Re: TLS renegotiation

As the bug points out, TLS renegotiation has trouble in HTTP/1.x.  Its just
not well thought through and is inherently racey, regardless of the
protocol which is running atop it. Unfortunately, I don't think there is
any good answer.  If the client starts chattering and doesn't give the
server a chance to reneg, its just going to break.  I suppose you could try
to force some client-side flow control blocker so that it can issue a
renegotiate, but when the renegotiate is done, you'll probably have to drop
all the in-flight streams.

On the good news side, almost nobody uses client auth or renegotiation.
 This is in part due to the fact that it just doesn't work well with any
protocol, HTTP/1 or otherwise.

Mike



On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 11:28 PM, Martin Thomson
<martin.thomson@gmail.com>wrote:

> Brian raises a fairly important set of points around negotiation:
>
> https://github.com/http2/http2-spec/issues/363
>
> I think that I can distill this down to two major concerns:
>
> 1. renegotiation causes problems with mapping server authentication to
> requests; false start means that this is true even with renegotiation
> immediately after connecting
>
> 2. client certificates are tricky because they often rely on
> renegotiation and they can interact with any coalescing feature we
> define
>
> Discuss.
>
>