- From: Andrew Hughes <andrewhughes3000@gmail.com>
- Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2022 17:51:05 -0800
- To: Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com>
- Cc: Mike Prorock <mprorock@mesur.io>, W3C Credentials CG <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAGJp9Ub46+SBb2e2WGdyFVvK7V+_JfxmNn0f=Uh9WcSegUjJrg@mail.gmail.com>
All of that is fine. But still in the bleeding edge category. 800-63 is written for federal agencies to manage risk and ensure appropriate safeguards. On Sun, Dec 18, 2022 at 5:47 PM Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com> wrote: > Ok thank you Andrew > > With that specific scope, the criticisms are less valid > > However, even for that scope, isn’t there a valid pattern where a person > has their own did in their own wallet and has some kind of identity > credential (eg a drivers license) issued to that did - then this user > provides a VP to a completely different (government or non government) > party to create an account with identity integrity and then continue with > the service. Im not entirely sure the NIST document reflects that model? > > Steven Capell > Mob: 0410 437854 > > On 19 Dec 2022, at 12:17 pm, Andrew Hughes <andrewhughes3000@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > > Take a look at the Introduction and Scope text of the main document. SP > 800-63 is about how a federal government organization can attain confidence > in a person’s actual identity and then how to gain confidence that a > returning user is the same user previously enrolled. > It’s not about centralized or decentralized models. > > On Fri, Dec 16, 2022 at 9:30 AM Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Reading the table of contents you’d be forgiven for thinking that NIST >> have totally forgotten to include decentralised identity models >> >> Digging further into the document you can see in fig 1 page 12 there’s a >> diagram that has a bit of a flavour of decentralised models with the >> “credential service provider” (issuer?) that does “identity origins and >> enrolment” (issue Vc?) to an “applicant” (vc subject?) who then becomes a >> “subscriber” (to what?). The “subscriber” then “authenticates” (presents >> vp?) to a “relying party” (verifier?) and gets redirected to a “verifier” >> (another verifier?) to become a “claimant” and then can continue identified >> and authenticated interactions with a relying party. All three roles of >> “relying party”, “verifier”, “credential service provider” are wrapped in >> one box called “service provider functions” >> >> The diagram title is “non federated digital >> Identity model”. Don’t see anything in there about subject self issued >> identifiers (dids). >> >> It looks like an attempt to include half the ideas of a proper >> decentralised identity architecture and stuff them into a slightly tweaked >> version of the federated identity model (ie a “federation” of centralised >> idps) that we all know and “love” ;) >> >> I don’t understand the intent of fearing up this hybrid that is neither >> decentralised or centralised and labelling if “non-federated”? Why do >> that? Why not fully recognise the reality of decentralised models, name it >> appropriately, draw it correctly, and include one of the most foundational >> ideas (the did)? >> >> I think somebody with some clout (Anil?) should suggest some corrections >> to NIST >> >> Steven Capell >> Mob: 0410 437854 >> >> On 17 Dec 2022, at 3:17 am, Mike Prorock <mprorock@mesur.io> wrote: >> >> >> >> CCG, >> I would love to collect thoughtful feedback and review comments from >> members of the community on the the following: >> https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-63/4/draft >> >> There are some strong implications in this doc, and it may set the stage >> for many years to come, so we should all take some time to review >> carefully, and comment in a professional, proactive, and positive way on >> areas we are individually subject matter experts in. I would love feedback >> on the list as well for myself and the other Co-chairs as we review in >> depth additionally for any items that are highly positive in the draft(s) >> or areas of concern that could be refined to avoid future issues. >> >> thanks in advance! >> >> Mike Prorock >> CTO, Founder >> https://mesur.io/ >> >> -- > Andrew Hughes CISM CISSP > In Turn Information Management Consulting > o +1 650.209.7542 m +1 250.888.9474 > 5043 Del Monte Ave,, > <https://www.google.com/maps/search/5043+Del+Monte+Ave,,+Victoria,+BC+V8Y+1W9?entry=gmail&source=g> > Victoria, BC V8Y 1W9 > <https://www.google.com/maps/search/5043+Del+Monte+Ave,,+Victoria,+BC+V8Y+1W9?entry=gmail&source=g> > AndrewHughes3000@gmail.com > https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrew-hughes-682058a > Digital Identity | International Standards | Information Security > > -- Andrew Hughes CISM CISSP In Turn Information Management Consulting o +1 650.209.7542 m +1 250.888.9474 5043 Del Monte Ave,, Victoria, BC V8Y 1W9 AndrewHughes3000@gmail.com https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrew-hughes-682058a Digital Identity | International Standards | Information Security
Received on Monday, 19 December 2022 01:51:28 UTC