Re: null ciphers in 9.2.2

On 01/10/14 01:10, Greg Wilkins wrote:
> I am not saying that these are not good restrictions to have on the
> majority use-case for h2.  

While I didn't memorise all of the mails commenting on this short
section of the draft, I do think I saw some claims that these were
"not good."

> I'm just saying that they are restrictions that
> are being developed elsewhere and we have no need to become the enforcer of
> them, nor do they generally apply to all our current and future possible
> use-cases.

Hmmm. If you have specific arguments against those choices then I
suggest you should raise those on the TLS WG list. Its pretty likely
that TLS code will sooner or later reflect what the TLS1.3 spec
mandates after all so if you don't like the meat of the selections
that's the place to make your case most effectively probably.

If you have an editorial problem then suggesting specification text
would seem better than feeling suppressed or being limited in
one's imagination. (Sorry, couldn't resist:-)

If you have a substantive suggestion for how to better couple or
decouple the two specifications, then again, suggesting text would
be the way I think. (And the proper (de)coupling of related specs
is an ongoing real problem that I doubt we'll solve in general
but that can often be improved upon in specific cases.)

S.

PS: Apologies if text was already suggested recently for this, I
really didn't have time to read the many thousands of lines of
mail on the couple of dozen lines of 9.2.2;-)

Received on Wednesday, 1 October 2014 00:22:50 UTC