- From: steve capell <steve.capell@gmail.com>
- Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2020 10:48:16 +1000
- To: steve.e.magennis@gmail.com
- Cc: daniel.hardman@evernym.com, Luca Boldrin <luca.boldrin@infocert.it>, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>, W3C Credentials CG <public-credentials@w3.org>, Chris Gough <chris.gough@gosource.com.au>, Roman Evstifeev <someuniquename@gmail.com>, Richard Spellman <richard.spellman@gosource.com.au>
- Message-ID: <CAEMprt+wLrzgOiOzSSnPv2Y-BU2eODMqRMCufsMyd1d7ue1+rQ@mail.gmail.com>
just to give you a feel for the scale of this "edge case" issue. The world bank together with partner UN agencies maintain statistics on a thing called the "cost of trade"- its complex stuff but can be simplified to roughly the ratio of price of the thing at the warehouse door of the distributor in an importing nation - over the price of the same thing at factory door of the producer in the exporting nation. So, for example, the cost of trade would be 100% if you can buy a sack of potatoes at the farm gate in USA for $10 but the same sack of potatoes costs $20 from the distributor warehouse in china (for the example of potatoes exported from Us to china). Globally the average cost of trade between all nations hovers at around 90% for manufactured goods and 150% for agricultural goods. Obviously it's a super-critical number when reduced to specific bilateral pathways because it has a huge impact on the relative competitiveness of national produce in export markets. For example is USA-CN cost of trade is 120% but EU-china cost of trade is 80% then EU producers are significantly advangated. the (very) interesting question is - how does this 100% average cost of trade break down? where are these costs? Of course the answer is specific to particular trade lanes but on average it's something like: - 40% is distributor markup (ie profit int he supply chain) - 30% is the actual cost of transport - 30% is border costs. what is even more interesting is that, of that 30% border costs, on average, only around 10% is duty. So the other 20% are "non-tariff barriers" like the paper certificates I described. Now when you realise that international trade accounts for around 20% of world GDP then this 20% is a LOT. world GDP currently stands at $80Tn USD. So international trade is maybe a bit under $20Tn (including the cost of trade). So these non-tariff border costs add up to at least $1Trillion. not an edge case I think.... On Sat, 1 Aug 2020 at 10:17, steve capell <steve.capell@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Steve, > > "except maybe with very specific use cases, at which point you probably > already have sufficient a-priori knowledge that a verifier wouldn’t need to > go (much) beyond the issuer to determine if they trust the issuer or not" > > My main use cases are in international trade and specifically where the > issuer is in the exporting country and the verifier is in the importing > country. And pretty much ALL of my use cases are therefore of the "very > specific" kind that you indicate may be an unusual edge-case. My view is > that they are certainly not unusual - they are an every day occurrence at > volumes that make your eyes water. > > For example - lets get specific with two very common kinds of certificates. > > - A "preferential certificate or origin" is a document issued by an > authorised body in the exporting country (in USA, one of 7000 chambers of > commerce) that attests that the goods in a specific shipment (identified > with a consignment number and/or invoice number) conform to the terms of > free trade agreement. Crucially, the verifier is the customs authority in > the importing country who will decide whether they believe the (currently > mostly paper / wet seal) certificate is valid. If so then the importer is > granted preferential duty rates. Note that a certificate of origin must > accompany EVERY shipment. It's not a multiple use license, it is a single > use certificate. Obviously there are literally millions of them issued > every day around the world. They are a burden (is a non-tariff barrier) on > trade. > - A "phytosanitary certificate" is a document issued by an accredited > person (a qualified food health inspector) in the exporting country that > attests that the plant material (there are different certificates for > animal products) meet the quality criteria of the importing jurisdiction. > There are complex rules maintained by most exporting nations about exactly > what kind of phyto certificate is needed by which country for which > category of plant based material. Just search through this for a bit to > see what I mean - > https://micor.agriculture.gov.au/Plants/Pages/default.aspx. that's > just for plants - there are five other categories. The actual certificates > are issued by accredited persons - in Australia they are called "Australian > Authorised Officers" - to become one, you go through this process > https://www.agriculture.gov.au/export/controlled-goods/plants-plant-products/ao. > there are around 700 officers in australia. The department maintains a list > of accredited officers at > https://www.agriculture.gov.au/export/controlled-goods/plants-plant-products/ao/register as > a set of state