- From: Joe Andrieu <joe@legreq.com>
- Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 10:19:13 -0800
- To: public-credentials@w3.org
- Message-Id: <1547576353.2522072.1635343424.0B6B78AA@webmail.messagingengine.com>
On Tue, Jan 15, 2019, at 8:57 AM, Daniel Hardman wrote: > I accept the pushback from Carlos and Joe that the notion of a single > identifier for a shared thing is unenforceable. Point well taken.> > However, I am still uncomfortable with the easy assertion that DIDs > must equate with control. For example, I could answer Tom's question > ("What's the point of a DID that can't authenticate") as follows: It is control of DIDs that define them. In centralized identity architectures, there is an authority who can control everything: delete accounts, reset passwords, in some cases even impersonate users, and most usually they delegate control to users. The point of DIDs is that they use a decentralized layer (blockchain, IPFS, etc.) to enable control for updates and authentication as the referent of the DID, WITHOUT a central authority. There will absolutely be DIDs that no one actually controls--because the private keys are lost. That's just a consequence of a lack of administrative authority who can recover control by fiat. Unfortunately, there is no general way to know if the keys are lost. However, it is possible to revoke DIDs, which could be on interpretation of what you're actually asking for. However, not all methods support resolving a revoked DID to a DID Document that somehow indicates it is revoked. There has been some discussion about whether or not methods should return a different result for a revoked DID versus a non-DID (there's no record of it and therefore no DID Document to resolve to), but there is no consensus other than that this seems to be best left up to individual methods. It *might* be interesting for DID methods to require an entry in the authentication property in order to authenticate, but some methods simply use the control proof for authentication. Note also that it is explicitly permitted to authenticate as a DID without being the controller of the DID. As such, you could in fact have an uncontrolled DID (the initial key required for proof-of-control is lost) but for which a valid authentication entry allows a different key to authenticate as the referent of the DID. Finally, the current spec has a lot of out-dated text about ownership. There has been a developing consensus that owner and ownership are an unfortunately misleading terms and the intent is to shift to "controller" as a more appropriate term. See https://github.com/w3c-ccg/did-spec/issues/153 https://github.com/w3c-ccg/did-spec/issues/108 https://github.com/w3c-ccg/did-spec/issues/101 As well as your own https://github.com/w3c-ccg/did-spec/issues/148 which I just commented on. -j > >> When a person who controlled a DID dies (or a an org that controlled >> a DID is legally dissolved), I would expect the DID that they once >> controlled to continue to exist, but I would expect there to be a way >> to demonstrate that the DID cannot ever authenticate again (e.g., the >> public key for the DID is rotated to all zeros). This is desirable so >> no future malicious actor can take over the identity. Compare the >> mischief that happens with SSNs of deceased people in the US.> > What this suggests to me is that there needs to be a formal status of > a DID that is: "resolvable, but not controlled and therefore not > authenticatable."> > Is this wrong? > > --Daniel > > On Tue, Jan 15, 2019 at 2:04 AM Joe Andrieu <joe@legreq.com> wrote: >> __ >> There is a lot of misperception and misunderstanding here. Two items >> stand out.>> >> First, DIDs are not just strings. They are URLs. They resolve to DID >> Documents, either by retrieval or by construction. This is >> fundamental. As some have suggested, a DID that does NOT resolve to a >> DID Document is just another GUID, at best a URI but not a URL.>> >> Second, this notion from Daniel Hardman <daniel.hardman@evernym.com> >> that Carlos Bruguera <cbruguera@gmail.com> quoted:>>>>> The common characteristic of asteroids, Mount Everest, biological >>>>> species in a taxonomy, and other objects of this type is that they >>>>> are *shared concepts controlled by nobody*. *There must be one >>>>> identifier for them*, known to all--and *that identifier should >>>>> have no controller*.>> >> This is fundamentally false. >> >> There is no unique identifier for these things. What you call Mount >> Everest some call Chomolungma and others call Sagarmatha.>> >> No one controls what you call it. There is no possibility that there >> would be a singular DID that somehow uniquely refers to it, any more >> than there would be a singular name that everyone uses in all >> conversations.