- From: Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com>
- Date: Sat, 22 May 2021 13:22:56 -0700
- To: "Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web)" <mwherman@parallelspace.net>
- Cc: Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@dustycloud.org>, "public-credentials@w3.org" <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CANpA1Z3yjGuM_kwyMvRMHjkav8LzqeH1ry1Yu3U6b43udSn+QA@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 4:20 AM Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) < mwherman@parallelspace.net> wrote: > > > Alan, taking this a step further, because every FDO has an MVCA and each > MVCA already has a subject property (a link to the specific FDO), the > subject property can be removed from the VCA and replaced with a link to > the top-level root MVCA. > Another reason to keep the subject property in the VCA just occurred to me. The FDO referred to in the MVCA might be a collection, but you want to issue a VCA for a subset. Of course, I don't know if people will want to deal with collections as a unit or only the individual items in them. -------------- Alan Karp On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 4:20 AM Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) < mwherman@parallelspace.net> wrote: > RE: A very important point you make is, "NOTE: An MI doesn’t have a > subject property. The target object is specified by the subject property of > the proclamation VCA." That point is so important, not separating > designation from authorization, that I'd like to see it in bold. > > > > Alan, taking this a step further, because every FDO has an MVCA and each > MVCA already has a subject property (a link to the specific FDO), the > subject property can be removed from the VCA and replaced with a link to > the top-level root MVCA. > > > > > > Love these TLAs. 😊 > > > > Michael > > > > *From:* Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> > *Sent:* May 17, 2021 12:07 PM > *To:* Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) <mwherman@parallelspace.net> > *Cc:* Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@dustycloud.org>; > public-credentials@w3.org > *Subject:* Re: Capability Authorization-enabled Decentralized Object > Model [was RE: The "Verifiable" Economy [was RE: a few thoughts about > zcaps]] > > > > Looks like you got it right. Just to be sure, I've asked some other > capability folks to take a look. > > > > A very important point you make is, "NOTE: An MI doesn’t have a subject > property. The target object is specified by the subject property of the > proclamation VCA." That point is so important, not separating designation > from authorization, that I'd like to see it in bold. > > > > Another useful example is delegating some permission of a second resource > to the resource provider of the first resource. An example might be, > "Translate the properties of this document and put those fields in this > other document." In this example, the resource provider of the first > document gets write but not read permission to some fields of the second > one. > > > -------------- > Alan Karp > > > > > > On Sun, May 16, 2021 at 10:35 PM Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) < > mwherman@parallelspace.net> wrote: > > RE: RE: Does the model include delegation of a subset of permissions? > > > > Alan, apologies for the short (and somewhat cryptic) reply last month. I > now have a complete description of the VE-ARM Fully Decentralized Object > (FDO) Model: > > > > The Verifiable Economy Architecture Reference Model (VE-ARM): Fully > Decentralized Object (FDO) Model > > > https://hyperonomy.com/2021/04/26/the-verifiable-economy-architecture-reference-model-ve-arm-fdo/ > > > > The goals of this article are three-fold: > > > > 1. Introduce the concept of a Verifiable Capability Authorizations > (VCA) and how they can be used to implement controls over which specific > methods a particular party is allowed to execute against a particular > instance of a Fully Decentralized Object (FDO). VCAs are both delegatable > and attenuatable. > 2. Illustrate how #graphitization techniques can be used for modeling > and visualizing: > > > 1. Trusted Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) > 2. DID Documents > 3. Trusted Digital Agents (and their Service Endpoints (SEPs)) > 4. Verifiable Credentials (VCs) > 5. Verifiable Capability Authorizations (VCAs) and, > 6. Most importantly, their myriad of interrelationships. > > > 1. Use the above 2 goals to further detail and describe how to use the > VE-ARM model for implementing trusted, reliable, efficient, frictionless, > standards-based, global-scale software systems based on Fully Decentralized > Objects (FDOs). > > > > Best regards, > > Michael Herman > > Far Left Self-Sovereignist > > > > Self-Sovereign Blockchain Architect > > Trusted Digital Web > > Hyperonomy Digital Identity Lab > > Parallelspace Corporation > > > > > > > > > > *From:* Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) <mwherman@parallelspace.net> > *Sent:* April 22, 2021 12:35 AM > *To:* Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> > *Cc:* Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@dustycloud.org>; > public-credentials@w3.org > *Subject:* RE: Capability Authorization-enabled Decentralized Object > Model [was RE: The "Verifiable" Economy [was RE: a few thoughts about > zcaps]] > > > > RE: Does the model include delegation of a subset of permissions? > > > > The current vision is that the VCA delegation model includes any > collection of methods authorizable against a subject entity by the entity’s > AGENT wrt to a particular invocating entity. > > > > Michael > > > > *From:* Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> > *Sent:* April 21, 2021 8:47 PM > *To:* Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) <mwherman@parallelspace.net> > *Cc:* Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@dustycloud.org>; > public-credentials@w3.org > *Subject:* Re: Capability Authorization-enabled Decentralized Object > Model [was RE: The "Verifiable" Economy [was RE: a few thoughts about > zcaps]] > > > > Does the model include delegation of a subset of permissions? > > > -------------- > Alan Karp > > > > > > On Wed, Apr 21, 2021 at 6:18 PM Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) < > mwherman@parallelspace.net> wrote: > > Here’s the final first iteration of *The Verifiable Economy Architecture > Reference Model (VE-ARM)* (at least for awhile): > https://hyperonomy.com/2021/04/21/the-verifiable-economy-architecture-reference-model-ve-arm/ > > > > The scenario used to model the VE-ARM is an example of a citizen (Erin) of > a fictional Canadian province called Sovronia being issued and holding a > valid physical Sovronia Driver’s License (Erin RW SDL) as well as a > digital, verifiable Sovronia Driver’s License (Erin SDL). It includes > Verifiable Capability Authorization support (based on the RWoT article). > > > > The VE-ARM details every moving part (almost). …this is potentially of > interest to anyone of creating a new fully-decentralized, verifiable, > credential-based economy …e.g. some of the health pass initiatives. > > > > The visualization uses some interesting queries that were created using > Neo4j to automatically build the underlying model directly from the actual > DID Document, Verifiable Credential, and Verifiable Capability > Authorization JSON files used in the example scenario. > > > > Best regards, > > Michael Herman > > Far Left Self-Sovereignist > > > > Self-Sovereign Blockchain Architect > > Trusted Digital Web > > Hyperonomy Digital Identity Lab > > Parallelspace Corporation > > > > > > > > *From:* Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) <mwherman@parallelspace.net> > *Sent:* April 17, 2021 5:54 PM > *To:* Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com>; Christopher Lemmer Webber < > cwebber@dustycloud.org> > *Cc:* public-credentials@w3.org > *Subject:* RE: Capability Authorization-enabled Decentralized Object > Model [was RE: The "Verifiable" Economy [was RE: a few thoughts about > zcaps]] > *Importance:* Low > > > > It’s understandable why folks have difficulty understanding a complete, > integrated DID, DID Document, VC, and VCA (Verifiable Capability > Authorization) data model. > > Here’s a graph of the DID and Public Key ID relationships for a simple *Erin’s > Sovronia Driver’s License* scenario I’m working on… > > SDL = Sovronia Driver’s License, PoS = Province of Sovronia, DD = DID > Document, VCA MI = VCA Method Invocation. > > > > > > “More news at 11:15…”, > > Michael > > > > *From:* Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> > *Sent:* April 7, 2021 11:53 AM > *To:* Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) <mwherman@parallelspace.net> > *Cc:* Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>; public-credentials@w3.org; > Christopher Lemmer Webber <cwebber@dustycloud.org> > *Subject:* Re: Capability Authorization-enabled Decentralized Object > Model [was RE: The "Verifiable" Economy [was RE: a few thoughts about > zcaps]] > > > > On Wed, Apr 7, 2021 at 7:09 AM Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) < > mwherman@parallelspace.net> wrote: > > I see all of this converging into a Capability Authorization-enabled > Decentralized Object Model. “More news at 11…” > > > > You made my day. I just want to make sure your proposal can handle cases > more complex than requesting a single file from a resource server. I > believe that any system that can handle the example in > https://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2008/HPL-2008-204R1.pdf is general > enough. (It won Best Paper at ARES 2010, so you don't think I'm blowing > smoke.) > > > > In that scenario, Alice wishes to use Bob's backup service, which relies > on Carol's copy service. We show that authentication-based schemes can > lead to bad results. For example, Alice specifies a file she is not > allowed to read, and Bob specifies a file he does not have permission to > write. Nevertheless, Carol reads the input and writes it to the > output, potentially destroying one of her files. These problems cannot > arise with capabilities. > > > -------------- > Alan Karp > > > > > > On Wed, Apr 7, 2021 at 7:09 AM Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) < > mwherman@parallelspace.net> wrote: > > I see all of