level pdf documents. Like certificates of origin, > phytosanitary certificates are single use and so there are also millions > issued all the time and they also present a non-tariff barrier to trade and > also a high entry barrier to export markets for domestic SME food producers. > > Now, back to your "specific" case. The verifier in the importing country > (who often doest speak english) cannot be expected to know that a > particular chamber (of hundreds) or authorised officer (of hundreds) is > accredited or not. very often they are legislatively obliged not to trust > these random claims. However, under the terms of Free Trade Agreements etc, > most importing customs authorities will trust the exporting regulator to > assert the veracity of a digital version. It's not often actually done > which is why the majority of these millions of daily certificates are still > paper and why they are often faked. Also it's not uncommon when there is > either some corruption at the border or some greater political tension > between nations, that an importing authority customs officer will reject a > valid certificate - to make a point or to get paid some rort. These use > cases are crying out for a high integrity digital equivalent where fakes > are hard to make and valid ones cannot be refuted. > > So these very specific use case do require a chain of trust between the > issuer (who is definitely unknown and untrusted by the verifier) and the > accreditation authority (who is almost always some agency of the exporting > government and so is known and trusted by the verifier - often legislated > in the FTA). > > Our solution to this problem if digitising certificates has two phases > > 1. a single central government site (portal) has the job of > registering, identifying, and authorising domestic issuers of certificates > (eg chambers and authorised officers). It'll include manual or > semi-automated checks against public lists like those PDF docs from the > department of agriculture. Idetity would be confirmed via national ID > frameworks such as myGovID in Australia. Then this authorised issuer loads > their certificate and the site wraps it in a VC and notarises it to a > public ledger - puts a QR code on the cert. The importing authority > customs officer can scan the QR code and will see a ".gov.au" domain as the > issuer and so trusts it. The scan returns also the original ceritificate > as issued so it can be compared against the one provided by the importer - > thereby preventing just sticking the genuine QR on a fake cert. This is a > "semi distributed, semi digital" model that basically still has the human > readable certificates - just that they can be send as a PDF in an email > attachment (avoiding the whole original document, wet seal, fedex bag > stuff) and also cannot be unreasonably refuted at the border. > 2. the above scenario still has a lot of centralisation in it and not > much machine automation - but still adds a lot of value. The next phase is > what has been driving my questions to this WG. In that phase, the > certificate data is JSON and there are two VCs - one issued to the > certifier (ie chamber or AAO) by the government - it's a certificate of > accreditation. the other is the actual certificate of origin or > phyosanitary certificate issued by the authorised entity. They will need > to be identity linked - possibly via a DID representing the authorised > entity. Both certificates are provided in native digital form, maybe via a > G2G channel called a "secure trade lane" or otherwise via any B2B2G > channel. The VCs are verified by the importing regulator system so that > the corresponding consignment can be auto-cleared (at least from an > origin criteria and food health perspective). > > Phase 2 above is what we'd like to do following best practices in the DID > / VC / DIF world - hence my original question. > > kind regards, > steve > > > On Fri, 31 Jul 2020 at 23:59, <steve.e.magennis@gmail.com> wrote: > >> … upon further refection. >> >> Having a verification process that checks the issuer of a VC so the >> verifier can determine if they trust them, >> >> and if they do not then checks the whoever accredits / authorized / >> certified the issuer so the verifier can determine if they trust them >> >> and if not, checks the whoever accredits / authorized / >> certified them, etc. >> >> >> >> Is interesting and has a nice recursive symmetry, but would also require >> that Accreditation / authorization / certification VC’s be issued at all >> levels starting at the top and somehow chained down to the issuer. At this >> point of market maturity that seems like a pretty unlikely think to happen >> except maybe with very specific use cases, at which point you probably >> already have sufficient a-priori knowledge that a verifier wouldn’t need to >> go (much) beyond the issuer to determine if they trust the issuer or not. >> >> >> >> Would welcome use cases that show I’m thinking about this incorrectly. >> >> >> >> -S >> >> >> >> *From:* steve.e.magennis@gmail.com <steve.e.magennis@gmail.com> >> *Sent:* Thursday, July 30, 2020 6:54 PM >> *To:* daniel.hardman@evernym.com >> *Cc:* 'Steve Capell' <steve.capell@gmail.com>; 'Luca Boldrin' < >> luca.boldrin@infocert.it>; 'Adrian