>> >> In fact, decentralized identifiers demands a framework where >> literally ANYONE can refer to ANYTHING by ANY identifier it wants. >> Any perspective that suggests "there must be one identifier" for >> anything is a form of centralization and antithetical to the notion >> of directed identity aka pairwise identifiers.>> >> THAT said, it may be more useful to consider "actors" in this context >> purely as entities capable of generating the proofs in a DID >> Document. For example, a secure module that is part of an engine >> control system could use an embedded private key to generate proofs >> that meet the requirements for authentication without ever revealing >> its internal key.>> >> In this framing, it is perfectly reasonable to have DIDs that refer >> to passive actors, capable only of interrogatory responses to verify >> said actors' provenance aka identity. Think of it as a >> cryptographically secure Vehicle Identification Number (VIN).>> >> Of course, it's a bit more interesting to think of that engine >> autonomously interacting with the world, making it more of an "actor" >> in the UML sense, an "agent" to others, but we don't need to dissect >> the finer nuances of these terms. What matters is that the DID >> controller can perform the math to prove control. And that any entity >> seeking to authenticate as the referent of a DID is capable of >> performing the math associated with authentication.>> >> In short, the point of the bitcoin revolution that spawned DIDs is >> that the proof is in the math. Period. Assumptions about autonomy or >> humanity or keys being in the hands of a particular individual are >> groundless leaps of faith.>> >> -j >> >> >> On Mon, Jan 14, 2019, at 11:11 PM, Tom Jones wrote: >>> what's the point of a did that cannot authenticate? >>> It may as well be a guid >>> Peace ..tom >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 14, 2019 at 10:09 PM Carlos Bruguera >>> <cbruguera@gmail.com> wrote:>>>> Interesting topic, and thanks Daniel for putting together this >>>> perception divergence. I do think it's a relevant discussion in >>>> this early stages of conception and design of DIDs.>>>> >>>> I'd like to share a few personal views on the matter. >>>> >>>> The motivator for DIDs is indeed SSID, in which *Actors *will be at >>>> the core of the ecosystem. Yet inanimated things (even abstract >>>> "things") are also part of the world we live in, and they will >>>> inevitably have a role in digital interactions among self-sovereign >>>> entities.>>>> >>>> I agree that a (sufficiently autonomous) "thing" can perfectly be >>>> an actor, and I don't think it's wise enough to assume that these >>>> things will *always* be associated to a "non-thing" that is able to >>>> "control" them (or even be legally accountable, but that's whole >>>> different subject). I see no issues with a self-driving car or a >>>> DAO having a DID or a set of DIDs with which they can *interact* >>>> with other entities of any kind, while being themselves "self- >>>> sovereign" in a manner of speaking. Any legal/philosophical doubts >>>> regarding this are probably outside the scope of at least the >>>> (technical) *possibilities* for DIDs. I think we should leave this >>>> technical possibilities open, while addressing their social >>>> implications according to each specific use case and in their >>>> corresponding layers.>>>> >>>> Now, the problem sure comes with entities that can take *no >>>> possible action* within a system, in which it seems there's little >>>> point in having DIDs, yet on the other hand allowing these "things" >>>> to enjoy the resolvability of DIDs (among other properties) >>>> certainly brings more "expressive power" to DIDs, which will >>>> translate to a wider potential of applications that can be built on >>>> SSID. However, I think there's a problem with the bold part of the >>>> following statement:>>>> >>>>> The common characteristic of asteroids, Mount Everest, biological >>>>> species in a taxonomy, and other objects of this type is that they >>>>> are *shared concepts controlled by nobody*. *There must be one >>>>> identifier for them*, known to all--and *that identifier should >>>>> have no controller*.