Re: When Technical Standards Meet Geopolitical Reality

Manu,

Thank you for your multiple thoughtful responses throughout very long
thread (July and August). Your dual perspective - acknowledging
disappointment while maintaining pragmatic hope - captures the tension many
of us feel.

> "it's disappointing to see our work co-opted and twisted into something
we didn't intend it to become. To have the core principles whittled away
until they are unrecognizable."

This whittling away isn't random - it follows predictable patterns. What
I'm documenting in a policy framework I'm developing is how this represents
"systematic inversion" through extraction incentives. Each compromise
shifts what's possible.

> "funders don't have unlimited patience and money, which typically drives
towards centralization."

This gets to the economic heart of the problem. It's not just impatience -
when platforms capture coordination infrastructure, they transform public
goods into private services. The "convenience trap" you describe - where
decentralized solutions remain "not easy enough" - is maintained by design,
not accident. Platforms benefit from this complexity asymmetry.

> "There are over 1.8 million digital driver's licenses in production in
the state of California now that are Verifiable Credentials and that use
Decentralized Identifiers."

Yes, this represents real progress in adoption. But when those DIDs are
did:web, we've achieved scale at the cost of principle. As you note:

> "While California DMV has adopted did:web, and while that's not as
decentralized as we'd like them to go, we haven't yet put something better
in front of them that achieves their goals."

The Controlled Identifiers specification you edited exemplifies this
dilemma:

> "the Controlled Identifiers specification is a distasteful specification.
I say this as the lead editor of that specification... but there was a
small group of people that were adamant that the specification exist"

You made the rational choice given the constraints - "compromise or watch
them kill the work." But each compromise creates path dependencies. What
was unthinkable (centralized DIDs) becomes debatable, then standard, then
mandatory.

Your question to Daniel about acceptable compromise is crucial:

> "Where's the bar, though? Is it good enough that it removes one thing
while adding another?"

I propose a different metric: does this compromise preserve or erode the
capacity for future resistance? California adopting did:web doesn't just
compromise today's decentralization - it makes future decentralization
harder.

> "we're not done yet. The decentralized bits are taking longer to build..."

True, but we need to be honest about trajectory. The gap between
centralized deployment and decentralized alternatives is widening, not
narrowing. Every pragmatic compromise increases platform leverage for the
next negotiation.

Regarding Kyle's edge-based age verification proposal, you raise valid
concerns:

> "Speaking as a parent that is stretched very thin... Why is the burden on
me, as a parent, to stop my kid from being pulled into a social media
website that is designed to be addicting?"

This is fair, but consider: the burden is already on you. Platforms just
make it invisible. When they fail (and they do fail), you discover your
child has been exposed to content you never approved. The difference with
edge-based systems is transparency about where responsibility lies, plus
tools to actually exercise it.

> "you're shifting a massive amount of liability onto the operating systems
and web browser, putting them in the position of policing content."

Actually, this highlights exactly what I call "graduated obligations" in my
framework - those with power should have proportional duties. Apple and
Google already police content through app stores. They already have this
power. The question is whether they have corresponding accountability.

Your point about society's expectations is important:

> "If you want to sell that stuff, you have to do so responsibly -- which
seems to be where society largely is these days."

But "responsibly" has become "require government ID for everyone," creating
surveillance infrastructure that far exceeds the original problem. We're
solving parental concerns by building systems that enable financial
exclusion and political control.

Your August reflection on Daniel's experience with his children's papers
was powerful:

> "The flush of adrenaline; the heat on your face, hits you before you can
process what's going on."

This visceral understanding of what's at stake is why your three focal
points matter:
- Broad dissemination so "confiscating the original documents" cannot happen
- Proper pseudonymity levels for transactions
- Enable broad base of issuers, not just government bureaucracies

But I worry these technical solutions assume good faith that doesn't exist.
When platforms control the infrastructure these credentials flow through,
they can still achieve confiscation through lockout, regardless of
cryptographic possession.

Your clarification to Kyle about alternative architecture was helpful:

> "we need to reevaluate how these primitives are put together into a
functioning architecture; specifically, what credentials are issued by whom
and who depends on those -- decentralize the issuers, if possible."

Yes, but also: who controls the pipes these credentials flow through?
Decentralized issuers mean little if centralized platforms mediate every
transaction.

You note that DIDs face resistance:

> "Even to this day the technology is snubbed in some circles with the
hopes that it will just go away."

This isn't just technical conservatism - it's active resistance from those
whose power depends on centralized control. The x509 diehards aren't wrong
technically; they're protecting an architecture that preserves existing
power relationships.

You're right that we've made significant progress since 2017 - global
standards for DIDs and VCs exist. But standards without power to enforce
them become suggestions. Utah's new SSI law, where the state explicitly
rejects the issuer role, shows alternative paths exist between purist and
pragmatist positions.

The work continues, but perhaps it's time to complement standards work with
building countervailing power - legal frameworks that constrain platforms,
economic models that resist extraction, and coalitions that can demand
rather than request.

-- Christopher Allen