Gropper' <agropper@healthurl.com>; >> 'W3C Credentials CG' <public-credentials@w3.org> >> *Subject:* RE: A question on best practices for dependent claims >> >> >> >> Agree, but I think Steve C. presents an interesting nuance that intrigues >> me. Defining acceptable authority or creating white lists implies an >> a-priori perspective of what a verifier would consider acceptable. Here, I >> think, the situation is that even if an assurance is unacceptable at one >> level, if the chain of assurance can be followed to the entity at the next >> level up … and that entity is acceptable then the verifier could be OK with >> it. Of course a verifier could always set the minimal level of acceptance >> to be the top most level (e.g. government or other well know body) and be >> assured that they wouldn’t reject anything unnecessarily, but that would be >> heavy handed. Maybe there can be a dynamic nature to setting the threshold. >> >> >> >> *From:* Daniel Hardman <daniel.hardman@evernym.com> >> *Sent:* Thursday, July 30, 2020 4:33 PM >> *To:* Steve Magennis <steve.e.magennis@gmail.com> >> *Cc:* Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com>; Luca Boldrin < >> luca.boldrin@infocert.it>; Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>; W3C >> Credentials CG <public-credentials@w3.org> >> *Subject:* Re: A question on best practices for dependent claims >> >> >> >> Aries RFC 0430 ("Machine Readable Governance Frameworks") >> <https://github.com/hyperledger/aries-rfcs/blob/master/concepts/0430-machine-readable-governance-frameworks/README.md> >> contemplates this question and answers it by saying that any governance >> framework can answer the question by a DIF-style presentation definition, >> an Indy proof request, or some other demand for proof. That is, the gov fw >> can say, "Trust any university that can present a credential issued by DID >> X, showing that they're accredited." Or the gov fw can say, "Trust any DID >> in the following list." Or lots of other variations. >> >> The thinking is that software "installs" or "activates" a gov framework. >> A user might get prompted: "Do you want to use trust rules about how >> universities are accredited, as codified by Org X?" Saying yes activates >> the gov framework for all proving contexts that identify that gov >> framework, going forward. Once the user says yes, the software reads the >> rules that tell how an org becomes trusted to be an issuer or a verifier, >> and automatically challenges other parties to prove their bona fides on >> behalf of the user. >> >> >> >> On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 5:05 PM <steve.e.magennis@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Actually, these are exactly the type of use cases I think are important >> to get on the radar of the WG to challenge our thinking. In your Sarah Doe >> example, as I understand it the department of public health in Australia >> accredits inspectors directly, so the chain is pretty short: the validator >> is either comfortable with the assurance of the government or is not. In >> other scenarios a verifier might have to continue farther up the chain to >> reach an institution they know or are comfortable with. >> >> >> >> -S >> >> >> >> *From:* Steve Capell <steve.capell@gmail.com> >> *Sent:* Thursday, July 30, 2020 3:10 PM >> *To:* steve.e.magennis@gmail.com >> *Cc:* Luca Boldrin <luca.boldrin@infocert.it>; Adrian Gropper < >> agropper@healthurl.com>; W3C Credentials CG <public-credentials@w3.org> >> *Subject:* Re: A question on best practices for dependent claims >> >> >> >> Thanks steve, I will have a look at toip >> >> >> >> “ The main question is what does a verifier need to trust. In the above >> example, is the question simply do I have the right university, or is it >> that the university accredited, by a certified accreditor, etc. In the real >> world, much of this is known to and trusted a-priori by the participants, >> or at least is assumed based on seeing a familiar name, a letterhead, >> having had previous contact, etc.” >> >> >> >> It’s certainly true that, as a verifier, I really don’t need the trust >> chain to price accreditation if the issuer itself is already well known (eg >> Oxford / Harvard). But most o our use cases are not like that. It’s not >> general public knowledge (although often publically accessible ) that >> Australian business 78 145 321 320 is the trademark owner of lindemans >> wine. Or that John Smith is an accredited vet. Or that Sarah doe is an >> authorised officer that is accredited for food safety inspections - and so >> on. These are our main use cases >> >> Steven Capell >> >> Mob: 0410 437854 >> >> >> >> On 30 Jul 2020, at 11:50 pm, steve.e.magennis@gmail.com wrote: >> >> >> >> I would highly recommend looking into the Trust over IP Governance Stack >> WG (disclosure I am vice-chair for the group). We are dealing with just >> such questions and welcome a variety of perspectives, especially grounded >> in real use cases. >> >> >> >> Currently some of the thinking is focused on the notion of >> ‘self-certification’ and ‘self-attestation’ vs. certification or >> attestation from a ‘known and trusted’ source whose trust is at least >> partially anchored by operating within a trust framework (that