>>>> >>>> Since these things certainly cannot be modeled in terms of control, >>>> then it doesn't seem possible that there is a "one (and only) >>>> identifier" for them, since who has then the right or >>>> responsibility to define the attributes and identifiers for such >>>> things? It seems to me that this is more a case for *verifiable >>>> claims*, since there's nothing stopping anyone to freely assert >>>> public attributes to Mount Everest or an asteroid or a biological >>>> species and publish identifiers for them according to some method. >>>> So then, upon resolving these DIDs there comes a matter of *trust* >>>> on the entity that created them, thus you might choose to resolve >>>> and use the "Fungi X Taxonomy according to John Doe (or Institution >>>> Y)" or a different one whose source you may trust more or less. >>>> Again, it seems we're talking either about *claims* or a very >>>> similar concept. I just don't see how it's possible to grant >>>> *unique* and final identifiers to "inanimate" things in a self- >>>> sovereign manner (i.e. without establishing central "authorities" >>>> in charge of the identification process).>>>> >>>> Perhaps we should then expand the scope of public claims to cover >>>> the act of *identifying* non-actor things using DIDs, or allow >>>> public claims themselves to have DIDs that can be resolved and (in >>>> this case) interpreted as "This DID *respresents* Object <X>, >>>> according to Entity <Y>"... In the end, philosophically speaking, >>>> the only thing we can conventionally share about the world we >>>> interact with (and which we do not control) is our subjective >>>> representation of it.>>>> >>>> Looking forward to read other people's opinions on the matter. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> Carlos >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 2, 2019 at 10:05 AM Michael Herman (Parallelspace) >>>> <mwherman@parallelspace.net> wrote:>>>>> Tim, again, this is an example where I believe the term DID isn’t >>>>> being used properly. ____>>>>> __ __ >>>>> A DID is only a character-string identifier …it’s not anything >>>>> more than that. Agreed?____>>>>> __ __ >>>>> >>>>> *From:* Tim Bouma <trbouma@gmail.com> >>>>> *Sent:* January 1, 2019 6:50 PM >>>>> *To:* daniel.hardman@evernym.com >>>>> *Cc:* Michael Herman (Parallelspace) <mwherman@parallelspace.net>; >>>>> W3C Credentials CG (Public List) <public-credentials@w3.org>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: what do DIDs identify?____ >>>>> >>>>> __ __ >>>>> Hi everyone,____ >>>>> __ __ >>>>> My simplified view is that DIDs are under the control of Agents >>>>> (software or hardware), which in turn can be attributed to, or >>>>> held accountable by Actors (Individuals, Organizations).____>>>>> __ __ >>>>> Things, in my view, are just a type of Agent.____ >>>>> __ __ >>>>> If an Agent (autonomous, friendly, or otherwise) cannot be >>>>> attributed or accountable to an Actor (i.e., Principal), you have >>>>> a legal, not a technical problem on your hands. ____>>>>> __ __ >>>>> What is missing in the entity model, is the notion of >>>>> Relationship. I believe this model can be simplified to >>>>> Individuals, Organizations, and Relationships, the details of >>>>> which can be scoped out of the technical architecture.____>>>>> __ __ >>>>> In the end, Agents control DIDs, for the purpose of interacting >>>>> with other Agents. Agents need to be attributable to Actors if >>>>> they are to be trusted in any manner.____>>>>> __ __ >>>>> Whether an Agent is autonomous, liable, or not (such as a car) is >>>>> really a question for the legal (or trust) frameworks, not >>>>> necessarily addressed by the technical architecture.____>>>>> __ __ >>>>> Best regards,____ >>>>> __ __ >>>>> Tim____ >>>>> __ __ >>>>> __ __ >>>>> __ __ >>>>> __ __ >>>>> ____ >>>>> __ __ >>>>> __ __ >>>>> On Tue, 1 Jan 2019 at 20:27, Daniel Hardman >>>>> <daniel.hardman@evernym.com> wrote:____>>>>>> I can agree partly. The chassis and engine of a car is not really >>>>>> an actor, and the software running a self-driving car IS. But I >>>>>> don't think that division is particularly crisp. The harder you >>>>>> look at it, the muddier it becomes. Where does software end and >>>>>> hardware begin, if programmable chips are involved? Does the >>>>>> software that gathers and processes signals from sensors deserve >>>>>> to be thought of as part of the actor--or only the part that >>>>>> makes decisions?____>>>>>> __ __ >>>>>> But I totally diverge on your last sentence. Yes, the owners of a >>>>>> car are the ones that get sued. But that doesn't make them actors >>>>>> in some special sense different from the way software is an >>>>>> actor. Actors are just entities that make decisions. Being >>>>>> susceptible to lawsuit doesn't make an entity an actor; it gives >>>>>> them legal standing. Those are two quite different concepts.____>>>>>> __ __ >>>>>> __ __ >>>>>> On Tue, Jan 1, 2019 at 5:59 PM Michael Herman (Parallelspace) >>>>>> <mwherman@parallelspace.net> wrote:____>>>>>>> RE: A self-driving car is an actor; it's just one that is owned >>>>>>> and operated by another actor.