- From: Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
- Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2018 11:28:49 -0400
- To: HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAHbrMsA8fOjGEpzy4gWMrjDBpMiwOZu+Qtk=fHmSRhbAszA+JQ@mail.gmail.com>
Hi HTTP, Section 5.1 of the Secondary Certificate Authentication draft [1] says: Clients MUST NOT consider previous secondary certificates to be validated after TLS session resumption. However, clients MAY proactively query for previously- presented secondary certificates. I think we should amend this to clarify the status of 0-RTT. Here's a proposed change. Clients MUST NOT consider previous secondary certificates to be validated after TLS session resumption. However, clients MAY treat previous secondary certificates as validated when sending TLS-1.3 0-RTT data, and MAY proactively query for previously- presented secondary certificates in the 0-RTT data or after session resumption. This is my attempt to clarify that 0-RTT data retains the security scope of the session that is being resumed, which is the union of the validated certificates for that session. --Ben [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-secondary-certs-02#section-5.1
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Received on Monday, 9 July 2018 15:29:25 UTC