- From: Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>
- Date: Wed, 6 Jun 2018 00:04:24 -0400
- To: Carlos Bruguera <carlos@selfkey.org>
- Cc: Chris Boscolo <chris@boscolo.net>, W3C Credentials Community Group <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CANYRo8gOtDBY-amPPCcYBT1e9a6WpjZjXkO733xd1obmrWj+Kw@mail.gmail.com>
You can also recognize a self-sovereign tech by the lack of a privacy policy, because there's nobody to have a privacy policy with. Adrian On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 11:56 PM, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> wrote: > If someone else makes the rules then you don't. Walled gardens can be > fine, until they are not. Censorship, rent-seeking, and lock-in can always > creep in unless there's no identifiable entity to censor, pay, or leave. > > At their best, public blockchains are pretty self-sovereign in the sense > that they are censorship resistant and no particular entity is being paid. > Even the best public blockchains are not self-sovereign to the extent that > they have a specified governance mechanism and that governance could become > oppressive to some users at some point. Public blockchain users are > protected from governance changes to the extent they can move an asset to > another blockchain. That works for currency but not as much for assets > represented by a smart contract. > > Adrian > > On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 11:35 PM, Carlos Bruguera <carlos@selfkey.org> > wrote: > >> Personally, I don't see why *self-sovereign* *necessarily* implies not >> being tied to a particular institution, jurisdiction, or federation, as >> long as the identity owner is still in control of her identifier by means >> of being able to create, update and revoke. But maybe I'm missing something >> about the fundamentals of self-sovereignty... Any thoughts? >> >> On Wed, Jun 6, 2018 at 8:22 AM, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Everything in the DID document is public and hence in category *iii*. >>> The spec for what's actually in the DID doc is still somewhat in flux. >>> Category *ii* could be a service endpoint pointing to a public document >>> such as a website. >>> >>> As far as I'm concerned (I could be wrong) everything that is not public >>> should be behind an authorization barrier such as OAuth. This controls >>> access via an object capabilities model mediated by tokens rather than an >>> access control list https://github.com/WebOfTrustI >>> nfo/rebooting-the-web-of-trust-fall2017/blob/master/final- >>> documents/identity-hubs-capabilities-perspective.pdf >>> >>> Adrian >>> >>> On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 7:30 PM, Chris Boscolo <chris@boscolo.net> wrote: >>> >>>> +1 (Clarifying emails like this are like a warm blanket on a cold >>>> winter night.) >>>> >>>> I have one question, or possibly just a further clarification. Is the >>>> following statement true: >>>> >>>> Items *i* and *ii* can be found in the DID Document, while item "*iii*" >>>> (public claims) are not in the DID Document. >>>> >>>> -chrisb >>>> >>>> On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 2:53 PM, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> (I'm starting this thread because I'm having a hard time following the >>>>> "Focal" DID Use Cases) >>>>> >>>>> A Decentralized IDentifier (DID) is a self-issued IDENTIFIER that is >>>>> globally unique within a governance domain called a Method. A DID is >>>>> self-sovereign if it is not tied to any particular institution, >>>>> jurisdiction, or federation and if the issuer can substitute or choose >>>>> among multiple Methods of governance without loss of control of the DID. An >>>>> IPFS address is an example of a DID. >>>>> >>>>> To be practical, a DID associates three essential components: >>>>> (i) Zero or more public keys to be used for authentication, digital >>>>> signatures, etc... >>>>> (ii) Zero or more service endpoints to receive messages or issue >>>>> access authorization tokens. >>>>> (iii) Zero or more public claims. >>>>> >>>>> A DID that has neither public keys or service endpoints is merely a >>>>> persistent tag with some public claims and with the potential to add public >>>>> keys or service endpoints at some point in the future. From a privacy >>>>> perspective, it is safe to assume that the public claims will be cataloged >>>>> by others and will persist, along with the tag, forever. >>>>> >>>>> DIDs are de-duplicated (unique) within their Method. They are not a >>>>> de-duplicated IDENTITY. A DID can be associated with a de-duplicated >>>>> identity at any time just as it can be associated with any other claim or >>>>> credential. >>>>> >>>>> As defined above, the privacy footprint of a DID is negligible. >>>>> Self-issuance means that they can be issued at negligible cost. Public keys >>>>> can also be self-issued at negligible cost. Service endpoints can be >>>>> self-issued to some extent (e.g. .onion and ?maybe? IPv6 addresses) Because >>>>> service endpoints are routable, they do have some privacy footprint and >>>>> this should be considered as part of any use-case. >>>>> >>>>> Adrian >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 5:13 PM, Liam R. E. Quin <liam@w3.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, 2018-06-05 at 17:57 +0000, Christoph Dorn wrote: >>>>>> > I have serious concerns that DIDs will be used to bring online, in >>>>>> a >>>>>> > central/correlating fashion, what was in the past spread around >>>>>> many >>>>>> > parties which by law or inconvenience could not correlate/share >>>>>> > information. >>>>>> >>>>>> These are valid concerns and i'm glad that you are raising them. >>>>>> >>>>>> A possible mitigation is that an individual can choose to have >>>>>> multiple >>>>>> sets of identifiers and multiple third-party repositories as well as >>>>>> self-held identifiers. The same applies to Verifiable Credentials. >>>>>> >>>>>> > I find that this group is skewed towards technology for government >>>>>> > and big business (understandably so since it is a W3C group) >>>>>> >>>>>> One of the unusual aspects of W3C is that individuals can have as loud >>>>>> a voice in most respects as governments and large companies. >>>>>> >>>>>> > I have decided not to contribute individual-empowering use-cases as >>>>>> > I >>>>>> > think the problem does not lie with DIDs but how they are leveraged >>>>>> > by >>>>>> > authorities and corporations which is completely out of our hands. >>>>>> I >>>>>> > feel like this group is the wrong venue to discuss the layers of >>>>>> > abstraction that need to be built on top of DIDs to realize self >>>>>> > sovereign identity as it is not purely a technical problem. I don't >>>>>> > know if there is a venue for such discussions and if such a venue >>>>>> > can >>>>>> > actually effectively affect anything. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think you *should*, if you are willing, contribute them. >>>>>> >>>>>> We don't do enough at W3C to discuss, think about, encourage >>>>>> discussion >>>>>> of wider implications of the technologies we crare, nor contextualize >>>>>> them socially. That we could do more doesn't mean we should do >>>>>> nothing. >>>>>> >>>>>> Liam >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Liam Quin, W3C, http://www.w3.org/People/Quin/ >>>>>> Staff contact for Verifiable Claims WG, SVG WG, XQuery WG >>>>>> Improving Web Advertising: https://www.w3.org/community/web-adv/ >>>>>> Personal: Web-slave for https://www.FromOldBooks.Org/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> Adrian Gropper MD >>>>> >>>>> PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy! >>>>> HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data. >>>>> DONATE: https://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-3/ >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Adrian Gropper MD >>> >>> PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy! >>> HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data. >>> DONATE: https://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-3/ >>> >> >> > > > -- > > Adrian Gropper MD > > PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy! > HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data. > DONATE: https://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-3/ > -- Adrian Gropper MD PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy! HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data. DONATE: https://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-3/
Received on Wednesday, 6 June 2018 04:04:48 UTC