- From: Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>
- Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2020 21:10:48 -0500
- To: Daniel Hardman <daniel.hardman@evernym.com>
- Cc: Oliver Terbu <oliver.terbu@consensys.net>, Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>, W3C Credentials Community Group <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CANYRo8ivmJukjJbDY=jir40TWP7wEDys4PcSia=ZCFvky6bL3Q@mail.gmail.com>
I don't understand how hashlinks mitigate the issuer's attack of creating a new context for each subject. Is this issue a cousin of revocation issues and should the privacy aspects of both be addressed in a coherent manner? Extensibility is critical, as Manu makes clear. Listening to today's discussions on standardized educational credentials makes me ask: Where is our best general discussion of extensibility and community-operated registries? Adrian On Tue, Jan 7, 2020 at 5:37 PM Daniel Hardman <daniel.hardman@evernym.com> wrote: > That's an excellent question. I've been ignoring it because Sovrin-style > presentations use JSON-LD only very modestly thus far--whereas we have > every intention of using JSON-LD's extensibility heavily on the credential > side. Perhaps I will catch up to your thinking eventually... > > On Tue, Jan 7, 2020 at 3:26 PM Oliver Terbu <oliver.terbu@consensys.net> > wrote: > >> My apologies for conflating VC and VP in my previous email. While I agree >> that this separation exists, I don't see that this can mitigate the >> described issue in all cases as the VP can still include the VC and the >> potentially malicious context. >> >> In that case, enforcing the validity checks at the verifier would cause >> verifiers to fail if the issuer had malicious intent. If there is enough >> pressure or incentive on verifiers to support these VCs, the system would >> need a fallback to support plain JSON to preserve the user's privacy. Then, >> the question is why should that not be the default case as it is also much >> simpler? >> >> Oliver >> >> On Tue, Jan 7, 2020 at 10:21 PM Daniel Hardman < >> daniel.hardman@evernym.com> wrote: >> >>> I think one of the reasons why the community has agreed to think of a >>> presentation and a credential as two different (though highly related) >>> types of data is that making the distinction allows us to make different >>> extensibility vs. security/privacy tradeoffs in credentials versus >>> presentations, per circumstances. Extensibility of *credentials* need >>> not trigger sacrifices in security/privacy of *presentations*, if we >>> don't conflate the two. But as long as we conflate the two, we create >>> unnecessary baggage in either direction. >>> >>> On Tue, Jan 7, 2020 at 2:01 PM Oliver Terbu <oliver.terbu@consensys.net> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> See my comments below ... >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jan 7, 2020 at 8:08 PM Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 1/7/20 1:22 PM, Oliver Terbu wrote: >>>>> > Note, that JSON-only processors won't have that issue and you can >>>>> > replace "government" with any type of issuers that have an interest >>>>> > in the online behavior of the user. >>>>> >>>>> JSON-only processors that don't have an extensibility mechanism will >>>>> fail to enable diverse industries to create their own credential types >>>>> and will fail in the market. What am I missing? >>>>> >>>> >>>> That is not related to the issue. However, I don't see that necessarily >>>> to happen without having JSON-LD but I recognized that this is a discussion >>>> where we will likely not come to a shared conclusion (see the most recent >>>> W3C DID WG discussion). >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> This isn't purely a JSON vs. JSON-LD issue -- it's a more specific >>>>> version of the phone home problem and there are mechanisms (as Orie >>>>> deftly outlined in the previous email) that can prevent phone home if a >>>>> URL is going to be used to retrieve external information as a part of >>>>> the verification process. Note that the spec talks about this very >>>>> attack: >>>>> >>>>> https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/#validity-checks >>>>> >>>>> There are also multiple solutions to this specific concern (among the >>>>> ones that Orie has already mentioned), but the easiest ones at a higher >>>>> level are: >>>>> >>>>> * Wallets should mark VCs as potentially being used to track them if >>>>> the >>>>> JSON-LD Contexts are not well known. >>>>> >>>>> * Verifiers should reject VCs containing contexts that are not well >>>>> known and/or loaded from a cache. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Companies that are large enough could exert enough pressure to dilute >>>> these checks. Furthermore, many of these checks are prone to errors as the >>>> complexity is quite considerable. >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> ... and in the very worst case: >>>>> >>>>> * Industry launches a mix-net caching proxy for JSON-LD contexts if >>>>> this >>>>> really becomes an issue. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> I guess that could work :) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Does that answer your question, Oliver? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Partially, yes. >>>> >>>> Note, that does not mean that we won't support processing of JSON-LD in >>>> VCs. >>>> >>>> Still, I don't see any good reason why we should prioritise >>>> extensibility over security and privacy at theses layers. >>>> >>>> Oliver >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- manu >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Manu Sporny (skype: msporny, twitter: manusporny) >>>>> Founder/CEO - Digital Bazaar, Inc. >>>>> blog: Veres One Decentralized Identifier Blockchain Launches >>>>> https://tinyurl.com/veres-one-launches >>>>> >>>>>
Received on Wednesday, 8 January 2020 02:11:02 UTC