Re: Re: Subject: Re: [public-agentprotocol] Layer 0 Trust & Verification

Hi Larry,

I mapped the four cases against the lab. It already tests actions outside a
grant's scope and revocation of delegated authority. My draft candidate
#158 tests whether a principal binding is associated with the right
authority root, but assumes both records already verify:
https://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/Agent-Authority-Conformance/aps-conformance-suite/pull/158&source=gmail&ust=1793902905423000&sa=E

The lab doesn't yet test a credential that links a legal principal to a
DID, whether its issuer is trusted for that claim, or whether the binding
itself has been revoked. Revoking the delegation is a different test.

I'd use a valid binding and an in-scope action as the control, then change
one condition in each of the other three cases, an untrusted issuer, a
revoked binding and an out-of-scope action.

Do you have a credential profile and revocation mechanism in mind for the
first set?

Best,
Tymofii

On Mon, Nov 02, 2026 08:07 PM, Larry Lewis <llewis@sovrlabs.com> wrote:

> Hi Gaowei, Ren, Abisheak, and all,
>
>
> Just want to add my input.
>
> Gaowei, this is an important question, and I think it highlights a
> distinction we should make explicit in the architecture.
>
> A DID establishes an identifier and supports cryptographic verification of
> key control. It does not, by itself, establish the legal identity of the
> person or organization responsible for that DID.
>
> I believe we should separate three concerns:
>
>    1.
>
>    *Identity assurance:* An accepted issuer verifies the legal person or
>    organization and issues a signed credential establishing the binding to the
>    relevant DID.
>    2.
>
>    *Delegated authority:* The principal issues a verifiable authorization
>    defining what the agent is permitted to do, including scope, duration,
>    constraints, and revocation.
>    3.
>
>    *Runtime enforcement:* The receiving system verifies the identity
>    evidence, delegation chain, and current authorization before allowing a
>    consequential action.
>
> This does not necessarily require a single globally authoritative
> institution. Different environments may recognize different issuers,
> including governments, enterprises, and identity providers. The verifier
> must still determine whether the issuer is trusted for the particular claim
> being made.
>
> I think this aligns naturally with the interoperability work across ANP,
> NTI, and Agent Trust Protocol (ATP).
>
> Rather than creating competing identity systems, we could define a
> method-neutral principal-binding verification profile using existing W3C
> DID and Verifiable Credential mechanisms.
>
> I would propose a small conformance test covering a valid principal
> binding, an untrusted issuer, a revoked binding, and an agent attempting an
> action outside its delegated authority.
>
> This would allow us to move from architectural discussion to independently
> reproducible verification evidence.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Larry Lewis
> Agent Trust Protocol Community Group
>
>
>
> From: Gaowei Chang <chgaowei@gmail.com>
> To: "Abisheak P"<abisheakp197@gmail.com>
> Cc: "Ren Yushan"<keotheodangcha548@gmail.com>, "public-agentprotocol"<
> public-agentprotocol@w3.org>
> Date: Mon, 02 Nov 2026 21:49:52 -0600
> Subject: Re: Subject: Re: [public-agentprotocol] Layer 0 Trust &
> Verification
>
> That’s a very good idea. I have one question: how can a DID be linked to
> an individual’s legal identity? How can developers trust this binding
> relationship? Does this require a pre-established authoritative institution?
>
> On Sun, Nov 1, 2026 at 6:37 PM Abisheak P <abisheakp197@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Gaowei, Ren, all,
>
> Gaowei, you have hit the exact architectural crux. You are absolutely
> right: Layer 0 (the underlying transport and identity root) is a
> prerequisite. If we cannot establish trusted domain names and DIDs, secure
> communication collapses.
>
> Building Layer 0 on top of HTTPS is the correct industry direction.
> However, as you noted, establishing a DID only proves the identity of the
> agent. It does not prove that the agent is authorized to perform a specific
> action.
>
> This is the gap that NTI (Neutral Trust Infrastructure) addresses. We do
> not compete with Layer 0 or DIDs. We anchor to them.
>
> Here is how NTI handles the second type of trust problem:
>
> 1. Principal-Bound Identity: Following Alan Karp's feedback, we bind the
> DID of the agent to the responsible legal party (the human or enterprise).
> 2. Runtime Non-Repudiation: Even with a trusted DID, an agent can be
