RE: Origin-signed responses

We've written up some of it in the I-D draft-pardue-quic-http-mcast. Section 6 and appendix B are particularly relevant. 

We expect the checks to happen in the application code, running in or above a HTTP UA of some sort. E.g. an app that incorporates libcurl, or JavaScript application code executing in a browser.

Lucas
________________________________________
From: Jeffrey Yasskin [jyasskin@google.com]
Sent: 01 September 2017 18:18
To: Lucas Pardue
Cc: HTTP Working Group
Subject: Re: Origin-signed responses

On Fri, Sep 1, 2017 at 10:04 AM, Lucas Pardue <Lucas.Pardue@bbc.co.uk> wrote:
> Hi Jeffrey,
>
> I spotted this yesterday and found it an interesting read, so thanks for starting a discussion.
>
> Your draft references draft-cavage-http-signatures, which we have been using on a project to add some authenticity to HTTP/2 pushed content. I'm still processing your draft but can see how it might complement our approach or help satisfy the higher goal.
>

I'm glad to hear it. :) What kind of software winds up checking that
authenticity? How do you transmit the public key? Do you need to
revoke keys or prevent downgrade attacks? (I'd be happy to read a
document about this, if you have one, rather than making you retype it
on the mailing list.)

Thanks,
Jeffrey

Received on Friday, 1 September 2017 17:36:56 UTC