- From: Brent Zundel <brent.zundel@evernym.com>
- Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 08:52:30 -0600
- To: Kyle Den Hartog <kdenhar@gmail.com>
- Cc: David Chadwick <D.W.Chadwick@kent.ac.uk>, "W3C Credentials CG (Public List)" <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAHR74YWxifLt6tDW05nEWXWYKOyJpfu7n5wQ2d69nBSyqtBWtw@mail.gmail.com>
I am already working on this for the implementation guide. I will add the third method to my section on subjective disclosure, and welcome feedback on the PR. (It is not complete, but I raised a PR for the express purpose of obtaining early feedback). https://github.com/w3c/vc-imp-guide/pull/14 On Fri, May 17, 2019, 08:41 Kyle Den Hartog <kdenhar@gmail.com> wrote: > The third option is something I haven't heard of as an approach to > selective disclosure. I like the idea of adding both in as methods of > supporting selective disclosure in multiple ways. > > When writing specs to this do we highlight concerns with particular > approaches? Particularly one of the concerns I had with this is that by > sharing even a hash, it creates the potential for data to be brute forced. > This is easily solved with adding a salt and only providing the salt when > revealing the data. Would we want to include something like this to heed > potentially less private implementations? > > *Kyle Den Hartog* > Personal Blog <https://kyledenhartog.com> > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 8:00 AM David Chadwick <D.W.Chadwick@kent.ac.uk> > wrote: > >> Dear All >> >> selective disclosure is clearly an important feature of VCs, e.g. for >> driving licenses or passports we might only wish to reveal our name and >> nothing else. There are several potential ways of doing this, viz: >> >> i) use of ZKPs - zero knowledge proof algorithms allow assertions to be >> made about the VC, without revealing the VC itself >> ii) use of atomic credentials - each property of the credential is >> issued as a separate VC so that the holder can reveal individual >> properties >> iii) use of hashes - The VC only contains hashes of each of the >> credential subject's properties, and the properties are separately held >> by the holder. The holder places the to-be-revealed property in the >> Verifiable Presentation and the verifier computes its hash and compares >> it to the appropriate hash in the VC. >> >> Only the former is mentioned in the data model and neither of the >> latter, whereas the latter 2 are less computationally intensive to >> support and might be preferred by implementors. Can we add a section on >> this to the Implementors Guide >> >> thanks >> >> David >> >> >> >> >> >> >>
Received on Friday, 17 May 2019 14:53:05 UTC