> hijacked by prompt injection. NTI acts as a runtime sidecar. It verifies a
> post-quantum (Dilithium5) signature on every tool call. If the signature is
> missing or invalid, it fails closed.
> 3. The incomplete_check: If the revocation registry (where we check if a
> DID has been compromised) is unreachable, we do not proceed. The agent
> enters a PAUSE state.
>
> In short: Layer 0 proves the agent exists. NTI proves the agent is allowed
> to execute this exact action at this exact moment.
>
> I would love to see how we can integrate the ANP identity layer with the
> NTI enforcement layer. I am dropping the spec link here for your review
> (and for anyone else asking the Layer 0 question):
>
> 👉 https://github.com/abisheakp197/nti-spec
>
> Best,
> Abisheak
>
> On Sun, 1 Nov, 2026, 2:51 pm Gaowei Chang, <chgaowei@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Let me briefly share my thoughts for discussion.我简要分享一下我的想法供大家讨论。
>
> First, on trust. What is encoded in protocols may not be the trust we
> speak of in everyday terms, but rather cryptographic security mechanisms.
> Take HTTPS as an example: if I know the counterparty’s domain name, a
> cryptographic mechanism can establish a secure, hard-to-compromise
> connection between us. This is the foundational network trust enabled by
> cryptography. It comes with a prerequisite, though: you need a trusted
> domain name.首先谈谈信任。协议中所编码的或许并非我们日常所说的信任,而是密码安全机制。以 HTTPS 为例:若我知晓对方的域名,
> 一种密码安全机制便能在我们之间建立安全且难以被破解的连接。这是密码学所支撑的基础网络信任。不过,这有一个前提条件:你需要一个可信的域名。
>
> Another approach is something like Verifiable Credentials (W3C VCs): a
> trusted authority issues a credential for a DID. By verifying that
> credential, I know the DID has at least been attested by that trusted
> authority. The trust placed in the authority itself may, in turn, stem from
> offline arrangements or built-in machine trust roots.另一种方法类似于可验证凭证(W3C
> 可验证凭证):受信任的机构为去中心化标识符(DID)签发一份凭证。通过验证该凭证,我就能知道该去中心化标识符(
> DID)至少已得到该受信任机构的认证。而对该机构本身的信任,又可能源自线下约定或内置的机器信任根。
>
> My point is that protocols may not fully solve this second type of trust
> problem. If anyone has a strong solution, I’d welcome you to share it.
> 我的观点是,协议或许无法完全解决第二类信任问题。如果有人有更好的解决方案,欢迎分享。
>
> As for whether trust can be established using text, I’m not yet clear on
> your exact line of thinking. Agents are indeed highly capable of processing
> text. That said, for two agents to communicate, there must be a Layer 0
> protocol beneath the application layer; otherwise, secure communication
> cannot be established at all.至于能否通过文本建立信任,我目前还不清楚你具体的思路。
> 智能体确实具备极强的文本处理能力。但即便如此,两个智能体要进行通信,应用层之下必须存在0层协议,否则根本无法建立安全通信。
>
> The only real question is where this Layer 0 should sit. The prevailing
> view across the industry today is to build the Layer 0 protocol on top of
> HTTPS, which is also the direction we are taking.唯一真正的问题是这个第0层应该位于何处。
> 目前整个行业的主流观点是在HTTPS之上构建第0层协议,这也是我们正在采取的方向。
>
> On Thu, Oct 22, 2026 at 7:03 AM Ren Yushan <keotheodangcha548@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> I'd like to raise a point about one interaction in the ANP protocol —
> specifically, how trust between agents is handled once they are talking to
> each other.
>
> If two agents want to communicate, they first have to discover each other
> and establish a connection. A separate concern is that, while they are
> chatting, they need to trust each other.
>
> The difficulty arises when that trust is written into the protocol. It has
> to become a normative statement — a formulation you use to verify that the
> other party is a safe object. But in reality, when we chat, there is no
> security-verification step. We do not run some protocol while talking in
> order to guarantee that the information is safe. Safety is something we
> discover during the conversation: whether this person is reliable or not.
>
> So I would argue that the protocol should not try to define what is safe,
> what is unsafe, and what is trustworthy. Instead, it could offer reference
> suggestions about what means agents might use to communicate — for example,
> a password, or a standardised JSON format. But if that format is hard-coded
> into the protocol, it cannot be switched; and if it later turns out to be
> insecure, the protocol itself acquires a hole.
>
> So could we take a step back: not define the protocol, only give reference
> definitions? Since agents can communicate in text, why not let them use
> text to establish trust? Give them a verification method they can choose —
> they decide whether to use it, and which one. That is my view of trust.
> Happy to hear counterarguments, especially from anyone who thinks trust can
> be made normative without the protocol becoming brittle.
>
> Best regards,
> Yushan Ren
>
>
>
>

Received on Wednesday, 4 November 2026 18:21:52 UTC