- From: Patrick Meenan <patmeenan@gmail.com>
- Date: Sun, 3 Nov 2024 05:16:37 -0500
- To: רועי ברקאי <roybarkayyosef@gmail.com>
- Cc: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>, Steven Bingler <bingler@google.com>, Yoav Weiss <yoav.weiss@shopify.com>, Rory Hewitt <rory.hewitt@gmail.com>, Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>, Colin Bendell <colin.bendell@shopify.com>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, Anne van Kesteren <annevk@apple.com>
- Message-ID: <CAJV+MGyF7ZzPxaXASNhiVp_VwdrQys0mzLS3Mt_SkevDhexrDQ@mail.gmail.com>
Specifically, the request was to use the same bounds already in place for set-cookie. Registerable domain 1 should not have access to registerable domain 2. Multiple domains within a given registerable domain where set-cookie can already access is the discussion point. On Sun, Nov 3, 2024 at 3:12 AM רועי ברקאי <roybarkayyosef@gmail.com> wrote: > So It shall be documented that domain1 should not have access to delete > domain2 . > > On Sun, Nov 3, 2024, 09:57 Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws> wrote: > >> >> >> On Sat, Nov 2, 2024, 21:41 רועי ברקאי <roybarkayyosef@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Hey Steven >>> >>> For special SaaS you as the provider don't know the coockie name, same >>> for wix for example. >>> >>> Secondly in regards to damain1.com on domain2.com the functionality is >>> desired by yoav , >>> >> >> It really isn't >> >> I wish to have a security feature for that to mitigate potential risk >>> >> >>> On Sat, Nov 2, 2024, 21:05 Steven Bingler <bingler@google.com> wrote: >>> >>>> > as a parent domain may...attempt to delete any other domain cookie >>>> >>>> This is already possible and is in fact nearly trivial if a human looks >>>> at their browser's developer tools to obtain the domain and path of the >>>> cookie they want to delete. No guessing required. >>>> >>>> > Also some enterprises hold domain1.com and domain2.com and might >>>> wish for domain1.com to delete domain2.com cookie this should be >>>> allowed with relevant security features >>>> >>>> It's not currently possible for one registrable domain to target and >>>> delete cookies of another registrable domain and I don't believe this >>>> proposal is advocating for that ability. >>>> >>>> - Steven >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Nov 1, 2024 at 5:46 PM רועי ברקאי <roybarkayyosef@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> well the thing is it does introduce new functionality as a parent >>>>> domain may/ any other domain attempt to delete any other domain cookie in >>>>> the current suggestion. >>>>> I believe the current edit rights are abusive and many supply chain >>>>> attack are carried with that. >>>>> by lowering the complexity the attack would be more common and the >>>>> options would larger for different domains. >>>>> Also some enterprises hold domain1.com and domain2.com and might wish >>>>> for domain1.com to delete domain2.com cookie this should be allowed >>>>> with relevant security features >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, 1 Nov 2024 at 22:38, Steven Bingler <bingler@google.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi All, >>>>>> >>>>>> Browsers will send any cookies that a given request has access to >>>>>> (i.e.: domain, path, secure-ness), meaning that any server that receives >>>>>> these cookies also already has write access to all those cookies. >>>>>> >>>>>> Since the purpose of this proposal is to target “cookie crust” then >>>>>> these are presumably cookies the server is receiving from the client. So, >>>>>> imo, it follows that a `Delete-Cookie: foo` request should delete any >>>>>> cookies that match the name “foo” regardless of their domain/path. Perhaps >>>>>> this could be made more precise and require both the cookie’s name and >>>>>> value to limit collateral damage? >>>>>> >>>>>> This isn’t dangerous as it doesn’t introduce new behavior, it’s just >>>>>> a convenience so the server doesn’t have to guess all applicable >>>>>> domain/path combinations (well, it could be a footgun). Any hosts worried >>>>>> about malicious sub/super-domains should consider the public suffix list as >>>>>> Yoav mentioned. >>>>>> >>>>>> But I question how useful this is and whether it’s worth the added >>>>>> complexity. 6265bis has a requirement that all UAs limit the longest >>>>>> specifiable expiry of a cookie to 400 days in the future. Chrome has had >>>>>> this behavior for a couple of years now meaning that any orphaned cookies >>>>>> with far-reaching expiry dates have since been deleted. It’s possible that >>>>>> some orphaned session cookies still exist but Chrome and other UAs have >>>>>> methods for deleting those as well. >>>>>> >>>>>> Given all that I believe it’s increasingly less likely for a server >>>>>> to see any “cookie cruft” after a ~year and so I’m leaning against the >>>>>> creation of a `Delete-Cookie` header given the complexity/usefulness >>>>>> tradeoff. >>>>>> >>>>>> - Steven >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Oct 31, 2024 at 11:53 PM Yoav Weiss <yoav.weiss@shopify.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> It seems to me that it would make sense to mirror the domain-based >>>>>>> scope of cookies here. >>>>>>> That is - if you can get these cookies in requests to your origin, >>>>>>> you can also delete them. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So, if b.example.com have set domain-wide cookies on example.com, >>>>>>> a.example.com would be able to delete them. But it wouldn't be able >>>>>>> to delete host-specific cookies for b.example.com. Does that make >>>>>>> sense? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, Oct 31, 2024 at 6:18 PM Rory Hewitt <rory.hewitt@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yeah, the existing clear-site functionality has a big security risk >>>>>>>> and massive blast radius. