- From: Greg Wilkins <gregw@intalio.com>
- Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2014 07:55:25 +1100
- To: HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Received on Monday, 6 October 2014 20:55:53 UTC
Nicholas, I was not implying that FF has done anything wrong and it is good to know that there is a configuration to turn off 9.2.2 checking. But my point remains. if 9.2.2 is configurable, then a server cannot know on what basis a cipher is offered - is it a h1 fallback cipher or a configured weak cipher. If the server guesses wrong communication failure results even though the pair might have protocol/cipher choices that are acceptable. The argument made when the fragile handshake was pointed out was that 9.2.2 could never ever be implemented differently and thus would not be subject to configuration. So when I point out that null ciphers/weak/unusual ciphers might have niche use-cases, it can't be argued that acceptable ciphers are indeed configurable. regards -- Greg Wilkins <gregw@intalio.com> http://eclipse.org/jetty HTTP, SPDY, Websocket server and client that scales http://www.webtide.com advice and support for jetty and cometd.
Received on Monday, 6 October 2014 20:55:53 UTC