Re: Support, Co-editing Interest, and Suggestions for the did:cel Specification

čt 18. 12. 2025 v 7:23 odesílatel Amir Hameed <amsaalegal@gmail.com> napsal:

> I am writing to you following my review of the "The did:cel Method v0.3"
> draft specification published on 07 December 2025. I wish to express my
> strong support for the direction of this work.
>
> As someone involved with the Sirraya DID method, which shares the
> foundational philosophy of moving beyond heavy blockchain dependencies for
> decentralized identity, I find the witness-based architecture of did:cel to
> be a compelling and necessary evolution. Your focus on minimal
> infrastructure, near-zero cost, and censorship resistance directly
> addresses critical barriers to global adoption that blockchain-based
> methods inevitably face.
>
> I believe this approach represents a more scalable and pragmatic path
> forward for mainstream decentralized identity. The concept of "oblivious
> witnessing" is particularly elegant for balancing verifiability with
> privacy.
>
> I am keen to contribute more directly to this effort and would like to
> formally express my interest in joining as a co-editor of the
> specification. My experience with Sirraya has given me deep practical
> insights into the challenges and solutions in this space, which I believe
> would be valuable for the did:cel project.
>
> Furthermore, I have some technical reflections and suggestions that I
> think could strengthen the resilience and security model of the method:
>
>    1.
>
>    DAG-based Structure for Enhanced Robustness: The current linear
>    hash-linked CEL provides strong integrity. However, I propose exploring a
>    shift to a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) structure for the event log.
>    This could introduce a form of self-authentication and tamper detection where
>    multiple subsequent events can reference prior events. A fork or tampering
>    attempt would be immediately apparent as a "conflict" within the DAG, and a
>    predefined consensus rule (e.g., based on witness weight or topological
>    ordering) could allow the network to converge on the canonical history
>    autonomously, without relying solely on storage service policies.
>    2.
>
>    Adding Constraints for a More Robust Witness Model: To further
>    mitigate risks from witness collusion or coercion (as noted in Sec 6.1), we
>    could introduce formal constraints:
>    -
>
>       Temporal Diversity Requirement: A policy that witness proofs for an
>       event must come from services in operationally distinct time zones or
>       regulatory jurisdictions.
>       -
>
>       Proof-of-Freshness Challenge: Verifiers could issue a challenge
>       nonce that must be incorporated into the event hash witnessed, preventing
>       replay of old witness attestations.
>       -
>
>       Witness Set Commitments: The DID document could include a committed
>       Merkle root of its active witness set. Changing witnesses would require a
>       witnessed event, making sudden, suspicious changes to the trust model
>       transparent and auditable.
>
> I am very enthusiastic about the potential of did:cel and am convinced
> that a collaborative effort to integrate these kinds of graph-based and
> constraint-driven mechanisms could make it exceptionally robust. I would be
> happy to discuss these ideas further, elaborate on their technical
> implementation, or draft text for the specification.
>
> Thank you for your pioneering work on this. I look forward to the
> possibility of collaborating.
>
+1 Amir, as someone who’s been interested in this area for several years,
including through some overlap with the Bitcoin space, I’ve had a chance to
look over your work. Your interest in co-editing seems reasonable, and
having an additional editor with relevant implementation experience would
likely strengthen this work.


> Best regards,
>
> Amir Hameed
>
> Founder, Sirraya Labs
>