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Re: http2 opportunistic security negotiation

From: Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Feb 2015 19:02:32 -0500
Message-ID: <CAOdDvNqKp46JT7qCRfNQc6ZNrA_h6NMTPb1Aap7NcUYLdnLNrw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Erik Nygren <erik@nygren.org>
Cc: HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
What about 421 for https scheme or any h1 on 443?
On Feb 10, 2015 6:14 PM, "Erik Nygren" <erik@nygren.org> wrote:

> The two motivations for OE are to 1) help HTTP/2 deployment for
> HTTP-scheme sites by getting around meddlesome middle-boxes, while 2) also
> providing a tiny bit of protection against pervasive monitoring.  In both
> cases, the closer the traffic is to HTTPS traffic (port 443) the more
> likely it is to make it through and work without interference.  Both argue
> for using port 443 with a handshake where at least the ClientHello is
> indistinguishable between a true HTTPS request and an OE HTTP request.
>
> The "cleanest" solution would just be to give OE for HTTP/2 its own ALPN
> token such that it is explicitly negotiated where you only send that token
> in your ClientHello.  This would help for #1 but is not ideal for #2.  On
> the other hand, there are some many attack vectors for #2 that it seems
> more worthwhile to make sure #1 works well while raising the bar a little
> for #2 where possible.
>
>        Erik
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>
> wrote:
>
>> I might be under-thinking this one.... but it occurs to me its possible
>> to not put the tls version of the site on 443 if there is no https://
>> version of the site.. oe doesn't require a particular port number and 443
>> seems like the wrong choice if https:// isn't available. too simplistic?
>>
>> On Thu, Feb 5, 2015 at 10:08 AM, Erik Nygren <erik@nygren.org> wrote:
>>
>>> While digging further into server-side implementation details of the
>>> current opportunistic security draft, we identified a user experience
>>> problem.  In particular, for a site that has Virtual Hosts which are
>>> HTTP-only (ie, there is no valid certificate for them), there is no way in
>>> the current proposal to both support Opportunistic Security  (negotiate h2
>>> for http scheme over TLS without a necessarily valid certificate) without
>>> also giving users accidentally typing in https URIs a certificate mismatch
>>> interstitial they'd be prompted to click through.
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
Received on Wednesday, 11 February 2015 00:02:55 UTC

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