Re: Phil Windley, Biometrics, and Digital Identities

How is a "kiosk inside a privacy booth at a supervised location" different
from a voting booth?

In any case, *electronic devices should never be used to tally or record
votes*. One may use such devices to count votes, but the result should only
be trusted after an appropriate amount of integrity assurance based on
manual counting of physical, non-electronic voting media.

bob wyman


On Thu, Feb 17, 2022 at 4:35 PM Christopher Allen <
ChristopherA@lifewithalacrity.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, Feb 7, 2022 at 10:03 PM Christopher Allen <
> ChristopherA@lifewithalacrity.com> wrote:
>
>> Proof-of-personhood does not require biometrics.
>>
>> https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fbloc.2020.590171/full
>>
>> There is a group of about 20 individuals and half-a-dozen companies that
>> have been meeting regularly to try to collaborate on approaches, or even
>> merge some efforts. We had a presentation this morning on
>> coercion-resistance for voting registration & possibly verifiable claims.
>>
>> I’m not suggesting that nothing requires biometrics, but far less than
>> you think.
>>
>
> That presentation on “coercion-resistance for voting registration” is now
> a published paper:
>
> https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.06692
>
> TRIP: Trustless Coercion-Resistant In-Person Voter Registration
>
> ABSTRACT: Most existing remote electronic voting systems are vulnerable
> to voter coercion and vote buying. While coercion-resistant voting systems
> address this challenge, current schemes assume that the voter has access to
> an untappable, incorruptible device during voter registration. We present
> TRIP, an in-person voter registration scheme enabling voters to create
> verifiable and indistinguishable real and fake credentials using an
> untrusted kiosk inside a privacy booth at a supervised location, e.g., the
> registrar's office. TRIP ensures the integrity of the voter's real
> credential while enabling the creation of fake credentials using
> interactive zero-knowledge proofs between the voter as the verifier and the
> kiosk as the prover, unbeknownst to the average voter. TRIP ensures that
> even voters who are under extreme coercion, and cannot leave the booth with
> a real credential, can delegate their vote to a political party, with the
> caveat that they must then trust the kiosk. TRIP optimizes the tallying
> process by limiting the number of credentials a voter can receive and
> capping the number of votes that a credential can cast per election. We
> conduct a preliminary usability study among 41 participants at a university
> and found that 42.5% of participants rated TRIP a B or higher in usability,
> a promising result for a voter registration scheme that substantially
> reduces trust in the registrar.
>
> — Christopher Allen
>
>