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RE: [Minutes] Auto WG 2016-09-06

From: Peter Winzell <Peter.Winzell@melcogot.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 08:28:32 +0000
To: "Streif, Rudolf" <rstreif@jaguarlandrover.com>, T Guild <ted@w3.org>
CC: Song Li <ls@newskysecurity.com>, public-automotive <public-automotive@w3.org>, Jeremiah Foster <jeremiah.foster@pelagicore.com>
Message-ID: <F151E948D19EFA4A8D984455EF32D51701A5DE5D43@melcosse04.meaegot.local>

Hi Rudi!

I completely agree with you on this. From the tier1 ones perspective it is important to be able to have specifications that can be applied to various OEMS and meet one specific OEM reqs.

Br
Peter W
From: Streif, Rudolf [mailto:rstreif@jaguarlandrover.com]
Sent: Thursday, September 8, 2016 1:50 AM
To: T Guild
Cc: Song Li; public-automotive; Jeremiah Foster
Subject: Re: [Minutes] Auto WG 2016-09-06

Although it's bad practice, I am just top-posting here as what I want to convey is related but not directly in response to particular elements of the discussion.

As you know, JLR has been working on a universal services framework for vehicle connectivity which is called Remote Vehicle Interaction (RVI) [1]. RVI is a GENIVI open-source project. RVI's three macro use cases are:

  *   SOTA
  *   Remote Control
  *   Vehicle Data
RVI implements two-layer security [2]:

  *   Transport Security using TLS

     *   All communication between RVI nodes is secured using TLS

  *   Certificate-based Authentication and Authorization

     *   For any entity to invoke a service the entity must present a JSON Web Token (JWT) that contains the requesting entities device certificate for authentication and a list of services the entity is allowed to invoke for authorization. The entire token is signed by the root certificate of the issuing entity (typically the OEM).
The following diagram depicts how I envision a potential architecture of interaction between the socket server and RVI.

[Description: Inline image 1]

In this architecture security is not handled by the Socket Server but by an underlying layer. I think that makes very much sense as it can be left to the implementing OEM or their Tier1 on what security mechanism to use. The Socket Server only needs to be able to receive on pass on a security token which is treated as an opaque data item. For RVI that would be the RVI JWT. Other implementations can use a different format.

I do not think that all OEM and Tier1 have to agree on the same security mechanism. The OEM has to provide the security token anyway. Even if a web application is developed universally to run on any IVI system that supports the Socket Server, OEMs will want to authorize that application for their vehicles. If an OEM does not want to use RVI but another system that implements its own security schema that is perfectly fine and desirable. And even if multiple OEMs use RVI that does by no means imply that they are using the same JWT to authenticate/authorize web apps.

In my opinion the Socket Server does not need to provide the security mechanism nor does the W3C specification need specify the security mechanism. It only needs to specify how security tokes are provided but not what they are and what they contain.

Best regards,
Rudi



[1] https://github.com/GENIVI/rvi_core

[2] https://github.com/GENIVI/rvi_core/blob/develop/doc/rvi_protocol.md


On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 11:23 AM, Ted Guild <ted@w3.org<mailto:ted@w3.org>> wrote:
Found the link I was looking for related to certs and CA in auto space:

https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2015-0060-0004


Interesting and ambitious although a very different use case. They want
to have tons of short (or one time) use certs that can be verifiable
and disposable while retaining anonymity.

On Tue, 2016-09-06 at 18:39 -0700, Song Li wrote:
> > > I missed the security part of the discussion - I would suggest we
> > > include certificate management in our security model. It should
> > cover
> > > (but not limited to):
> > > How to create certificates
> > > How to deploy certificates to in-vehicle servers
> > > How developers authenticate the server via certificates
> > > How to revoke and renew certificates
> >
--
Ted Guild <ted@w3.org<mailto:ted@w3.org>>
W3C Systems Team
http://www.w3.org




--
Rudolf J Streif
System Architect - Open Source Initiative
Open Source Technology Centre

M: +1.619.631.5383
Email:  rstreif@jaguarlandrover.com<mailto:rstreif@jaguarlandrover.com>

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Received on Thursday, 8 September 2016 08:31:00 UTC

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