____>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> This is another instance of the architectural terminology >>>>>>> problem. The car is not an Actor. ____>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> The car is a component of the Technology/Infrastructure Layer. >>>>>>> …that is, the car is the nuts-and-bolts vehicle with its >>>>>>> propulsion system (engines, motors, fuel system etc.), >>>>>>> suspension system (tires, maglev, etc.), >>>>>>> vision/auditory/proximity/temperature/road conditions, etc, >>>>>>> sensors, etc, etc, etc. The car is not an Actor …at least, not >>>>>>> technically an Actor …until it hits someone, of course.____>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> The Actor in this scenario is the software agent(s) in the car >>>>>>> as well as in the vendor(s) cloud(s) that are controlling this >>>>>>> piece of nuts-and-bolts infrastructure. IMHO ;-)____>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> When the car does hit someone, they don’t sue the car …they sure >>>>>>> the Actors …the owners of the software agent(s).____>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> Michael____ >>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> *From:* Daniel Hardman <daniel.hardman@evernym.com> >>>>>>> *Sent:* January 1, 2019 5:36 PM >>>>>>> *To:* Michael Herman (Parallelspace) >>>>>>> <mwherman@parallelspace.net>>>>>>>> *Cc:* W3C Credentials CG (Public List) <public- >>>>>>> credentials@w3.org>>>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: what do DIDs identify?____ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> Michael:____ >>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> I think what you're laying out here does describe my issue with >>>>>>> pretty good overlap. And of course you were one of the bright >>>>>>> minds that I spent time learning from in Basel...____>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> With respect to the notion that a DID is just a character >>>>>>> string: I agree with you quite strongly. However, there is an >>>>>>> *association* between the string and certain semantics, *by >>>>>>> definition*. This association is reflected in rules about how >>>>>>> DIDs can be created. The semantic assumptions are so strong >>>>>>> sometimes that they leak into our verbiage in ways we don't >>>>>>> strictly intend. If my verbiage had such leakage, I apologize. >>>>>>> My email was about teasing out different layers of these >>>>>>> assumptions, because I don't think they're monolithic.____>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> I do disagree with one aspect of your characterization: I don't >>>>>>> think the distinction between Actor and Thing is tenable. CF the >>>>>>> entity hierarchy in Sovrin's V1 Trust Framework; it's described >>>>>>> here: >>>>>>> https://github.com/hyperledger/indy-hipe/tree/master/text/0014-ssi-notation#entities. >>>>>>> The key insight is that what distinguishes People and >>>>>>> Organizations from Things is not whether they are capable of >>>>>>> action (including independent action, even)--but whether they >>>>>>> are the sort of thing that can be held legally responsible for >>>>>>> its actions.____>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> A self-driving car is an actor; it's just one that is owned and >>>>>>> operated by another actor. You could imagine an AI released into >>>>>>> the wild with no controller (e.g., I instruct an AI to rotate >>>>>>> its keys so I can never wrest control back); it would still be a >>>>>>> thing, but it would also be an actor.____>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>> On Tue, Jan 1, 2019 at 5:25 PM Michael Herman (Parallelspace) >>>>>>> <mwherman@parallelspace.net> wrote:____>>>>>>>> 1. RE: Such an identifier could be called an "uncontrolled >>>>>>>> DID", for example. And DIDs that make the strong assumption >>>>>>>> about control could be called "DIDs" for short, or >>>>>>>> "controlled DIDs" when clarity is needed. Or we could pick >>>>>>>> other adjective pairs.____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> This statement implies that a DID is a “something” …that is, a >>>>>>>> ID is something that is controlled/uncontrolled …it’s not >>>>>>>> …it’s just a character-string identifier. I think the >>>>>>>> referenced statement is trying to project high-level behaviour >>>>>>>> onto what is essentially a character-string behaviour. It’s >>>>>>>> similar to the remarks I heard over and over again in Basel: >>>>>>>> e.g. “A DID can have a publicKey”. It simply can’t …it’s only >>>>>>>> a character string. Ditto for any higher-level >>>>>>>> adjectives/behaviours.