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My thinking on subdomains is that if you own " >>>>>>>> customer1.saasprovider.com" (and potentially own subdomains within >>>>>>>> that, e.g. "d999.customer1.saasprovider.com") then there is >>>>>>>> certainly the possibility that, for reasons fair or foul, your landlord (" >>>>>>>> saasprovider.com") may send "Delete-Cookie: abc;subDomains=true" >>>>>>>> and as a result *your* "abc" cookie in *your* " >>>>>>>> customer1.saasprovider.com" domain is deleted, along with the >>>>>>>> "abc" cookie in the "saasprovider.com" domain and maybe other >>>>>>>> subdomains. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Arguably, saasprovider.com should be on the PSL >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But... >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Presumably your landlord isn't malicious, so either this scenario >>>>>>>> would happen because they're hacked or they make a stupid mistake. These >>>>>>>> things obviously do happen, but is that reason enough to not allow >>>>>>>> otherwise useful functionality. We're talking about cookies being deleted, >>>>>>>> which is a low-ish risk, no? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> We could, of course limit this to certain cookies - perhaps no >>>>>>>> "Sec-*" cookies or those without the "Secure" attribute or to those which >>>>>>>> have a domain implicitly (i.e. it wasn't included when the original >>>>>>>> Set-Cookie header was sent to create it.) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> To me, the benefits of allowing this subdomain functionality >>>>>>>> outweigh the drawbacks. But that's just me. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thu, Oct 31, 2024 at 9:38 AM רועי ברקאי < >>>>>>>> roybarkayyosef@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> A better mechanism for the clear-site-data would be >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> 1.delete only subdomains cookies that also hold that flag >>>>>>>>> (allow-parent domain-deletion=true) >>>>>>>>> 2.where the subdomain cookie has a list of domains allowed to >>>>>>>>> delete this cookie. >>>>>>>>> 3.a request should be sent to the subdomain web server to approve >>>>>>>>> that in which the approval logic would be on the subdomain server side. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The same 3 suggested solutions are also security architectures for >>>>>>>>> the feature you suggested (Yoav, Rory). >>>>>>>>> That way you may add a parent to subdomain deletion without the >>>>>>>>> risk of supply chain attack as that behavior is implemented by the >>>>>>>>> subdomain. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Thu, 31 Oct 2024 at 18:18, רועי ברקאי < >>>>>>>>> roybarkayyosef@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Dear Patrick, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You are correct that risk is also available in that sense as >>>>>>>>>> well. >>>>>>>>>> But two wrongs don't make a right. Do you believe this >>>>>>>>>> supply chain risk is irrelevent? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 31 Oct 2024 at 18:13, Patrick Meenan <patmeenan@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I agree in principle to subdomains-only, but wouldn't the risks >>>>>>>>>>> called-out also be a problem with clear-site-data which wipes out all >>>>>>>>>>> cookies (including parent and horizontally to peers)? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Oct 31, 2024 at 12:02 PM רועי ברקאי < >>>>>>>>>>> roybarkayyosef@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Rory please read my response. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I agree with Rorry on most of the solution. >>>>>>>>>>>> I believe an issue may be rissen when an authority example.com >>>>>>>>>>>> may delete a cookie for a.example.com may have supply chain >>>>>>>>>>>> attack vector possibilities therefore im against that solution. >>>>>>>>>>>> As a tennant of a domain (owner of a subdomain) I wouldnt want >>>>>>>>>>>> my landlord ie the domain the company I buy services from to delete the >>>>>>>>>>>> cookies of my users. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Take in mind that many subdomains that uses SAAS have their >>>>>>>>>>>> scripts run as well from the parent domain. therefore a supply chain/DOS >>>>>>>>>>>> attack may take place via removing access to users by deleting their >>>>>>>>>>>> cookies. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 31 Oct 2024 at 17:45, Rory Hewitt < >>>>>>>>>>>> rory.hewitt@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Since the "Delete-Cookie: abc, def" is a response header, then >>>>>>>>>>>>> if sent from a server at e.g. bob.example.com, I would expect >>>>>>>>>>>>> it to only delete the "abc" and "def" cookies in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> bob.example.com subdomain. Allowing even a higher iste (i.e. >>>>>>>>>>>>> clearing the "abc" and "def" cookies at the example.com root >>>>>>>>>>>>> domain seems very dangerous. In a federated world, we have things like " >>>>>>>>>>>>> customer1.saasprovider.com" who is completely unrelated to " >>>>>>>>>>>>> customer2.saasprovider.com", and I wouldn't want either of >>>>>>>>>>>>> them to to be able to delete cookies at the "saasprovider.com" >>>>>>>>>>>>> root domain, since they could have been placed there by either customer. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, allowing "Delete-Cookie: abc, def" sent from >>>>>>>>>>>>> bob.example.com to be able to delete those cookies from both >>>>>>>>>>>>> bob-example.com and all *.bob.example.com subdomains seems >>>>>>>>>>>>> more reasonable, IF one assumes that the bob.example.