- From: Jason Greene <jason.greene@redhat.com>
- Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2014 10:06:30 -0600
- To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
- Cc: Roland Zink <roland@zinks.de>, Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>, ietf-http-wg@w3.org
> On Nov 17, 2014, at 11:52 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Nov 17, 2014 8:14 AM, "Jason Greene" <jason.greene@redhat.com> wrote: > > Even better would be to support anonymous ECDH. Why bother requiring all of these fake certs to be generated when they have no legit purpose. > > That at least is an easy one to answer. If your handshake looks different (and any anonymous mode will, unless you use TLS 1.3 and some aggressive padding), then you open an invitation to MitM. Have them look identical, and it gets harder to mount an undetectable attack. Not to mention avoiding code complexity. Thats pretty small advantage. Self signed certs are easily detected and decoded by anyone in a position to MITM. Anyway I thought the point was to replace plain text communication where possible, and that requires addressing the non-authenticated case, which this IAB statement even refrerences. -- Jason T. Greene WildFly Lead / JBoss EAP Platform Architect JBoss, a division of Red Hat
Received on Tuesday, 18 November 2014 16:07:09 UTC