____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> Scan >>>>>>>> https://hyperonomy.com/2018/12/21/decentralized-identifiers-dids-architecture-reference-model-arm/____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> 1. RE: Or we could say that "DID" should only be used for the >>>>>>>> form of identifier that has strong control semantics, and >>>>>>>> that whatever the other thing is, it shouldn't be a >>>>>>>> "DID".____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> See above. A DID is only a character-string identifier.____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> @Daniel: The root problem is an architectural terminology >>>>>>>> problem: People insist on projecting all of the different >>>>>>>> layers of architectural functionality onto this poor character >>>>>>>> string. …it’s not fair :-)____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> Scan >>>>>>>> https://hyperonomy.com/2018/12/21/decentralized-identifiers-dids-architecture-reference-model-arm/____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> Best regards,____ >>>>>>>> Michael Herman (Toronto/Calgary/Seattle)____ >>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> *From:* Daniel Hardman <daniel.hardman@evernym.com> >>>>>>>> *Sent:* January 1, 2019 4:39 PM >>>>>>>> *To:* W3C Credentials CG (Public List) <public- >>>>>>>> credentials@w3.org>>>>>>>>> *Subject:* what do DIDs identify?____ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> At the recent Hyperledger Global Forum in Switzerland, I had >>>>>>>> some discussions about the semantics of DIDs, and I feel like I >>>>>>>> observed a deep divide in community understanding about their >>>>>>>> intent. This causes periodic surprises and frustrations, >>>>>>>> including some that came up on the recent thread with subject >>>>>>>> "Ideas about DID explanation."____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> I'm going to try to contrast two divergent mental models. In >>>>>>>> reality they may not be so far apart. But I think until we see >>>>>>>> their divergence clearly, we may continue to experience mental >>>>>>>> friction when we least expect it.____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> *1. DIDs are inherently about SSI*____ >>>>>>>> An inconsistently articulated but very strong assumption in >>>>>>>> this worldview is that a DID is an identifier *controlled for >>>>>>>> the purpose of interaction*. People, organizations, and IoT >>>>>>>> things can be behind the identifier because they are the sorts >>>>>>>> of entities for which interaction is imaginable-- but notice >>>>>>>> the "IoT" qualifier on "things": inert things cannot be DID >>>>>>>> referents. This worldview is nicely articulated by various >>>>>>>> statements in the the DID Primer and the DID Spec, such as this >>>>>>>> one: "The purpose of the DID document is to describe the public >>>>>>>> keys, authentication protocols, and service endpoints necessary >>>>>>>> to bootstrap cryptographically-verifiable interactions with the >>>>>>>> identified entity."____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> *2. DIDs are inherently about decentralization, and SSI is just >>>>>>>> one use case*____>>>>>>>> Proponents of this worldview might point to the name ("DID" = >>>>>>>> "Decentralized Identifier", not "SSI Identfier" or "Controlled >>>>>>>> Identifier") and say, "Of course we need decentralization for >>>>>>>> SSI. But we need it for other reasons, too. We should be using >>>>>>>> DIDs for lots of other stuff."____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> What other stuff? Well, the use cases I heard in Switzerland >>>>>>>> are pretty similar to the ones I would give for uuids: "I want >>>>>>>> a DID for every asteroid NASA discovers" or "I want a DID for >>>>>>>> {Mount Everest | each species that biologists add to the >>>>>>>> Linnaean taxonomy | each database record | flows in my ERP >>>>>>>> system | etc}". What makes these different from the classic DID >>>>>>>> use cases is that the identified item is not *imagined to >>>>>>>> interact in the ways that we expect as we usually describe DID >>>>>>>> Docs.* You don't set up a cryptographically secure channel over >>>>>>>> which you interact with an asteroid.____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> In conversations where this alternate viewpoint surfaces, I >>>>>>>> commonly hear two reactions:____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> Reaction A: That's not a DID use case. Use UUIDs.