this converging into a Capability Authorization-enabled > Decentralized Object Model. “More news at 11…” > > > > > > > > *From:* Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) <mwherman@parallelspace.net> > *Sent:* April 4, 2021 8:36 PM > *To:* Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>; public-credentials@w3.org > *Subject:* The "Verifiable" Economy [was RE: a few thoughts about zcaps] > > > > After ruminating on ZCAPs, VCs, DIDs, and DID Documents over Easter > dinner, it occurred to me that we’re on the verge of creating a model for a > “verifiable” economy… > > > > > > …glaze the above with your favorite verifiable digital currency and voila! > > > > Best wishes, > > Michael Herman > > Far Left Self-Sovereignist > > > > Self-Sovereign Blockchain Architect > > Trusted Digital Web > > Hyperonomy Digital Identity Lab > > Parallelspace Corporation > > > > > > > > > > *From:* Michael Herman (Trusted Digital Web) > *Sent:* April 4, 2021 11:22 AM > *To:* Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>; public-credentials@w3.org > *Subject:* RE: a few thoughts about zcaps > > > > 1. In https://w3c-ccg.github.io/zcap-ld/, I found the "authority by > possession" label to be quite confusing (and hence, the car key metaphor). > When I read "authority by possession", I read "authority by [simple] > possession" and this couldn't be further from what is presented in > https://github.com/WebOfTrustInfo/rwot5-boston/blob/master/draft-documents/lds-ocap/lds-ocap.md. > When I read the latter, I interpret that scenario as "authority by > delegation" ...delegation of a capability to a specific subject (e.g. > grantedkey in the latter; invoker in the former). The Proclamation is > only valid in the hands of the Delegatee …not an arbitrary possessor. > 2. The (conventional) car key analog is confusing because car keys are > generally not bound to any specific person/subject. Perhaps if it was a > car key on Alyssa’s keyring, that would be a better analogy …but it doesn’t > really help …because then it becomes clear that we’re talking about > delegation of the use of the car key …and not the actual car. > > > > 1. https://w3c-ccg.github.io/zcap-ld/#example-1 appears to be a > capability to control the entire car (e.g. open the trunk, change the oil, > repaint the exterior) …not simply the capability to drive the car. This is > contrary to the statement “The following document delegates authority from > the car (who always has authority over itself) to Alyssa so that she may > drive”. Where is the “Drive” attenuation specified in Example 1? > > > > In general, I found the presentation of this subject to be much more clear > and digestible in the RWoT paper. > > > > Best regards, > > Michael > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com> > Sent: April 4, 2021 7:09 AM > To: public-credentials@w3.org > Subject: Re: a few thoughts about zcaps > > > > On 4/3/21 2:39 PM, Nikos Fotiou wrote: > > > I was reading zcaps draft, as well as related work, mostly macaroons > > > (https://research.google/pubs/pub41892/). > > > > Hi Nikos, attempts at responding to your concerns below... > > > > > Something that I found confusing about capability documents is that > > > they do not make clear the actions they concern. For example from this > > > https://w3c-ccg.github.io/zcap-ld/#example-1 it is not clear that this > > > is a capability for "driving a car". > > > > Yes, that document needs an overhaul and is a bit dated. It's good to get > some of the basics, but still needs to be made more accessible. > > > > For example, I don't think much time is spent on expressing the caveats > and actions... or why one would pick a zcap over a VC... which you get to > below. > > > > > From this, it is clear not only the importance of caveats, but also > > > how challenging is to implement and evaluate them correctly, e.g., a > > > caveat can only confine a capability you already have. > > > > Yes, the specification needs to be updated and your feedback is very good > feedback. > > > > We are still trying to figure out how to explain these things to people. > > Capabilities-based systems are not a new concept; they're decades old at > this point. The challenge has always been in communicating why they're > useful and have a place in modern security systems. > > > > The Encrypted Data Vault work uses zcaps, and it's there that we're trying > hard to explain to developers how to use it: > > > > https://identity.foundation/confidential-storage/#introduction > > > > The documentation is lacking around zcaps, but it's an active area of > development and we're trying very hard to communicate not only the core > technology, but some concrete design patterns around them. > > > > All this to say that you make very good points and we're working on it... > and would love some help if you can spare the time. :) > > > > -- manu > > > > -- > > Manu Sporny - https://www.linkedin.com/in/manusporny/ > > Founder/CEO - Digital Bazaar, Inc. > > blog: Veres One Decentralized Identifier Blockchain Launches > https://tinyurl.com/veres-one-launches > > > > > >
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Received on Saturday, 22 May 2021 20:23:25 UTC