similar sounding name but very different use case >> >> It’s not the subject / holder of the credential that wants to redact in >> supply chain - it’s the verifier that needs to redact it before passing it >> on to the next actor >> - personal use case : I want to redact MY personal details in MY >> credential before I show it to a verifier that wants it >> - supply chain use case : I received a credential from my supplier >> containing claims about my supplier (eg my farm is deforestation free). I >> need to redact the supplier name before I pass it on to my customer as >> evidence that my product is made from deforestation free inputs >> >> Sounds similar - but big difference in how it could be implemented. This >> supply chain use case is the rationale behind the trade trust (Singapore) >> selective redaction proof method >> > > For those interested in other practical use cases of elision (or > "selective redaction"), we written about how it can be applied across > industries such as education, where it enables secure, selective sharing of > student records; wellness, where it protects sensitive health data while > supporting controlled disclosures; and data distribution, where it ensures > recipients only access necessary information. More details can be found > here: > > Envelope Use Cases Overview: > https://developer.blockchaincommons.com/envelope/use-cases/ > > For more details on our specific **elision and our specific implementation > within Gordian Envelope**, which uses structure hash trees, see: > > Envelope Developer Overview: > https://developer.blockchaincommons.com/envelope/ > IETF draft-mcnally-envelope-08 -- The Gordian Envelope Structured Data > Format: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mcnally-envelope/ > > I’d be happy to provide additional pointers or discuss further if anyone > is interested. > > -- Christopher Allen > >
Received on Saturday, 22 February 2025 16:10:16 UTC