- From: Bob Wyman <bob@wyman.us>
- Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2025 18:12:27 -0400
- To: Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com>
- Cc: "W3C Credentials CG (Public List)" <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAA1s49V5KJLz2NA04EtRPnRuOh9CqT1tO4c8eupTxNc7MODPqQ@mail.gmail.com>
Alan Karp wrote: > "Policy is a topic I chose to avoid." How is "policy" distinguished from access control? bob wyman On Thu, Aug 21, 2025 at 5:43 PM Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> wrote: > On Thu, Aug 21, 2025 at 11:41 AM Bob Wyman <bob@wyman.us> wrote: > >> When addressing Composed Delegations, you say: >> >>> Composable: Dave needs to be able to get one permission from Alice, >>> another from Bob and use them both in the same API call. >> >> >> Imagine that Bob and Alice both have Q,U, and D privileges in respect to >> object X. Alice delegates Q and U to Dave. Bob Delegates U and D to Dave. >> Neither Bob nor Dave >> > > I think you mean Alice > > >> are aware that the other had delegated privileges to Dave. Now, Dave >> needs to do something to X that requires both U and D. Are you really >> comfortable with letting him combine the Q from Alice with the D from Bob? >> Doing this would allow Dave to do something that neither Bob nor Alice >> intended him to do. In fact, both Bob and Alice might be very surprised to >> learn that Dave had, in fact, done that thing. >> >> You could also ask if Alice's delegation to Dave violates some policy. > Policy is a topic I chose to avoid. > > If you want policy enforcement, you'll have to mediate delegations in some > way. However, you still need to deal with credential sharing to get around > blocked delegations. > > -------------- > Alan Karp > > > On Thu, Aug 21, 2025 at 11:41 AM Bob Wyman <bob@wyman.us> wrote: > >> When addressing Composed Delegations, you say: >> >>> Composable: Dave needs to be able to get one permission from Alice, >>> another from Bob and use them both in the same API call. >> >> >> Imagine that Bob and Alice both have Q,U, and D privileges in respect to >> object X. Alice delegates Q and U to Dave. Bob Delegates U and D to Dave. >> Neither Bob nor Dave are aware that the other had delegated privileges to >> Dave. Now, Dave needs to do something to X that requires both U and D. Are >> you really comfortable with letting him combine the Q from Alice with the D >> from Bob? Doing this would allow Dave to do something that neither Bob nor >> Alice intended him to do. In fact, both Bob and Alice might be very >> surprised to learn that Dave had, in fact, done that thing. >> >> bob wyman >> >> >> >> On Thu, Aug 21, 2025 at 1:49 PM Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> I have followed a variety of access control systems off and on for some >>> 30 years, including the recent discussion on this list of the use of OAuth >>> 2.0 and 2.1. I have concluded that many, if not all of them, suffer from >>> being based on use cases that are too simple. >>> >>> In an attempt to address that problem, I've constructed a bunch of use >>> cases <https://alanhkarp.com/UseCases.pdf> that I think capture all the >>> hazards an access control system must address. Comments, criticisms, and >>> corrections will be appreciated and resented in equal measure. >>> >>> -------------- >>> Alan Karp >>> >>
Received on Thursday, 21 August 2025 22:12:46 UTC