____ >>>>>>>> Reaction B: That's a perfect DID use case. An asteroid can have >>>>>>>> an agent to facilitate digital interactions, can't it? And >>>>>>>> won't you need to talk to it (e.g., to ask its current position >>>>>>>> or to request permission to land)?____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> I believe neither of these reactions stands up under careful >>>>>>>> analysis, and that's why I think the topic I'm raising here is >>>>>>>> worthy of such a long email.____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> Here's what I think Reaction A misses: Although UUIDs are >>>>>>>> createable by anyone without central coordination, they are not >>>>>>>> *resolvable*. One of the wonderful properties of DIDs is that >>>>>>>> they have a defined resolution mechanism that is more >>>>>>>> decentralized than DNS, *without* requiring invisible and >>>>>>>> untrackable contextual assumptions. UUIDs lack this; you have >>>>>>>> to know to go look them up in a particular database. When >>>>>>>> people say they want a DID for asteroids, they don't just want >>>>>>>> UUID uniqueness and lack of centralized registration; they >>>>>>>> *also* want DID's resolution properties. But what they want to >>>>>>>> resolve isn't information about *control*, it's information >>>>>>>> about the inert object in question -- when it was first >>>>>>>> discovered, where someone can find out more, how it can be >>>>>>>> looked up on wikipedia, or dozens of other properties. (Aside: >>>>>>>> some may want another DID property as well, which is >>>>>>>> cryptographically enforced global uniqueness. UUIDs lack this >>>>>>>> property for sure. Some DID methods may lack it as well, which >>>>>>>> has been a subject of frustration on earlier threads in this >>>>>>>> group...)____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> This brings us to Reaction B. Proponents of this reaction would >>>>>>>> say, "You should just talk to the agent for the asteroid. No >>>>>>>> new mental model needed." But let me ask you how you think >>>>>>>> China would like it if Tibet or India registered an agent for >>>>>>>> Mount Everest. And what gives NASA or the European Space Agency >>>>>>>> the right to register (control) a DID for an asteroid that an >>>>>>>> astronomer in South Africa first observed? In other words, I >>>>>>>> think Reaction B's fatal flaw is that it thinks *control* is an >>>>>>>> appropriate mental model for all objects. It's not. Nobody >>>>>>>> *controls* a new species of mushroom that gets discovered. And >>>>>>>> nobody interacts with its agent, either. The common >>>>>>>> characteristic of asteroids, Mount Everest, biological species >>>>>>>> in a taxonomy, and other objects of this type is that they are >>>>>>>> *shared concepts controlled by nobody*. There must be one >>>>>>>> identifier for them, known to all--and *that identifier should >>>>>>>> have no controller*. Modeling them with a controller is >>>>>>>> fundamentally incorrect.____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> This makes me wonder if we need to be able to talk about an >>>>>>>> identifier that has the decentralized and resolvable properties >>>>>>>> of DIDs, and the pluggable methods--but that doesn't make the >>>>>>>> strong assumption that behind every DID is a control- and interaction- >>>>>>>> oriented DID Doc. Instead, it might make a lighter assumption >>>>>>>> that the DID Doc lets you discover how to learn more about an >>>>>>>> inert object.____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> Such an identifier could be called an "uncontrolled DID", for >>>>>>>> example. And DIDs that make the strong assumption about control >>>>>>>> could be called "DIDs" for short, or "controlled DIDs" when >>>>>>>> clarity is needed. Or we could pick other adjective pairs.____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> Or we could say that "DID" should only be used for the form of >>>>>>>> identifier that has strong control semantics, and that whatever >>>>>>>> the other thing is, it shouldn't be a "DID". But if we do this, >>>>>>>> we need to somehow leverage all the work we've done on DID >>>>>>>> methods and specs and documentation and implementation, without >>>>>>>> reinventing the wheel.____>>>>>>>> ____ >>>>>>>> How would you resolve this dissonance?____ >>>>> ____ >>>>> __ __ >>>>> -- ____ >>>>> Find me at: http://about.me/tim.bouma____ >> >> -- >> Joe Andrieu, PMP >> joe@legreq.com>> LEGENDARY REQUIREMENTS >> +1(805)705-8651>> Do what matters. >> http://legreq.com[1]>> >> -- Joe Andrieu, PMP joe@legreq.comLEGENDARY REQUIREMENTS +1(805)705-8651Do what matters. http://legreq.com[2] Links: 1. http://www.legendaryrequirements.com 2. http://www.legendaryrequirements.com
Received on Tuesday, 15 January 2019 18:19:39 UTC