participants >> can trust). For example a university may self-certify their ability to >> issue a diploma VC. The perceived value of that VC though is connected to >> the university being accredited by an educational accreditation body, who >> in turn is certified by CHEA or the US department of education (in the US), >> who at the top of the authority chain is self-certified. In the future >> there may even be a separate accreditation body, independent of the chain >> just described that is solely focused on the issuance of diploma >> credentials from accredited and non-accredited universities. >> >> >> >> The main question is what does a verifier need to trust. In the above >> example, is the question simply do I have the right university, or is it >> that the university accredited, by a certified accreditor, etc. In the real >> world, much of this is known to and trusted a-priori by the participants, >> or at least is assumed based on seeing a familiar name, a letterhead, >> having had previous contact, etc. so a verifier probably doesn’t need the >> entire chain of authority to properly evaluate a VC. When participants seek >> trust assurance because they don’t already have it or there is presumed >> risk of fraudulent activity is where the problem comes in. >> >> >> >> <image001.png> >> >> >> >> >> >> *From:* Luca Boldrin <luca.boldrin@infocert.it> >> *Sent:* Thursday, July 30, 2020 12:12 AM >> *To:* steve capell <steve.capell@gmail.com>; Adrian Gropper < >> agropper@healthurl.com> >> *Cc:* W3C Credentials CG <public-credentials@w3.org>; Luca Boldrin < >> luca.boldrin@infocert.it> >> *Subject:* R: A question on best practices for dependent claims >> >> >> >> Dear Steve, all, >> >> >> >> this is a familiar issue in EU, due to the large diffusion on legally >> binding digital signature (eIDAS regulation), and especially of its >> strongest form which is the “qualified” digital signature. IMHO, it does >> not have a satisfying solution yet. >> >> >> >> The most common way of dealing with the “right of issuing credentials” in >> EU is simply through “liability”: when vet John Smith issues a credential, >> he is in fact signign a document with a key whose public key is certified >> by a CA who identified him. In signing the document, John Smith is himself >> claiming to be an authorized vet, and he takes legal responsibility for >> that (identification is essential to enforce liability). >> >> >> >> This is however not satisfying in many situations, like those you >> mention. A different approach involves “role certificates”, public key >> certificates issued by the CA which additionally contains a specific “role” >> attribute (e.g., “accredited vet”). The process for issuing/revoking such >> certificates involves the authority (e.g. https://www.anzcvs.org.au/ ), >> which must interact with the CA. The interaction with the CA is a critical >> point, especially when the vet loses his qualification: the authority >> should inform the CA, and the CA should revoke the certificate. This >> process is CA-centric and inefficient. >> >> >> >> The use of external existing oracles, as recommended by Adrian, is >> certainly a valid option. The issue here is obviously that the verifyer has >> to be oracle-aware, and implement as many oracle integrations as there are >> oracles. >> >> >> >> There is now a lot of interest on “trust frameworks”, as a set of tools >> to support the verifier. I’ve seen different approaches, from those based >> on linked credentials to those based on external infrastructures (e.g., DNS >> like in lightest.eu or centrally managed like in >> https://github.com/hyperledger/aries-rfcs/tree/master/concepts/0430-machine-readable-governance-frameworks). >> Applicability to IOT (where automatizaion is paramount) appears to be >> relevant. >> >> >> >> I believe this will be a field of growing interest. I am very interested >> in hearing of other views. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> >> --luca >> >> >> >> >> >> *Da:* steve capell <steve.capell@gmail.com> >> *Inviato:* giovedì 30 luglio 2020 02:21 >> *A:* Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> >> *Cc:* W3C Credentials CG <public-credentials@w3.org> >> *Oggetto:* Re: A question on best practices for dependent claims >> >> >> >> Hi Adrian, >> >> >> >> Thanks for that - a lot of common sense in there. And, yes, I think you >> are right about not overwhelming existing trust chains with too much >> digital change. >> >> >> >> I think it'll work fine for most use cases. We do have a few cases where >> the register is not public (for example "Australian Trusted Traders" - a >> kind of international supply chain accreditation granted after audit of >> facilities and processes). But perhaps the simple solution for that is >> just that the "convener" needs also to be trusted by the accreditation >> authority and API access is authenticated. >> >> >> >> I really appreciate this response Adrian. And if anyone else has any >> ideas to contribute, we are listening attentively and gratefully ;) >> >> >> >> kind regards, >> >> steve >> >> >> >> On Thu, 30 Jul 2020 at 09:32, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> >> wrote: >> >> At least for medical, and maybe veterinary, practice the solution is not >> as