representation and consciousness

This is an interesting talk relevant to this  CG as  cognitionm AI KR and
Neuroscience are converging
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OAmB5SOS2LQ

Neural representation is a key neuroscientific concept meant to bridge
brain and mind, or brain and behavior. But what is meant exactly by a
“neural representation”? Conventionally, a neural representation is a
correspondence between something in the brain and something in the world, a
“code”. The encoding view of representations faces two critical issues,
empirical and theoretical. Empirically, I will show that neural codes do
not have the properties required to naturalize mental representations.
Theoretically, it raises the problem of “system-detectable error”
(Bickhard): if the brain sits at the receiving end of the code, then how
can it know if the representation is wrong? As John Eccles has concluded,
the logical implication is dualism – there must be a “decoder” that
translates brain properties to world properties. Consequently, a number of
authors have argued that representations are not only homuncular but also
unnecessary: adapted behavior results not from calculations on an internal
copy of the world, but from coupling between body and world – “the world is
its own best model” (Brooks). Anti-representationalism introduces crucial
concepts missing from the conventional view (embodiment, autonomy,
dynamicism) but it struggles to explain some aspects of anticipation and
abstraction. I argue that the problem with representation is to think of it
as a “thing” that can be manipulated and observed (like a painting), which
collides with the dynamical nature of brain activity. I suggest to shift
the focus from the encoding properties of brain states, a dualistic
concept, to the representational properties of brain (and body) processes,
such as anticipation and abstraction.