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> server in some way 'controls' its subdomains. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> In short, the only thing that should be able to delete cookies >>>>>>>>>>>>> from a domain is a Delete-Cookie header sent from that domain or a 'higher' >>>>>>>>>>>>> (closer to root) domain. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course, the header could be enhanced in a similar way to >>>>>>>>>>>>> HSTS: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "Delete-Cookie: abc, def;subDomains. ghi" >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> indicating that (if sent from bob.example.com), the following >>>>>>>>>>>>> cookies should be deleted: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> * "abc" if it has a Domain of bob.example.com domain >>>>>>>>>>>>> * "def" if it has a Domain of bob.example.com domain or any >>>>>>>>>>>>> subdomains of bob.example.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> * "ghi" if it has a Domain of bob.example.com domain >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> But that's getting into more complexity that maybe isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>> necessary. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Oct 31, 2024 at 4:55 AM Patrick Meenan < >>>>>>>>>>>>> patmeenan@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm assuming the scope would be similar to clear-site-data: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "cookies" where, at least in w3c land, it clears across all of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> subdomains in the "registered domain" ( >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.w3.org/TR/clear-site-data/#clear-cookies), just >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with the ability to target a specific name instead of nuking everything. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Should it be limited to the direct hierarchy or should it >>>>>>>>>>>>>> also impact same-level origins like clear-site-data does? i.e. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bob.example.com clears from bob.example.com and example.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> but should it be able to target deleting from >>>>>>>>>>>>>> alice.example.com? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Oct 31, 2024 at 6:57 AM Yoav Weiss < >>>>>>>>>>>>>> yoav.weiss@shopify.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Oct 31, 2024 at 11:49 AM רועי ברקאי < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> roybarkayyosef@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> As a first party coockie holder you may set an expiration >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> date on the coockie you have created. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sure, but since setting an expiration date requires >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicting the future, we need a way to correct past predictions that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> didn't quite work out. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Allowing cross site coockie deletion would enable issues >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for users as an attacker may remove all mostly used coockie names >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Can you expand on that? I wouldn't expect a server to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> able to delete cookies that it can't receive, if that makes sense. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Oct 31, 2024, 12:39 Yoav Weiss < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> yoav.weiss@shopify.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Oct 31, 2024 at 11:15 AM Daniel Stenberg < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> daniel@haxx.se> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 31 Oct 2024, Yoav Weiss wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > `Delete-Cookie: name1, name2` as an example syntax, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which seems simple >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > enough and can get the job done. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since cookies are hierchical, it should probably be noted >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that this list >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> identifying 'name1' and 'name2' can in fact match >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> numerous cookies (for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different paths), not just two and there is no way for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this syntax to delete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just a subset of them. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That's true. At the same time, the use case at hand is one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> where we want to delete cookies when we have no knowledge of their path. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So I believe it's fine to delete all matching cookies. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> +Colin Bendell <colin.bendell@shopify.com> to keep me >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> honest, as he's closer to this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> / daniel.haxx.se >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> Rory Hewitt >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://www.linkedin.com/in/roryhewitt >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Rory Hewitt >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> https://www.linkedin.com/in/roryhewitt >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>
Received on Sunday, 3 November 2024 10:16:55 UTC