Re: committing fraud with credentials

Glad to hear this work will continue.  It will be extremely valuable for
implementers and deployment.  Hopefully this won't happen, but you might
want to think about how you would handle any disagreements over listed
risks and/or mitigations, with a goal of making sure that users of the
material have what they need to come to their own decisions.

Thanks to you (and Rouven!) for kicking this off!

-- dan

On Wed, May 8, 2019 at 3:40 PM Daniel Hardman <daniel.hardman@evernym.com>
wrote:

> At IIW last week, Rouven Heck called a session to explore the topic of
> committing fraud with link secrets. This was a very interesting session,
> and I think it generated some new knowledge and a set of follow-on topics.
> I then called a follow up session on the broader topic of committing fraud
> with credentials in general--both ZKP- and non-ZKP-based. We had a number
> of smart minds in the room, including good representation from the CCG's
> own Daniel Burnett.
>
> I intend to pursue this topic in greater detail. In the second IIW
> session, we began to create a matrix that lists particular attack scenarios
> as rows, and that shows remediations for particular credential types as
> columns. It is still quite sparse, but already has important info in it.
> Anybody can comment on the spreadsheet
> <https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1HALoNgZ7GTogw324squ7LRL4unfLSmPH_8B1ibxCQgE/edit#gid=0>;
> if you want edit access, ping me.
>
> I intend to pursue this topic more carefully, and hope to produce some
> kind of a whitepaper about it. If people would like to collaborate, let me
> know. We could do this under the auspices of the CCG, as an official work
> item, but I am not specifically proposing that here. I will probably
> publish something under my own name regardless.
>
> --Daniel
>