- From: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>
- Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 05:40:46 +0000
- To: Roberto Peon <grmocg@gmail.com>
- cc: Adrien de Croy <adrien@qbik.com>, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, Phil Hunt <phil.hunt@oracle.com>, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
In message <CAP+FsNcaxeEhEpQCAteQUZGn03OXTv=MR8xz9nLZVDSU9nf8iA@mail.gmail.com> , Roberto Peon writes: >If the path contains: >/foo/RANDOM_NUMBER/bar > >and the query contains: >q=foo&user=SOME_SECRET_ID > >Then guessing: >/foo/RANDOM_NUMBER/bar?q=foo&user=SOME_SECRET_ID > >is far, far FAR more difficult than guessing: > q=foo&user=SOME_SECRET_ID >alone or > /foo/RANDOM_NUMBER/bar >alone. Only if you have an oracle to tell you that you got a hit. Could you outline exactly how this attack would work ? -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 phk@FreeBSD.ORG | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
Received on Tuesday, 22 July 2014 05:41:12 UTC