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Re: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nottingham-httpbis-alt-svc as a normative reference in http/2

From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2014 12:38:13 +1100
Cc: HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Message-Id: <F5E519A8-4089-43B9-8F26-32DACFA960C0@mnot.net>
To: "William Chan (陈智昌)" <willchan@chromium.org>

On 20 Mar 2014, at 12:05 pm, William Chan (陈智昌) <willchan@chromium.org> wrote:

>> We're going to propose that the alt-svc draft be a normative reference in HTTP/2 because the ALTSVC frame uses the concepts in there, not for any other reason. If you look at the -04 version of the alt-svc draft, you'll see that opportunistic / http://-over-TLS isn't mentioned, except for a very indirect one-sentence reference to the use case in the Introduction. Nor does it require implementation of or support for the Alt-Svc HTTP header field.
>> Given that, are you still concerned about the reference?
> This mitigates my concerns greatly. I eagerly await the next version of the draft so I can comment on it more definitively.

OK. Do you understand that the pull request on the altsvc branch (for the http2 spec itself) contains the documentation for http:// over TLS?


Regardless, I'm a bit confused by your pushback. You don't seem to mind that we document this as an option, but have great concerns about *where* it's documented. From the standpoint of our specs, the important thing is what is required (with RFC2119 language), not now many documents it's factored into (which I consider largely an editorial concern; if we start re-factoring documents as a means of political compromise, it leads to bad things). 

>> Not sure how Zurich comes into it; London is the most recent meeting where this was discussed.
> It's because of what I said before - I don't think it was actually discussed in any real detail in London. I very distinctly remember Pat saying we should discussing opportunistic encryption in the httpbis session and getting tabled. And I know several people who were confused about whether or not there was an appropriate time to raise opportunistic encryption as a topic of discussion.

I've asked a few people, and their recollection (and mine) is different from yours. The minutes also seem to support my interpretation. 

In any case, we're discussing it now.


Mark Nottingham   http://www.mnot.net/
Received on Thursday, 20 March 2014 01:38:37 UTC

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