- From: Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>
- Date: Tue, 10 Feb 2015 19:02:32 -0500
- To: Erik Nygren <erik@nygren.org>
- Cc: HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAOdDvNqKp46JT7qCRfNQc6ZNrA_h6NMTPb1Aap7NcUYLdnLNrw@mail.gmail.com>
What about 421 for https scheme or any h1 on 443? On Feb 10, 2015 6:14 PM, "Erik Nygren" <erik@nygren.org> wrote: > The two motivations for OE are to 1) help HTTP/2 deployment for > HTTP-scheme sites by getting around meddlesome middle-boxes, while 2) also > providing a tiny bit of protection against pervasive monitoring. In both > cases, the closer the traffic is to HTTPS traffic (port 443) the more > likely it is to make it through and work without interference. Both argue > for using port 443 with a handshake where at least the ClientHello is > indistinguishable between a true HTTPS request and an OE HTTP request. > > The "cleanest" solution would just be to give OE for HTTP/2 its own ALPN > token such that it is explicitly negotiated where you only send that token > in your ClientHello. This would help for #1 but is not ideal for #2. On > the other hand, there are some many attack vectors for #2 that it seems > more worthwhile to make sure #1 works well while raising the bar a little > for #2 where possible. > > Erik > > > On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com> > wrote: > >> I might be under-thinking this one.... but it occurs to me its possible >> to not put the tls version of the site on 443 if there is no https:// >> version of the site.. oe doesn't require a particular port number and 443 >> seems like the wrong choice if https:// isn't available. too simplistic? >> >> On Thu, Feb 5, 2015 at 10:08 AM, Erik Nygren <erik@nygren.org> wrote: >> >>> While digging further into server-side implementation details of the >>> current opportunistic security draft, we identified a user experience >>> problem. In particular, for a site that has Virtual Hosts which are >>> HTTP-only (ie, there is no valid certificate for them), there is no way in >>> the current proposal to both support Opportunistic Security (negotiate h2 >>> for http scheme over TLS without a necessarily valid certificate) without >>> also giving users accidentally typing in https URIs a certificate mismatch >>> interstitial they'd be prompted to click through. >>> >> >> >> > >
Received on Wednesday, 11 February 2015 00:02:55 UTC