complicated as it would seem if we make best use of existing regulations >> and practices. The problem arises when we try to overwhelm the existing >> chains of trust with excess digital innovation. >> >> >> >> For example: >> >> - Licensed physicians have public credentials that can be used to >> hold them accountable if their actions are logged in non-repudiable way. >> - Because these credentials are public, it makes no difference how >> they are held or even if they are published by an oracle like a state board. >> - Many state and federal boards already offer APIs that can serve as >> oracles. >> - A simple DID credential that links an official oracle with the DID >> can be self-signed or co-signed by a notary who also reviews a driver's >> license. >> - DID wallets can also support a non-repudiable digital signature at >> least as good as the ink on paper ones. >> - Paper signatures in medicine are often accepted by verifiers based >> on "Trust On First Use" with out-of-band verification. >> - Timestamping signatures on public blockchains is easy and may >> almost be a commodity. >> - Licensed physicians and verifiers are typically subject to records >> retention regulations that combine with digital timestamps to close the >> loop on non-repudiation and enforcement. >> >> In this example and many like it, the technology and standards related to >> SSI are almost entirely in the control of the physician herself. Yes she >> has to install a relatively simple DID wallet. Yes, she has to go through >> the one-time credential issuance process. The economic benefit to the >> physician of a self-sovereign professional identity pays off handsomely in >> terms of not sharing power or revenue with hospitals that provide them with >> an administrative identity. >> >> >> >> The oracles already exist and don't need to know about SSI or VCs. >> >> >> >> The last thing left is hosting the digital transaction that brings >> patient and doctor together and gets the document timestamped. This >> convener does have to be SSI-aware and trusted as an intermediary by the >> patient, the doctor, and the verifier. Nice thing is, these conveners can >> be almost anywhere and don't themselves need to keep any patient data >> related to the transaction, limiting both security and privacy risks. >> >> >> >> Wouldn't this be the fastest way to gain mass adoption of SSI? >> >> >> >> - Adrian >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 29, 2020 at 6:37 PM steve capell <steve.capell@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> Hi all, >> >> >> >> I'm hoping some of you will have some sage advice for me on how best to >> handle a common pattern that we need to solve here in Australia. The >> generalised case is that a certificate (ie credential) issued by X has >> little value to verifier Y unless backed up by an accreditation (ie >> credential) issued by recognised authority Z that says X is authorised to >> issue this type of claim. Some real world examples >> >> - Business identity ABN123 issues a claim that a consignment of wine >> is genuine penfolds. But without another claim from IP Australia that >> ABN123 is the holder of trademark "Penfolds" then it's of little value. >> - Veterinary surgeon John Smith issues an animal health certificate >> about snoopy the dog. But without a supporting claim from >> https://www.anzcvs.org.au/ that john smith is an accredited vetinary >> surgeon, the certificate is useless. >> - And there are hundreds of others.... >> >> Some initial thinking >> >> - If these are totally separate credentials then there is a problem >> with identity linking. The subject of one claim (john smith is a vet) must >> be identical to the issuer of the other claim (snoopy is healthy). even if >> the identifiers are the same, there are lots of john smiths in the world so >> how to be sure that the one issuing the cert about snoopy is the one that >> was accredited? Does John smith first create a self-sovereign identity and >> get https://www.anzcvs.org.au/ to issue the claim to that identity? >> - Another approach is that the accreditation authority runs a service >> that counter-signs each certificate. so john issues the health cert and >> then authenticates to https://www.anzcvs.org.au/ and gets it >> counter-signed. the verifier can trace the authority through a single >> health certifiate. This implies some real-time infrastructure capability >> on the part of all accreditation authorities that might be a bit >> impractical. >> - Another is that the accreditation authorities maintain public lists >> of accredited identities via some public ledger protocol. verifiers can >> check the issuer id in the health claim and then check the public list. >> Maybe the lists need to be anonymised via some kind of zero knowledge >> proof. >> - and so on... >> >> Looking for best practice advice that is both cryptographically secure >> and practical to implement for large number of accreditors and certifiers. >> >> >> >> Thanks in advance! >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Steve Capell >> >> +61 410 437854 >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Steve Capell >> >> >> >> > > -- > Steve Capell > > -- Steve Capell
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